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1. General Abstract
In several scientific disciplines human decision-making behavior has gained rapidly 
growing interest in the last decades. Neuropsychological research made remarkable effort to 
investigate the cognitive and emotional processes involved during decision making in 
different types of decision situations, for example under ambiguity and under risk conditions.
In decisions under risk conditions, explicit information about the rules for gains and losses is 
available to the decision maker (Brand, Labudda, & Markowitsch, 2006; Yates & Stone, 
1992). In the wide research field on this type of decisions, there are still theoretical and 
methodological gaps. Three outstanding gaps are addressed in this thesis. First, a 
neuropsychological model that theoretically describes the processes involved in these 
decisions was proposed by Brand and colleagues (2006) but still waits to be specified. 
Particularly, the model suggests executive functions as the main director of decision-making 
behavior, but it is not described in detail which subcomponents of the central executive 
system contribute in which way to decision making. Second, the model does not incorporate 
one of the main moderators of human behavior and cognitive performance: explicit outcome 
goals. Third, a methodological gap in decision-making research is to be found in the 
measurement of decision-making competences. For the measurement several laboratory 
gambling tasks are used. The variety of existing tasks as well the tasks’ architectures severely 
restrict the theoretical and practical conclusions that can be drawn from the results they 
provide. The main problems of the tasks are that they differ with regard to several attributes, 
are often inflexible for experimental manipulation, and that their ecological validities are 
restricted due to their gambling orientation. The first two studies of this thesis aimed to fill the 
gaps in the theoretical model. Study 1 investigated the role of different executive 
subcomponents in decision-making performance. It was found that particularly strategy 
managing functions, such as planning and monitoring, predicted performance, while situation 
processing functions, such as attention/inhibition and coding of information, supported the 
strategy managing operations. Study 2 investigated the effects of explicit goals on 
performance in a decision situation that provides increased strategic control. Realistic and 
attainable goals were found to have a positive effect, improving decision-making 
performance. In contrast, if the goals were unrealistic and too high, performance decreased. 
Study 3 evaluated an innovative methodological framework for measuring decision-making 
performance. The new framework allows designing several decision-making problems within 
one real-world oriented and unitary story line. The attributes of three standard decision-
making tasks were mapped to the new scenario and it was found that participants behaved
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similarly in the new scenario compared to the original tasks. This indicates that the new 
scenario measures decision-making performance accurately. The results of the three studies 
enhance the theoretical understanding of the neurocognitive processes involved in decision 
making under risk conditions and open new perspectives for the examination of decision-
making competence. A specified theoretical model is suggested, which incorporates the 
executive sub-processes directing the decision-making process, as well as the role of explicit 
goal setting and other situational conditions. These adaptions are supposed to help to better 
explain variances in decision-making competence as they can be found in healthy persons as 
well as patients with neurological or psychiatric diseases.
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2. General Introduction
Every day, humans have to make several decisions. Each decision can affect one or 
more aspects of the decision-maker’s life, the lives of other individuals, the success of a 
company, or several other entities that may be affected by the consequences of the decision.
For example, a business consultant may have an engagement in a business enterprise. The 
consultant is asked to attend managers’ strategy-meetings and to provide professional advice. 
One day the consultant is behind the day’s schedule, but needs to make sure to arrive with a 
minimum of delay at a meeting at the company’s place of business. The company will only 
pay for the time the consultant is present. Therefore, depending on the amount of delay, the 
company will reduce the salary for the consultation. The consultant plans to go by car and has 
to decide between two routes to the company: One is very short and the consultant would 
arrive on time if the route is free of traffic jams. Unfortunately, on four of five working days 
there is a heavy traffic jam on this route and if this was the case today the consultant would 
arrive late and lose almost his whole salary. The alternative route is a long detour around the 
first route, and the consultant would certainly be late, resulting in a moderate loss of his 
salary. On this route it is also possible to get into a traffic jam. However, the traffic jam along 
this route is usually rather short and occurs only about three times a week. Thus, getting into a 
traffic jam would result in some increase of the delay and thereby a loss of three thirds of his
salary. How will the consultant be able to make a decision that will probably lead to an 
advantageous outcome? This thesis investigates the cognitive abilities that are required to 
make an advantageous decision in this and comparable situations understood as decisions 
under risk conditions. This thesis also addresses possible situational influences on decision-
making behavior. The focus is set on the neurocognitive functions involved in the decision
and on the effect of explicit outcome goals as situational influence. Furthermore, it will be 
examined how the ability to make decisions advantageously can be measured in the 
laboratory.
Trying to understand human decision making is a topic that has gained rapidly 
growing interest in psychological science in the last two decades (i.e. from the 1990s to 
2013). The psychological subfields of general psychology, neuropsychology, economic 
psychology, and neuroeconomics have made remarkable efforts towards a better 
understanding of the complex processes involved in decision making as well as the situational 
conditions influencing these processes and the resulting decisions (e.g., Bechara, 2011a; 
Brand et al., 2006; Ernst & Paulus, 2005; Kahneman, 2003; Loewenstein, Rick, & Cohen, 
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2008). Theoretically describing these processes and influences has not only relevance for 
decision-making researchers, but it is also important for practical reasons (e.g., Denburg et al., 
2007). A precise description of the effects of situational influences and cognitive mechanisms 
on the quality of a decision could help humans to improve their decisions in several contexts 
of their lives (ranging from personal life to health problems or economic issues) (e.g., 
Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994; Bettman, Luce, & Payne, 1998; Zamarian, 
Benke, Buchler, Wenter, & Delazer, 2010). Additionally, describing the basic neurocognitive 
mechanisms of decision making can uncover working points for therapy and training of 
patients with psychological disorders and neurological diseases that cause impairments in 
making advantageous decisions (e.g., Gleichgerrcht et al., 2010).
Often, like in the scenario of the consultant, decisions are made under conditions of 
risk. In this type of decision situation there is explicit information about the contingencies of 
the decision task available (Yates & Stone, 1992). The core information is the number of 
decision options, the possible consequences following them, and the probabilities of the 
occurrence of these potential consequences. One model of decision making under risk that has 
recently attracted attention was proposed by Brand, Labudda, and Markowitsch (2006). It 
describes particularly the neuropsychological mechanisms that are supposed to be involved in 
this type of decision situations. It is suggested that the decider can use the given information 
for the development of calculative long-term decision-making strategies (Brand et al., 2006). 
Thus, it is assumed that cognitive abilities determine the decision-making performance
systematically. However, the model remains unspecific in particular details, namely
concerning the neurocognitive processes underlying decision making as well as concerning 
the role of situational conditions potentially influencing decision-making performance. 
Therefore, the central aim of this thesis is to approach a specified version of the model of 
decision making under risk conditions.
Another topic of this thesis is the measurement of decision-making competences. In 
neuropsychological research decision making is assessed with several different laboratory 
tasks. These are used to measure decision making in healthy individuals and patients with 
neurological or psychiatric disorders. In these tasks, the participants play in casino-like 
gambling scenarios (e.g., Bechara et al., 1994; Rogers et al., 1999; Sinz, Zamarian, Benke, 
Wenning, & Delazer, 2008; Zamarian, Sinz, Bonatti, Gamboz, & Delazer, 2008) but so far it 
has been neglected to assess decision-making performances of healthy persons or patient 
samples using real-world oriented decision-making problems. Therefore, a further aim of this 
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thesis is to test a new more real-world oriented measure of decision-making performance that 
could be applied in research and potentially in clinical practice. Moreover, it is supposed to be 
usable for experimental investigations that aim towards further theoretical progress.
This thesis consists of a theoretical background section (chapters 3 and 4), the reports 
of three studies (chapters 5, 6, and 7), and a general conclusion section (chapters 8 and 9). In 
the theoretical background section, the current state in the field of neuropsychological 
decision-making research, involving relevant theories and studies, is outlined on a general 
level. In the first part, the literature on emotional and cognitive processes in decision making
is summarized. Thereafter, important theories on executive functions are outlined. These 
theories are the basis for the specifications in the decision-making model, which are mainly 
attained in this thesis. Subsequently, an overview over theory and research on goal setting and 
goal striving is provided in order to explain how and why goals may be involved in decision-
making performance. In the last part of the theoretical background frequently used methods 
for the assessment of decision-making competences are compared. Additional to this general 
theoretical background, the report of each study also begins with a theoretical introduction 
(chapters 5.2, 6.2, and 7.2). In this, the specific core elements of the hypotheses for the 
particular study are explained. It has to be noted that the research reports are supposed to be 
readable as independent papers, that is without having read the theoretical background 
section. Therefore, and in order to make the specific hypotheses of each study 
comprehensible, some information which has already been explained in detail in the general 
theoretical background, is again pointed out in the introductions. Moreover, each research 
report also ends with a specific discussion of the results. After the description of the three 
studies, a general discussion on the new results of the three studies follows. In this section a
revised version of the model of decision making under risk is proposed. Furthermore,
conclusions for the assessment of decision-making abilities in future research and in clinical 
application are drawn.
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3. Theoretical background
3.1. Decision making
Decision making is regarded as a complex process that can imply a number of
cognitive and emotional mechanisms and can be influenced by the features of the decision 
task and by external conditions, in which the tasks are performed (Finucane & Lees, 2005). 
There are several theoretical approaches, which try to describe how decisions under different 
conditions are made and which abilities can determine how accurate (or how “good” or 
“advantageous”) a person can make his/her decisions (e.g., Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & 
Damasio, 1997; Brand et al., 2006; Ernst & Paulus, 2005; Finucane & Lees, 2005; Friedman 
& Savage, 1948; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993). However, 
before explaining any theoretical view on how decisions are made, the different types of 
decision situations should be taken into consideration.
It is widely accepted that decision situations can be classified into decisions under 
certainty and decisions under uncertainty (Yates & Stone, 1992). In decisions under certainty 
the decider is informed about the consequences that will follow from the available decision 
options and there is certainty that these consequences will occur. In decisions under 
uncertainty, the potential consequences are not clear. One decision option can lead to different 
consequences. Based on how explicitly the decider is informed about the rules with which 
different consequences will occur, decisions under uncertainty are divided into two further 
subtypes. Decisions under ambiguous risk (following the convention from now on called
“ambiguity”) and decisions under objective risk (from now on called “risk”) (Bechara et al., 
1994; Brand et al., 2006; A. R. Damasio, 1994; Edwards, 1954; F. H. Knight, 1921). In 
decisions under ambiguity the decision maker is not explicitly informed about the rules for 
gains and losses. Thus, the decision maker can neither exactly predict which consequence will 
occur nor with which probability it will occur. Therefore, the decision maker has to rely on 
“hunches” and “guesses” toward the choice of an alternative, and has to learn from the 
feedback about positive and negative consequences associated with the alternatives in order to 
learn to decide for the more advantageous options (Bechara, 2011; Damasio, 1994). In the 
other subtype of uncertainty, decisions under risk conditions, the decision situation provides 
explicit information about the rules for gains and losses. This information involves the 
possible consequences of choices for the different alternatives and the probabilities with 
which the possible consequences will occur (Brand et al., 2006; L. G. Epstein & Wang, 1994).
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Theory and research has mainly focused on decision making in the two subtypes of 
uncertainty. Making advantageous decisions under ambiguity or under risk requires the 
functioning of a number of cognitive and emotional processes. However, decision making in 
the two types relies to different amounts on these processes as has been suggested 
theoretically (see e.g., Bechara et al., 1997; Brand et al., 2006; Schiebener, Staschkiewicz, & 
Brand, in press) and demonstrated empirically (Brand, Recknor, Grabenhorst, & Bechara, 
2007; Schiebener, Zamarian, Delazer, & Brand, 2011). In the following, three theoretical 
approaches on decision making will be introduced. The first one is Finucane’s Person Task Fit 
framework of decision making competence (Finucane & Lees, 2005; Finucane, Mertz, Slovic, 
& Schmidt, 2005) that provides a holistic view on the possible components of decision-
making competence. The second view is the somatic marker hypothesis together with a model 
of decision making under ambiguity, both aiming to explain how decisions under ambiguity 
are biased by emotional learning mechanisms (Bechara & Damasio, 2005; Bechara et al., 
1997; A. R. Damasio, 1994). The third concept is Brand’s model of decision making under 
risk conditions (Brand et al., 2006), which will be the central topic in this thesis because it 
focusses on the neurocognitive processes that are involved in decision making under risk.
3.1.1. The Person Task Fit framework
Finucane’s Person Task Fit framework (PTF; Finucane & Lees, 2005; Finucane et al., 
2005) aims at describing the elements that can build up the competence to make advantageous
decisions in different situations and describes the possible external and internal (i.e., inherent 
in the person) influences on this competence. Finucane suggests that a person’s competence to 
make favorable decisions consist of five elements that are explained in the following. The first 
element is the ability to structure the decision problem by recognizing and then categorizing 
the available decision options according to the subjective evaluation of possible consequences 
and the probabilities for these consequences (Frisch & Clemen, 1994). The second element is 
the comprehension of the available information about the decision situation. Before 
information can be used accurately in any cognitive process, it is necessary that it is 
understood correctly. For example, information about the probability of a consequence can 
only be used competently by a person who understands what the meaning of a probability is
(Radvansky, 1999; Zamarian, Benke, et al., 2010). The third element is information 
integration. This is the ability to combine the relevant information and make rational use of it. 
The most important task of information-integration processes is the selection of a decision-
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making strategy, which is advantageous in the specific situation. Humans are normally 
equipped with a number of strategies from which they can chose adaptively depending on the 
attributes of the decision situation (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1988). For example, in very 
complex situations of high relevance, it is often advantageous to apply a compensatory 
strategy. In this strategy, high cognitive effort is invested to compare all options including all 
their attributes with the aim to come to the best possible decision (Frisch & Clemen, 1994). In 
routine decisions it is often advantageous to save cognitive effort and use a non-compensatory
strategy, for example by deciding on one simple criterion (e.g., for the alternative that is best 
in the most important attribute), instead of comparing all alternatives and attributes (S. 
Epstein, 2003; Payne et al., 1988, 1993). As fourth element of decision-making competence 
insight has been introduced. This is supposed to be the most complex element of decision-
making competence. It is understood as the ability to recognize the relevance of information 
and its usefulness for the personal decision problem. This implies that an appropriate value is 
assigned to the information, that the own competence to make the decision is accurately 
estimated, that information is correctly connected to possible consequences, and that the 
personal impact of these consequences is adequately judged emotionally and cognitively
(Appelbaum & Grisso, 2001; Dymek, Atchison, Harrell, & Marson, 2000; Harvey & Fischer, 
1997; Sieck & Arkes, 2005). For example, to maintain a good financial status it is necessary 
to adequately appreciate the value of any earning that one puts at risk. Additionally, the 
probabilities of losing or receiving any earnings need to be connected to the broader 
consequences (which it can have for the general financial situation). Finally, it needs to be 
recognized when to leave the decision to an expert (e.g., one’s financial consultant). Beyond
the four core elements of decision-making competence Finucane added a preliminary fifth 
element as a suggestion to the model: affective fluency. This accounts for the idea that 
emotional values and responses may also be involved in competent decision making (see also 
the next chapter about emotions in decision making, i.e. chapter 3.1.2).
The five elements of decision-making competence - decision structuring, 
comprehension, integration, insight, and affective fluency - are supposed to be affected by 
three factors. One is inherent in the person, the other two are allocated in the environment 
(Finucane & Lees, 2005; Finucane et al., 2005). Inherent influences on the ability to make 
highly competent decisions are decision-maker characteristics. Among these several abilities 
are mentioned, such as intelligence, memory, literacy, affective skills, or experience. The first 
category of environmental influences is called task characteristics. These are for example the 
decision situation’s complexity, the amount to which it is well or ill structured, or the extent 
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of affective engagement it elicits in the individual. The second environmental factor involves 
context characteristics, such as socio-cultural values, time pressure, and decision support. A 
visualization of the PTF can be found in Figure 1.
Figure 1. The PTF (Finucane & Lees, 2005; Finucane et al., 2005) involving three factors that are supposed to 
be the predictors of decision-making competence.
Finucane and colleagues (2005) suggest that “competent decision making occurs when 
an individual’s cognitive abilities and other characteristics adequately match the demands of 
the decision task or context.” (p.8). In other words, the fit between the characteristics of the 
decision situation and the characteristics of the decision maker determines the decision-
making competence.
As can be seen, the framework provides a comparably broad view on the factors that 
may be important for making good decisions. Despite the broad focus, it also implies ideas 
regarding some specific and relatively basic cognitive and emotional functions that could be 
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crucial for making good decisions. As outlined by Finucane and colleagues (2005) the PTF 
takes into consideration that there may be two basic systems of processing that can lead to 
decisions: an emotional (“intuitive”) System 1 and a cognitive (“deliberative”) System 2. 
These two systems have originally been suggested in several dual-process theories (J. S. B. T. 
Evans, 2003, 2008; Kahneman, 2003). The emotional System 1 works fast, parallel, 
automatically, and effortlessly, while its functioning is based on emotional signals. The 
cognitive System 2 works slowly, serially, controlled, and arduously, and is emotionally 
neutral. The emotional and the cognitive system may be differentially involved in the 
decision. There may be decisions, which are made quickly without cognitive effort, merely 
based on a gut feeling or intuition (System 1). In contrast, there may also be decisions, which 
are made after intense cognitive processes, such as comparisons of pros and cons or doing 
mathematical calculations (System 2). In line with the dual process theories some basic 
cognitive functions as well as emotional functions are mentioned as predictors of decision-
making competence in the PTF. As basic cognitive domains memory, speed of processing, 
literacy, and numeracy are listed. Connected to emotional processing, affective skills, and 
additionally affective fluency are suggested.
In summary, the PTF has a relatively general focus on the several possible predictors 
of decision-making competence. Thereby, it can be regarded as an important advance in the 
theory on decision making. So far, studies and theoretical views in the field of general 
psychology have rather tried to describe decision making behavior as a product of relatively 
narrowly defined situational circumstances (e.g., as a product of the way probability 
information are “framed”; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Theoretical and empirical work in 
the field of neuropsychology rather have concentrated on individual differences in decision 
making in order to understand the abilities, processes and mechanisms potentially predicting 
decision-making behavior (Bechara & Damasio, 2005; Bechara et al., 1997; Brand et al., 
2006) (see also 3.1.2, 3.1.3). The PTF tries to take theories and findings about the role of 
situational conditions as well as a person’s individual characteristics into account in order to 
provide a general view on the external and internal factors, which affect decision-making 
competence. Furthermore, the PTF not only regards internal and external factors separately 
but regards them as interacting forces. In the empirical literature, particularly the potential 
interactions between situational variations and individual differences in person characteristics 
have only seldom been addressed so far, as has recently been pointed out by Appelt and 
colleagues (Appelt, Milch, Handgraaf, & Weber, 2011).
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While the general or “global” focus of the PTF is one of its strengths this generality 
may be regarded as imprecise in some parts. For example, on the level of the person 
characteristics no model of neurocognitive processing is explicitly taken into account. Thus, 
the framework makes no assumption regarding the neurocognitive predictors of decision-
making competence. Moreover, there is no evaluation of the importance of the mentioned
individual abilities and whether there are cognitive or emotional functions, which are more 
systematically involved in decision making than other functions. Some functions may be more 
systematically involved because they are responsible for directing several cognitive and 
behavioral sub-processes leading to competent choice behavior. For example, the roles of 
working memory or executive functions are not defined in the model. 
On the level of external characteristics (i.e., task characteristics and context 
characteristics) it is comprehensible that not all factors that may possibly affect decision-
making competence are mentioned in the PTF. However, when aiming at describing the 
factors that should be crucial in real-life decision making, some further factors may be 
mentioned. Examples of such important factors are acute or chronic stress or the presence of 
explicit performance goals. The reason that these factors have been neglected in the 
formulation of the PTF may be that the evidence on the topic has been partly ambiguous (such 
as in the case of stress effects on decision making; for a recent overview see Starcke & Brand, 
2012) or very rare (such as in the case of explicit goals Locke & Latham, 2002). Concerning 
the effects of stress on decision making, there has been remarkable scientific progress in the 
last years, but for understanding the role of explicit performance goals for decision making 
methodologically sound studies are still rare (see also chapter 3.3 and the Introduction of 
Study 2, chapter 6.2).
Overall, the PTF can be regarded as an important advance in the theory on decision 
making. In order to become a useful and structured framework it would need to take into 
account more systematically the internal emotional and cognitive mechanisms predicting 
decision-making performance as well as the role of several external factors which very 
frequently accompany real-life decision making.
This thesis concentrates on internal mechanisms in decision making as well as 
influences by external factors. The following part summarizes the current neuropsychological 
view on the emotional bases of advantageous decision making. The focus lies on decisions 
under ambiguity, in which emotional mechanisms have been suggested to be deeply involved 
in advantageous decision making (e.g., Bechara et al., 1997; Naqvi, Shiv, & Bechara, 2006).
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3.1.2. Somatic markers: Emotions and decisions under ambiguity
When thinking about how to make advantageous decisions, for some it appears logical 
to assume that applying objective and fully rational reasoning is the best opportunity. Early 
theories suggested that humans calculate utilities of the given alternatives. In this calculation 
numerically coded evaluations of all possible outcomes were thought to be multiplied with the 
probability of their occurrence and the alternative with the highest resulting utility-value 
would be chosen (Arrow, 1971; M. Friedman & Savage, 1948; Keeney & Raiffa, 1993). 
Nevertheless, there are theoretical approaches and several studies, which have highlighted the 
role of automatic, emotional mechanisms for decision making, especially in decisions under 
ambiguity. 
Recognizing the role of emotions for decision making was a result of a series of 
investigations of patients with relatively selective damages to specific brain areas. One of the 
most famous patients was Phineas Gage (Harlow, 1848, 1993). In the 19th century, he worked 
for a railway company in the United States of America. His acquaintances and friends 
respected him for his pleasantness, his reliability, and his sense of responsibility. One day at 
work a fatal accident happened. At a blasting operation an iron bar that was accelerated by the 
pressure of the explosion hit Gage. The bar pierced through his head. Surprisingly, Gage not 
only survived this accident. Although the bar had severely damaged parts of Gage’s brain, he 
recovered in hospital. He was still fully capable of speaking, thinking logically, and creating
memories. However, his fellow men noticed severe changes in his personality. He lost his 
reliability, had difficulties in regulating his behaviors and moods, and was unable to follow 
advice if this was not in accordance with his currently perceived needs. For Gage’s fellow 
men and doctors it was difficult to understand how it was possible that a man who seemed to 
have fully intact cognitive functioning, could nevertheless develop suchlike dramatic changes 
in making decisions for his own behavior and for how to deal with other people. Later, it was 
recognized what the reason for Gage’s change had been. The iron bar had damaged one 
particular region in his brain, the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Bechara, 2011b; H. 
Damasio, Grabowski, Frank, Galaburda, & Damasio, 1994; Harlow, 1848, 1993). This 
damage caused his pathology that was later called the frontal lobe syndrome (see e.g., 
Bechara, 2011a, 2011b; Milner & Petrides, 1984; Milner, 1963). This was also observed in 
several other patients and was further investigated in the 20th century (e.g., in the famous 
patient known as E.V.R.; Eslinger & Damasio, 1985). It was recognized that the syndrome 
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was caused by damages to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and the orbitofrontal cortex and 
that it was closely related to problems the patients had with anticipating the consequences of 
their actions and also to problems in recognizing and describing their emotions (e.g., Eslinger 
& Damasio, 1985; Stuss, Gow, & Hetherington, 1992).
A theoretical approach that was developed as an explanation for the problems of 
patients with the frontal lobe syndrome is the “somatic marker hypothesis” (Bechara & 
Damasio, 2005; A. R. Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1991; A. R. Damasio, 1994). The 
hypothesis suggests that in decisions in ambiguous situations the decider can automatically 
learn to prefer the advantageous alternatives, by integrating his/her bodily emotional reaction 
to the expected feedback after the choice. In decisions under ambiguity the choices are made 
without explicit knowledge about the options attributes. Therefore, the decision has to be
made randomly at the beginning of the task. After each choice there may be feedback about 
the consequences. This feedback, which is often rewarding or punishing, elicits an emotional 
reaction of the body (e.g., changes in heart rate, visceral modifications, or small muscle 
contractions). This reaction is then implicitly linked to the chosen alternative: A somatic 
marker is created. When the decision maker thinks about choosing this alternative again, the 
brain and body automatically react with a repetition of the experienced emotion. This can bias 
the decision to another alternative, if the feedback was punishing or it can bias the decision 
towards repeating the choice if the feedback was rewarding. There are two ways of 
anticipation: The so called body-loop and the as-if-body-loop. On the body loop the emotional 
anticipation is actually implemented in the body periphery. This bodily reaction can then be 
processed in the associated brain regions. In contrast, within the as-if-body-loop, the brain 
merely simulates the processing of the emotional reaction within the brain regions, without 
really enacting the reaction in the body periphery (Bechara & Damasio, 2005; A. R. Damasio, 
1994).
In this process of emotional learning and reward anticipation, specific brain functions 
are supposed to be involved (e.g., Bechara & Damasio, 2005). The amygdala quickly triggers 
the bodily reaction, which is passed to the body by the brain stem nuclei. The sensory cortex 
processes the information about reward and punishment, particularly the elicited bodily 
reaction. The most important role in the creation of a somatic marker plays the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex. In this region the somatic marker is set on the chosen alternative by linking 
the emotional reaction that has been triggered by the consequence of the decision to the 
chosen alternative. In this process also the dorsolateral region of the prefrontal cortex is 
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supposed to be involved, being responsible for storing representations of behaviors.
Additionally, the sensory system including the insular cortex, the striatum, and the ventral 
tegmental area are important for processing the bodily emotional anticipations of 
consequences. These are the so called hunches and guesses that can bias the next decisions. 
(For further details on the somatic marker hypotheses and neural processes supposed to be 
involved, please refer to Bechara & Damasio, 2005; Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Lee, 
1999; Carter & Pasqualini, 2004; Gupta, Koscik, Bechara, & Tranel, 2010; Schiebener, 
Staschkiewicz, et al., in press; Shiv, Loewenstein, & Bechara, 2005; Verdejo-García, Pérez-
García, & Bechara, 2006).
In order to investigate the role of emotions in decision making the Iowa Gambling 
Task (IGT) has been developed (Bechara, 2007; Bechara et al., 1994; Bechara, Tranel, & 
Damasio, 2000) and has become one of the most popular decision-making tasks for assessing 
decisions under ambiguity. In the IGT participants are not informed about the rules for gains 
and losses, including their amounts and their probability of occurrence. Participants have to 
choose 100 times between four decks of cards, and after each decision they receive feedback 
about their fictitious monetary gain. Sometimes additional to the gain they lose money. Gains 
and losses seem to occur arbitrarily, making it almost impossible for the decision maker to 
identify the exact probabilities for the occurrence. However, there are two advantageous 
decks. These offer frequent low gains and frequent slightly lower losses. Thus, continually
choosing the advantageous decks leads to a positive final money capital. The other two decks 
are disadvantageous: They offer high gains, but sometimes very high losses. These losses are 
much higher than the accumulated gains. Therefore, choosing the disadvantageous decks 
frequently leads to a negative final money capital.
Several studies have been conducted using the IGT. These have often found support to
the somatic marker hypothesis. Frequently, patients were examined, who had relatively 
restricted brain damages in those areas that were supposed to take a specific role in processing 
emotions as well as in the creation of somatic markers. There were patients with damage to 
the ventromedial prefrontal cortex or the amygdala, who sometimes showed intact cognitive 
functions, but failed to make advantageous decisions in the IGT (Bechara et al., 1994, 1997; 
Bechara, Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1996; Brand, Grabenhorst, Starcke, Vandekerckhove, 
& Markowitsch, 2007). Moreover, in studies including patients and healthy participants 
impaired decision making has been found to be accompanied by reduced physiological 
reactions to feedback, as shown by skin conductance response measuring (Bechara et al., 
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1997; Carter & Pasqualini, 2004; Crone, Somsen, van Beek, & van der Molen, 2004; Suzuki, 
Hirota, Takasawa, & Shigemasu, 2003). Moreover, the IGT has been administered to several 
patients with psychiatric disorders, such as depression or borderline syndrome, who often 
showed abnormal decision-making performance because of their pathological emotional 
instability (Haaland, Landrø, Kano, Ito, & Fukudo, 2007; Must et al., 2006; Smoski et al., 
2008). In order to provide an overview of research on emotional processes in the IGT, 
exemplary studies are listed in Table 1. These studies have investigated the role of emotional 
processing for decision making in the IGT in patients with brain damages, neurological 
diseases, and psychiatric disorders. Please note that the table has no claim of being complete. 
The studies listed are selected because they are exemplary for the field of research and/or the 
type of patient group. A similar overview can be found in Dunn, Dalgleish, & Lawrence, 
(2006).
Table 1. Summary of exemplary studies investigating the role of emotions in patients with brain damages, 
neurological diseases, and psychiatric disorders.
Patient group Deficit/impair-
ment in the IGT?
Role of emotion/other 
interpretations
Author
Brain damage/lesions
frontal lobe regions yes theoretically argued role of 
emotions/somatic markers
Bechara et al., 1994
frontal lobe regions yes reduced SCRs in anticipation of 
emotional rewards and 
punishments
Bechara et al., 1996
ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex 
yes reduced anticipatory SCRs, 
impaired decision making 
despite explicit knowledge 
about disadvantageous decks
Bechara et al., 1997
right vs. left 
ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex
right: yes
left: no/marginally
right: processes emotional 
reaction to punishment
left: processes emotional 
reaction to reward
Tranel, Bechara, & 
Denburg, 2002
orbitofrontal vs. 
dorsolateral vs. 
dorsomedial vs. large 
frontal cortex lesions
orbitofrontal: no
dorsolateral: yes
dorsomedial: yes
large frontal: yes
impairments observed together 
with working memory and 
executive function deficits, 
orbitofrontal: intact decision 
making despite executive 
deficits
Manes et al., 2002
ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex vs. dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex
ventromedial: yes
dorsolateral: yes
ventromedial: problems with 
reversal reinforcement learning
dorsolateral: independent of 
reversal learning
Fellows & Farah, 2005
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amygdala yes impairments related to reduced 
anticipatory SCRs, inability to 
create bodily emotional 
reactions to reward and 
punishment
Bechara et al., 1999; 
Brand, Grabenhorst, et 
al., 2007
Neurological diseases
multiple sclerosis yes impairments related to reduced 
anticipatory SCRs, but not to 
executive dysfunctions
Kleeberg et al., 2004; 
Nagy et al., 2006
Parkinson’s disease mixed results impairments, probably
dependent on medication, 
impulsivity, and state of 
dementia
Delazer et al., 2009; 
Euteneuer et al., 2009; 
Poletti et al., 2012; 
Poletti, Cavedini, & 
Bonuccelli, 2011; and 
several more. See 
overview in
Gleichgerrcht, Ibánez, 
Roca, Torralva, & 
Manes, 2010
Alzheimer’s disease yes impairments are suggested to 
result from emotional learning
and working memory deficits as 
result of broad prefrontal cortex 
dysfunctions
Sinz et al., 2008
Huntington’s disease yes decreased SCRs, decreased 
memory functions
Busemeyer & Stout,
2002; Campbell, Stout, 
& Finn, 2004
epilepsy yes independent of abnormalities in 
major emotion processing 
structures, problems with 
feedback learning
Bonatti et al., 2009; 
Delazer et al., 2011; 
Labudda et al., 2009
Psychiatric disorders
depression contradictory 
results
impaired: changes in emotional, 
especially reward processing
unimpaired: risk avoidance, 
reduced interest in high gains of 
disadvantageous alternatives
Must et al., 2006; 
Smoski et al., 2008
borderline personality 
disorder
yes emotional instability, deficits 
unrelated to cognitive abilities
Haaland et al., 2007
attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder
adults: no
adolescents: yes
impairments related to 
impulsivity/hyperactivity
symptoms
Ernst et al., 2003; 
Toplak, Jain, & 
Tannock, 2005
schizophrenia yes deficits in reversal learning, and 
consciousness about own 
emotion
C. E. Y. Evans, 
Bowman, & Turnbull, 
2005; Ritter, Meador-
Woodruff, & Dalack, 
2004; Shurman, Horan, 
& Nuechterlein, 2005
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psychopathy yes impairments related to anxiety Schmitt, Brinkley, & 
Newman, 1999; van 
Honk et al., 2002
Miscellaneous diseases/disorders
substance addiction
(heroin, alcohol, 
marijuana)
yes slow learning, reduced 
anticipatory SCRs, unrelated to 
executive function deficits, 
insensitivity to long-term
consequences, impairments 
related to brain shrinkage in 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex, 
dorsal anterior cingulate cortex 
and right hippocampal 
formation
Bechara, 2005; Clark & 
Robbins, 2002; Le Berre 
et al., 2012; Verdejo-
García & Pérez-García, 
2007; Whitlow et al., 
2004
pathological gambling yes increasing preference for 
disadvantageous decks, seeking 
risk/high reward, deficits in 
feedback processing
Cavedini, Riboldi, 
Keller, D´Annucci, & 
Bellodi, 2002; 
Goudriaan, Oosterlaan, 
Beurs, & van den Brink, 
2005
HIV with substance 
dependence
yes inverse relation with sensation 
seeking and risky sexual 
practices, deficits unrelated with
procedural learning abilities
Gonzalez, Wardle, 
Jacobus, Vassileva, & 
Martin-Thormeyer, 
2010; Martin et al., 2004
chronic pain yes performance correlated with 
pain experience parallel to IGT 
administration
Apkarian et al., 2004
Narcolepsy-cataplexy yes seeking for high rewards, 
because of reduced emotional 
valence experience, 
impairments unrelated to 
executive functions
Bayard et al., 2011; 
Delazer, Högl, et al., 
2011
These patient studies often underlined the role of emotion for decision making in the 
IGT. Nevertheless, an often discussed question is whether decision-making performance and 
the learning effects in the task are due to the creation of explicit knowledge about the hidden 
contingencies rather than to the emotional anticipation of consequences. The results of two 
studies remarkably underlined the importance of intact emotion processing for advantageous 
decision making in the IGT. In the first study, it has been found that patients with prefrontal 
cortex damages made disadvantageous decisions although they had already created conscious 
and correct knowledge about which IGT-decks were advantageous and which were 
disadvantageous (Bechara et al., 1997). Furthermore, brain-healthy participants were also 
observed with the IGT and they have begun to decide advantageously, even before explicit 
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knowledge had been developed (Bechara et al., 1997). The second study demonstrated that 
even if the cognitive system (especially executive functioning) was interfered in processing 
the situation’s information, intuitive hunches and guesses helped to make advantageous 
decisions (Turnbull, Evans, Bunce, Carzolio, & O’connor, 2005). Thus, one might be inclined 
to conclude that advantageous decision making in the IGT does not require cognitive 
processing.
Nevertheless, the independence from explicit cognition in IGT decision making has 
been questioned by critics of the task and the somatic marker hypothesis. As can be judged 
from the results in some patient populations with cognitive deficits (e.g., Alzheimer’s disease 
and epilepsy patients) impairments in the IGT do not seem to be distinctly connected to 
impairments in emotional processing but also to executive functions or working memory. 
There are also studies, which investigated whether the role of emotional processing may have 
been overestimated and the role of cognition underestimated (for overviews refer to Buelow 
& Suhr, 2009; Dunn, Dalgleish, & Lawrence, 2006). Maia and McCelland (2004) found that 
participants report explicit knowledge in the IGT earlier, when they were asked for it very 
explicitly. In this study no evidence was reported for the assumption that emotional guidance 
by somatic markers precedes the development of explicit knowledge.
The connected question for the impact of basic cognitive functions on making good 
decisions under ambiguity was addressed in a model of decision making under ambiguity and 
in a number of studies. The model of decision making under ambiguity (Bechara et al., 1997)
supposes that somatic markers can bias the decision essentially, but they should furthermore
support cognitive reasoning strategies, also involved in the decision-making process.
Reasoning strategies are suggested to process on the information about the decision situation 
(such as the number of available options) and the information about the experiences with the 
decision situation (such as previous gains and losses that have followed from choosing the 
different alternatives). The model of decision making under ambiguity is depicted in Figure 2.
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Figure 2. The model of decision making under ambiguity modified from Bechara et al. (1997). 
It assumes that feedback about consequences is processed emotionally and that somatic markers guide 
subsequent decisions directly or by supporting reasoning strategies.
The model assumes that in decisions under ambiguity factual information about the 
decision situation is included in the development of reasoning strategies. Somatic markers and 
emotional processing are described to be elicited by feedback about outcomes and to directly 
bias the decisions or at least to support the reasoning strategies. 
Therefore, neurocognitive functions could also be involved in decision under 
ambiguity beside a person’s emotion. Especially working memory could be required because 
in this memory system representations about the situation and experiences might be kept 
available for active integration in cognitive processes. In the IGT, this can be the memory 
about which cards had been chosen and what the consequences were. Bechara, Damasio, 
Tranel, and Anderson (1998) investigated patients with lesions in brain areas closely involved 
in working memory functions (regions in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) and/or related to 
decision-making under ambiguity (regions in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex). It has been 
reported that decision making in the IGT was impaired especially in those patients, who had 
lesions in both areas. However, the results have also shown that decision-making performance 
was almost normal in patients who had lesions only in working memory regions but not in 
decision-making regions. The authors interpreted this finding as an indicator for an 
asymmetric relationship between decision-making under ambiguity and working memory. 
Working memory can be intact together with intact or impaired decision making, but intact 
decision making requires intact working memory functions (see also Bechara & Martin, 
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2004). However, there are several studies that suggested decision making in the IGT to be 
independent of working memory or executive functions. In the following Table (Table 2), 
exemplary studies that examined the role of general cognitive abilities, working memory, and 
executive functions in the IGT are summarized (for a similar overview please refer also to 
Toplak, Sorge, Benoit, West, & Stanovich, 2010). 
Table 2. Exemplary studies, which investigated the role of neurocognitive functions for decision making under 
ambiguity in the IGT. 
Patient group/brain-
healthy individuals
Relationship between cognitive functions/explicit 
knowledge and IGT performance
Author
Studies on the topic “explicit knowledge about contingencies”
healthy, prefrontal cortex 
damage
part of the participants showed explicit knowledge 
about good and bad decks, but advantageous decision 
making began earlier, or was unless not developed
Bechara et al., 1997
healthy advantageous decision making comes with explicit 
knowledge
Maia & McClelland, 
2004
Cognitive domain: General/Intelligence 
epilepsy positive correlation with LPS reasoning scale Labudda et al., 2009
substance abuse no significant correlation with intelligence, working
memory or different executive function measures
Barry & Petry, 2008; 
Bechara et al., 2001
schizophrenia with/ 
without cannabis use
positive correlation with Wechsler Adult Intelligence 
Scale (WAIS-III) / no significant correlation with 
Full Scale Intelligence Quotient (FSIQ)
Mata et al., 2008; 
Nakamura et al., 2008
borderline personality 
disorder
negative correlation with WAIS-III Haaland et al., 2007
psychopathy no significant correlation with WAIS-III / positive 
correlation with National Adult Reading Test 
(NART) IQ
Lösel & Schmucker, 
2004; Mahmut, 
Homewood, & 
Stevenson, 2008
healthy no significant correlation with NART IQ / positive 
correlation with Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test-III
Fein, McGillivray, & 
Finn, 2007; Patrick, 
Blair, & Maggs, 2008
Cognitive domain: Working memory
healthy, lesions in 
ventromedial, 
dorsolateral/high mesial 
damages
dissociation between working memory and decision-
making functions 
Bechara et al., 1998
Alzheimer’s disease no significant correlation with digit span tasks Sinz et al., 2008
epilepsy positive correlation with digit span backwards Labudda et al., 2009
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schizophrenia no significant correlations with delayed match to 
sample task
Shurman et al., 2005
attention deficits 
hyperactivity disorder
no significant correlations with digit span forwards or 
spatial span
Toplak et al., 2005
healthy no significant correlation with digit span / in young 
adults: significant positive correlation with paced 
auditory addition test
Denburg, Tranel, & 
Bechara, 2005; Fein et 
al., 2007
Cognitive domain: Executive functions
Parkinson’s disease correlation with color word interference test, no 
significant correlation with Wisconsin Card Sorting 
Test
Mimura, Oeda, & 
Kawamura, 2006
Alzheimer’s disease no significant correlation with Odd-Man-Out, shifting 
behavior in IGT correlated with inhibition subtest of 
FAB
Delazer, Sinz, Zamarian, 
& Benke, 2007; Sinz et 
al., 2008
epilepsy correlation with color word interference test, no 
significant correlation with Modified Card Sorting 
Test
Labudda et al., 2009
schizophrenia no significant correlations with Wisconsin Card 
Sorting Test, no correlations with Trail Making Test 
B
Fond et al., 2012; 
Nakamura et al., 2008; 
Ritter et al., 2004; 
Shurman et al., 2005
attention deficits 
hyperactivity disorder
no significant correlation with stop signal task or 
Go/No-Go task
Geurts, Van der Oord, & 
Crone, 2006
healthy ascending learning curve in the IGT despite parallel 
executive load, correlations with Wisconsin Card 
Sorting Test in later trials of the IGT, seldom with 
overall performance, no correlations with color word 
interference test, but with stop task
Brand, Recknor, 
Grabenhorst, & Bechara, 
2007; Denburg et al., 
2005; Shuster & Toplak, 
2009; Turnbull et al., 
2005
As Table 2 shows, some studies reported connections between cognitive domains and 
IGT performance, while other studies found no relations. One explanation for these 
heterogeneous results may be that performance in different phases of the IGT relies to 
different amounts on cognitive functions. When the participants begin to understand the 
contingencies of the IGT, they can increase the application of reasoning strategies (Bechara et 
al., 1997; Maia & McClelland, 2004). This seems to be the reason for the finding that in 
healthy individuals decision-making performance is correlated with executive functioning and 
decision-making performance under risk in the later trials of the IGT (trials 41-100), while 
there is no such correlation in the first trials (1-40) (Brand, Recknor, et al., 2007; Y.-T. Kim, 
Sohn, & Jeong, 2011). Given the knowledge the participants have constructed in the later 
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trials, the situation loses its ambiguity: The decision maker processes the initially ambiguous 
decision situation in a way that is comparable to the processing of a situation providing 
explicit risk conditions (Brand, Recknor, et al., 2007). 
In summary, a high number of studies focused on the topic of decision making under 
ambiguity. Thus, the comprehension of the emotional and cognitive processes in this type of 
decision situation is relatively profound. Despite the existing critics of the somatic marker 
hypotheses (Buelow & Suhr, 2009; Dunn et al., 2006; Maia & McClelland, 2004) there is 
considerable evidence for one of its main suggestions: that physical emotional arousal and the 
activation of emotion-associated brain structures are involved in advantageous decision 
making. In several studies it has been observed that emotional processing was a correlate of 
decision making under ambiguity and that it can predict performance in this type of decision 
situation. Therefore, one can bear in mind that emotional processing plays a crucial role in 
decision making under ambiguity. Conscious cognitive processes and individual differences 
in cognitive abilities also seem to have a role, but its impact was observed to occur less 
systematically. The role of cognitive processing may depend on the amount of explicit 
knowledge that has been constructed by the decision maker.
As a methodological remark, it should be regarded that the scientifically gained 
knowledge about decision-making processes in ambiguous situations is largely based on 
studies using the IGT. On the one hand, it may be considered as favorable that commonly one 
standard measure is used across almost all studies. On the other hand, there is little empirical 
data on the question whether the findings with the IGT can be replicated in other decision-
making tasks. For example, it is unclear whether behavior in the IGT, would change with a 
variation of the situation’s attributes (e.g., if the decisions were not made in a gambling 
scenario, if the number of available choice options were increased or decreased, or if the level 
of ambiguity was varied). In general, it may be useful, if a task which allows varying such 
attributes systematically was available. This may also help to understand which situational 
attributes determine the amount of emotional and cognitive processing that is involved in 
advantageous decision making.
It has already been reported that cognitive functions were more systematically 
involved in decision situations that provide explicit information on the rules for gains and 
losses, namely in decisions under explicit risk conditions. In such a situation the development 
and application of calculative decision-making strategies is possible. The neurocognitive 
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processes of strategic decision-making under risk conditions has been described in a model by 
Brand and colleagues (2006), which is explained in the following chapter.
3.1.3. Brand’s model: Executive functions and decisions under risk
The main focus of this thesis are the neurocognitive processes involved in decision 
making under risk conditions, as they are suggested in the model by Brand and colleagues 
(2006). While there had already been several studies and a theoretical frame addressing the 
mechanisms in decision under ambiguity (as outlined in the previous chapter, 3.1.2), only 
little was understood about the neurocognitive and emotional mechanisms involved in 
decisions under risk conditions1 (Brand et al., 2006). Then, studies showed that patients with
cognitive deficits (e.g., with Korsakoff’s syndrome and Parkinson’s disease) were impaired in 
making this type of decisions advantageously and that this impairment was closely related to 
their reduced executive functions (Brand, Fujiwara, et al., 2005; Brand, Labudda, et al., 
2004). Also, the case of a patient hinted toward a crucial involvement of these functions
(Brand, Kalbe, et al., 2004). The patient was a woman, who had suffered from a colloid cyst 
of the foramen of monro. The cyst was removed in a surgery, which left no structural 
damages behind. However, changes in her brain metabolism occurred in the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex bilaterally, the cingulate gyrus, and the left fusiform gyrus. She had normal 
abilities in several cognitive domains, but reported to have problems with making decisions in 
everyday life. Neurocognitive tests revealed that she was selectively impaired in executive 
functions and these impairments were accompanied by disadvantageous decision making 
under risk conditions, as measured by a new laboratory task. Based on these findings in 
patients the model of decision making under risk was developed by Brand and colleagues 
(Brand et al., 2006). The model assumes an important role of executive functions for choosing 
advantageously under risk conditions. In contrast to decisions under ambiguity, making 
1 Please note that lines of research and theory in the general psychological area had already begun to describe 
how humans make decisions under risk conditions. This involved the investigation of so called compensatory 
and non-compensatory decision-making strategies, heuristics, influences of framing, anchors, or decision aids. 
This line of research is still advancing and expanding (classical and current examples of literature are: Bröder & 
Schiffer, 2003; Epley & Gilovich, 2001; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999; Glöckner & 
Pachur, 2012; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Pachur & Olsson, 2012; Payne et al., 1993; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1981; Yates, Veinott, & Patalano, 2003). However, the neuropsychological mechanisms of decision-making 
under risk, as well as the possible impairments in patients with neurological diseases or psychiatric disorders 
were only marginally understood.
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advantageous decisions under risk should be clearly associated with cognitive functions, 
given that these decisions can be made on the basis of calculative strategies.
In the model, the process of decision making begins with the features of the decision
situation. The most important features are the number of decision options and the information 
that is provided on the potential outcomes (e.g., possible monetary gains and losses) and the 
probabilities for these outcomes. These are either provided explicitly in a certain type of 
probability presentation (e.g., in percentages) or are calculable considering the rules of the 
decision-making task. These features are perceived by the decision maker and the acquired 
information “enters” the executive system by being represented in working memory. These 
working memory contents can be complemented by long-term memory contents associated 
with the given or comparable decision situations, general knowledge about probabilities, or 
previous experiences with consequences. Furthermore, general reasoning and problem solving 
strategies are said to be recalled from long-term memory. This recall and handling of 
information is supposed to be controlled by executive functions, such as categorization and 
cognitive flexibility. The authors point out the substantial contribution of executive functions 
to the decision-making process. Executive functions are thought to be responsible for 
combining the information in working memory and for controlling the reasoning processes 
that are required for the development of a decision-making strategy. The application of the 
strategy is also suggested to be controlled by executive components. After a decision is made 
there may be rewarding or punishing feedback about the consequences. The feedback is 
assumed to trigger an emotional reaction that causes the creation of somatic markers. Beside 
the emotional reaction, feedback can also be used on the cognitive level, for the adaption of 
information in long-term memory contents. The information about decision outcomes can be 
used for improving the understanding of the decision situation’s rules, for checking the 
success of the current decision strategy, and for revising the strategy (Brand et al., 2006). 
Brand and colleagues (2006) suggested that decisions under risk conditions can 
therefore be made on the basis of two “routes” of processing: a cognitive and an emotional 
route. It should be possible to make advantageous decisions based on cognitive reasoning 
processes only. Moreover, advantageous decision making under risk can be learned 
emotionally, guided by somatic markers. However, both routes can interact, when somatic 
markers support the development of a reasoned strategy. The integration of both, cognitive 
and emotional processes, is suggested as the best way to making decisions under risk 
advantageously (Brand, Grabenhorst, et al., 2007; Brand, Laier, Pawlikowski, & 
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Markowitsch, 2009; Brand, Pawlikowski, et al., 2009; Brand, 2008). The model is depicted in 
Figure 3.
Figure 3. The figure shows the processes, which are supposed to be involved in decision making under risk 
conditions (Brand et al., 2006). 
Executive functions are assumed to be crucial in the handling of information about the situation and integrating 
information from long-term memory, as well as in the development and control of reasoned decision-making
strategies. Additionally, emotional reactions to and anticipations of feedback can bias the decision-making 
behavior.
Based on this theoretical model it is possible to make assumptions about the brain 
regions that are probably involved in decisions under risk. Especially the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex and the anterior cingulate cortex may be involved because of their 
association with executive functioning, such as categorization and cognitive flexibility 
(Burgess, 2000; Leber, Turk-Browne, & Chun, 2008; Lie, Specht, Marshall, & Fink, 2006; 
Loose, Kaufmann, Tucha, Auer, & Lange, 2006). Furthermore, emotion processing areas, 
such as the amygdala (LeDoux, 2007; Phelps & LeDoux, 2005; Salzman & Fusi, 2010)
should be important for eliciting bodily reactions to and anticipations of feedback.
There are brain damage and brain activation studies, which found support for the 
involvement of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, the anterior cingulate cortex, and the 
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amygdala (Brand, Grabenhorst, et al., 2007; Brand, Kalbe, et al., 2004; Labudda et al., 2008; 
R. D. Rogers, Owen, et al., 1999). Additionally, it was found that the inferior parietal lobe 
was involved in decision making with explicit information about probabilities and monetary 
consequences (Labudda et al., 2008). The authors suggested that this region was activated 
because it took part in handling numbers and in computations made prior to the decision (the 
role of the inferior parietal lobe for suchlike processes has been reported in several studies, 
e.g., Dehaene, Molko, Cohen, & Wilson, 2004; Pesenti, Thioux, Seron, & De Volder, 2000; 
Sandrini, Rossini, & Miniussi, 2004).
One measure of decision making under risk, which has been used frequently in recent 
studies, is the Game of Dice Task (GDT; Brand et al., 2005). In this task the participants try to 
increase a fictitious starting capital of €1,000. In each of 18 trials they have to guess which 
number will be thrown next by a single virtual die. They can bet on one single number (bet 
amount €1,000), or on combinations of two (€500), three (€200), or four numbers (€100). 
After the bet, the die is thrown. If the number that occurs on the die equals the number the 
participant has bet on, or is one of the numbers within the chosen combination the participant 
will win the amount of money. If one of the other numbers is thrown the participant will lose
and the amount of money will be subtracted from the total capital. These rules are explicitly 
explained to the participant, before the task starts. What is not made explicit, but can be 
calculated, is that there are two high risk alternatives (betting on one and two numbers, with 
winning probabilities below 34%), and two low risk alternatives (betting on three and four 
numbers, with winning probabilities of 50% or higher). A positive final capital will most 
probably be possible when making very frequent decisions for the low risk alternatives, and 
no or very seldom decisions for high ris alternatives.
Two other tasks that have been used frequently in recent neuropsychological decision-
making research are the Cambridge Gambling Task (CGT; Rogers et al., 1999) and the
Probability-Associated Gambling (PAG) task (Sinz et al., 2008; Zamarian et al., 2008). In the 
CGT there are ten blue and red boxes presented in ratios that vary from trial to trial. The 
participants have to guess under which color the game’s token is hidden. The probability of 
winning depends on the ratio of blue and red boxes. After the decision for blue or red has 
been made the participants have to decide how much fictitious money they want to bet on 
their guess. Therefore, a bet amount is presented and increases every five seconds. The 
participants can bet the current amount or wait for the next, higher amount. 
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In the PAG task, the subjects are confronted with the choice between a fixed sum (a 
gain or loss of €20) and a lottery gamble for which the winning probability is presented by 
displaying the content of the lottery urn. This contains 24 red or blue cubes in ratios that vary 
from trial to trial. When the participant decides to gamble, a cube is drawn from the urn. An 
amount of €100 is won if a red cube is pulled out and €100 is lost if a blue cube is pulled out. 
For more details on the tasks pease refer to chapter 3.4 and to Study 3.
Using the GDT, the CGT, and the PAG task several studies have been conducted with 
patient groups and healthy participants. Some of the studies have been conducted before the 
formulation of Brand’s model (Brand et al., 2006) and have contributed to the model’s 
assumptions. A substantial number of studies has also been conducted after the development 
of the model and have tested the models assumptions on the role of executive functions, 
working memory, or feedback processing. Also, other factors have been tested as predictors 
of decision-making performance, for example logical thinking abilities (e.g., Brand, Laier, et 
al., 2009; Schiebener et al., 2011), personality facets (Bayard, Raffard, & Gely-Nargeot, 
2011; Brand & Altstötter-Gleich, 2008; D. Y. Kim & Lee, 2011), and external influences on 
decision-making (e.g., Bagneux, Bollon, & Dantzer, 2012; Schiebener, Wegmann, 
Pawlikowski, & Brand, 2012). In the following table (Table 3) an overview of
neuropsychological studies with the three tasks is provided in order to summarize empirical 
evidence on the role of specific neurocognitive domains (e.g., executive functions and 
working memory) as well as the role of other factors with which decision-making 
performance was found to be associated. Based on this overview and on the assumptions in 
Brand’s model (Brand et al., 2006), the gaps in research which will be addressed with the 
studies in this thesis will be pointed out.
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Table 3. Studies investigating decision-making performances under risk conditions in patient groups and healthy 
individuals.
For the table studies were selected which investigated the involvement of neurocognitive functions, other 
domains (e.g., general intelligence or personality facets) and situational manipulations on decision making 
performance in the GDT, the PAG task, or the CGT.
Decision-making performance was associated
with…
Topic Deficit in 
decisions 
under risk 
(task)
Neuro-
cognitive 
function
Other 
domains 
Situational 
manipulation
Authors
Patients with brain damages
single case, 
patient with 
dorsolateral 
prefrontal 
cortex 
dysfunctions
yes (GDT) selective 
deficits in 
executive 
functions
- - Brand, Kalbe, 
et al., 2004
ventral vs. 
orbitofrontal 
prefrontal 
cortex damage
ventral: yes 
(CGT)
orbitofrontal: 
yes (CGT) 
- Ventral 
damage: 
increased 
betting,
Orbitofrontal 
damage: 
decreased 
betting, but not 
accurately 
adjusted to 
probabilities
- Rogers, Everitt, 
et al., 1999
insular vs. 
ventromedial 
prefrontal 
cortex lesions
both yes (CGT) - ventromedial: 
increased 
betting 
regardless of 
probabilities
insular: 
impaired 
adjustment to 
probabilities
- Clark et al., 
2008
differential 
prefrontal 
cortex lesions
depending on 
lesion region 
(CGT)
deficits in 
working 
memory spatial 
span in the 
large-lesion 
patients 
orbitofrontal: 
longer 
deliberation, 
large lesions: 
increased risk 
taking
- Manes et al., 
2002
aneurism in 
anterior 
communicating 
artery
yes (CGT) - damage to 
orbitofrontal 
prefrontal 
cortex or 
disconnection 
of ventromedial 
circuits
- Mavaddat, 
Kirkpatrick, 
Rogers, & 
Sahakian, 2000
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traumatic brain 
injury
no (CGT), yes 
(GDT)
- impulsive 
betting, CGT 
performance 
inversely 
correlated with 
abnormalities, 
e.g. in 
thalamus, 
striatum, 
dorsolateral 
prefrontal 
cortex
- Newcombe et 
al., 2011; 
Rzezak, 
Antunes, Tufik, 
& Mello, 2012
Patients with neurological diseases 
Parkinson’s 
disease
yes (GDT) /
only 
Parkinson’s 
disease 
dementia (PAG 
task) / only 
medicated 
participants 
(CGT)
deficits in 
executive 
functions
- - Brand, 
Labudda, et al., 
2004; Cools, 
Barker, 
Sahakian, & 
Robbins, 2003; 
Delazer et al., 
2009; 
Euteneuer et 
al., 2009; 
Labudda et al., 
2010
Huntington’s 
disease
no (CGT) deficits in 
visuo-spatial 
planning 
- - Watkins & 
Rogers, 2000
Alzheimer’s 
disease
yes (GDT, 
PAG task)
deficits in 
learning, 
executive 
functions 
- - Delazer, Sinz, 
Zamarian, & 
Benke, 2007; 
Sinz et al., 
2008
fronto temporal 
dementia
yes (CGT) unassociated 
with executive 
functions and 
working 
memory
increased 
deliberation 
times before 
bets, risk taking
methylphenidat
e 
administration 
“normalized” 
risk taking
Rahman et al., 
2006; Rahman, 
Sahakian, 
Hodges, 
Rogers, & 
Robbins, 1999
Korsakoff’s 
syndrome
yes (GDT) deficits in 
executive 
functions, 
memory 
functions
intelligence feedback 
removal had no 
effect on 
performances 
of patients but 
of healthy 
subjects
Brand et al., 
2005; Brand, 
Pawlikowski, et 
al., 2009
multiple 
sclerosis
yes (CGT) attention compared to 
controls 
reduced 
disappointment 
after loss, no 
differences in 
SCRs
- Simioni et al., 
2012
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Urbach-
Wiethe-Disease
part of the 
sample yes 
(GDT)
impairment 
particularly in 
patients with 
deficits in 
executive 
functions
reduced 
feedback SCRs
- Brand, 
Grabenhorst, et 
al., 2007
mild cognitive 
impairment
yes (PAG-
Revised)
- integration of 
information 
from different 
sources, 
flexibility in 
adapting 
decision 
strategy
- Zamarian, 
Weiss, & 
Delazer, 2011
epilepsy no (GDT) lower decision-
making 
performance 
associated with 
executive 
functions
reduced 
decision-
making 
performance 
associated with 
earlier onset of 
disease 
- Labudda et al., 
2009
Patients with psychological/psychiatric disorders
attention deficit 
hyperactivity 
disorder (adults 
and 
adolescents)
adults: no
(GDT), yes 
(CGT)
adolescents: 
only when 
GDT was 
administered 
second time
adults: higher 
medial 
orbitofrontal 
cortex 
activation in 
high-incentive 
reward 
processing task
adolescents: 
parent-report of 
executive 
functions
adults: 
feedback 
processing
(GDT), 
impulsive 
betting and 
problems with 
strategy 
adaption to 
probabilities 
(CGT)
repeated 
measurement
with GDT,
methylphenidat
e 
administration 
made CGT 
behavior saver
DeVito et al., 
2008; 
Drechsler, 
Rizzo, & 
Steinhausen, 
2008; Wilbertz 
et al., 2012
schizophrenia mixed results if impaired: 
associations 
with disease-
caused deficits 
in executive 
functions
no association 
with clinical 
variables
- Fond et al., 
2012; Lee et 
al., 2007
borderline 
personality 
disorder
yes (CGT) planning impulsivity, 
disinhibition
- Bazanis et al., 
2002
obsessive 
compulsive 
disorder 
no (GDT) executive 
functions
SCR’s 
comparable to 
healthy 
comparison 
participants
- Starcke, 
Tuschen-
Caffier, 
Markowitsch, 
& Brand, 2010; 
Starcke et al., 
2009
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compulsive 
hoarding
yes (CGT) executive 
functions, 
planning, 
categorization
self-reported 
cognitive 
processing 
difficulties 
- Grisham, 
Norberg, 
Williams, 
Certoma, & 
Kadib, 2010
opiate 
dependence 
yes (GDT)
mixed (CGT)
executive 
functions, 
logical thinking
deficits in 
feedback 
processing, 
success in 
maintaining 
abstinence
- Brand, 
Rothbauer, 
Driessen, 
Markowitsch, 
& Roth-Bauer, 
2008; Passetti, 
Clark, Mehta, 
Joyce, & King, 
2008
cocaine 
dependence
(CGT) - intelligence, 
IGT 
performance, 
delay 
discounting 
preferences
- Monterosso, 
Ehrman, 
Napier, 
O’Brien, & 
Childress, 2001
abstinent drug 
abusers
yes (CGT) - changes in 
emotional 
regulation, 
lower SCR 
increase while 
making 
decisions
- Fishbein et al., 
2005
pathological/ 
problem 
gamblers
yes (GDT) deficits in 
executive 
functions
deficits in 
feedback 
processing, 
stress hormone 
release 
associated with 
more 
advantageous 
decision 
making
- Brand, Kalbe,
et al., 2005; 
Labudda, Wolf, 
Markowitsch, 
& Brand, 2007
bulimia 
nervosa
yes (GDT) deficits in 
executive 
functions
no association 
with other 
neuropsycho-
logical 
variables, or 
personality 
measures 
- Brand, Franke-
Sievert, Jacoby, 
Markowitsch, 
& Tuschen-
Caffier, 2007
binge eating 
disorder
yes (GDT) - deficits 
feedback 
processing
- Svaldi, Brand, 
& Tuschen-
Caffier, 2010
restless legs 
syndrome
no (GDT) - - - Bayard, Yu, 
Langenier, 
Carlander, & 
Dauvilliers, 
2010
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narcolepsy no (GDT) - - - Bayard et al., 
2011
excessive 
online gamers
yes (GDT) - severity of 
psychiatric 
symptoms
- Pawlikowski & 
Brand, 2011
young adults 
with suicidality
yes (CGT) - CGT 
performance 
significantly 
predicted 
suicidality
- Chamberlain, 
Odlaug, 
Schreiber, & 
Grant, 2013
Healthy participants: studies investigating effects of task characteristics
feedback yes (GDT) logical 
thinking, 
executive 
functions
calculative
strategy 
development
feedback 
removal
reduced GDT 
performance 
Brand, Laier, et 
al., 2009; 
Brand, 2008
Healthy participants: studies investigating effects of person characteristics
perfectionism (GDT) - concern over 
mistakes, 
personal 
standards, but 
not other 
personality 
variables
- Brand & 
Altstötter-
Gleich, 2008
impulsivity (GDT) - sensation 
seeking, 
urgency
- Bayard, 
Raffard, & 
Gely-Nargeot, 
2011
behavioral 
inhibition
(BIS)/
behavioral 
approach 
system (BAS)
(GDT) - interaction 
between BIS 
and BAS 
predict risk 
taking after 
winning and 
losing 
experience
- D. Y. Kim & 
Lee, 2011
risk taking 
tendencies
(GDT) - interaction 
between risk 
taking tendency 
and self-control 
predicts 
decision 
making
- Dislich, 
Zinkernagel, 
Ortner, & 
Schmitt, 2010
Trait self-
control and ego 
depletion
(GDT) - higher trait-self 
control 
associated with 
higher ego 
depletion and 
more risk 
taking
- Imhoff, 
Schmidt, & 
Gerstenberg, 
2013
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testosterone 
level
(GDT) - - testosterone 
administration
had no effect 
on decision 
making
Goudriaan et 
al., 2010
young age
(adolescents)
(GDT) - planned and 
unplanned risk 
taking in real 
life
- Maslowsky, 
Keating, Monk, 
& Schulenberg, 
2010
older age yes (GDT)/ no 
(PAG)
individual level 
of executive 
functions and 
logical thinking
- - Brand & 
Schiebener, 
2012; Zamarian 
et al., 2008
calculative 
strategies
(GDT) executive 
functions, 
logical thinking
calculative 
processing of 
probability 
problems
- Brand, Heinze, 
Labudda, & 
Markowitsch, 
2008; Brand, 
Laier, et al., 
2009
probability 
processing 
abilities
(GDT, PAG) executive 
functions, 
logical thinking
advantageous 
handling of 
simple 
probability-
based decision 
problems
- Schiebener et 
al., 2011
Healthy participants: studies investigating effects of context characteristics
stress yes (GDT) - increased
cortisol level
feedback 
removal 
reduced GDT 
performance 
descriptively
Starcke, Wolf, 
Markowitsch, 
& Brand, 2008
parallel 
working 
memory load
yes (GDT) executive 
functions, 
working 
memory
- parallel solving 
of 2-back
working 
memory task 
reduced GDT 
performance
Starcke, 
Pawlikowski, 
Wolf, 
Altstötter-
Gleich, & 
Brand, 2011
anchor effects, 
explicit goal 
setting
anchors: yes 
(GDT)
goals: no 
(GDT)
executive 
functions
- misleading 
comparison 
values (high 
final capitals of 
other players)
reduced GDT 
performance
Schiebener, 
Wegmann, 
Pawlikowski, 
& Brand, 2012
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decision 
support
no (GDT) executive 
functions, 
working 
memory 
performance
- advice for the 
advantageous 
alternatives 
improved GDT 
performance in 
subjects with 
low working-
memory- and 
executive 
functions
Schiebener, 
Wegmann, 
Pawlikowski, 
& Brand, under 
review
emotion 
induction
no (GDT) - uncertainty 
related 
emotions
fear induction 
caused more 
advantageous 
(save) decision 
making 
compared to 
anger or 
happiness 
induction
Bagneux, 
Bollon, & 
Dantzer, 2012
methyl-
phenidate 
administration
(modified 
CGT)
- - methyl-
phenidate 
administration 
caused no 
changes in 
decision-
making 
behavior or 
attentional 
performance
Shalev, Gross-
Tsur, & Pollak, 
2013
Healthy participants: studies investigating effects of physiological activation
PET activation 
measuring
(CGT) - activation in 
medial, lateral, 
posterior 
prefrontal 
cortex
CGT compared 
to control 
condition
Rogers, Owen, 
et al., 1999
automatic 
activation
(GDT) - automatic 
activation 
unrelated to 
GDT behavior
- Drucaroff et al., 
2011
Notes. If no group comparison was performed the second column indicates only which task was used. For other 
overviews see also Brand et al., 2006; Clark & Manes, 2004; Gleichgerrcht et al., 2010.
As can be seen in the overview in Table 3, neuropsychological research on decision 
making under risk has become a very broad field, in which several predictors of decision-
making performance have been investigated. Different decision-making tasks were used, 
yielding relations between decision making and different neurocognitive functions, as well as 
other domains. Additionally, some studies investigated the influence of experimental 
manipulations. The table shows that some parts of the theoretical model have already been 
Theoretical background 41
supported by empirical evidence. The evidence supports the model’s idea that decisions under 
risk are mainly guided by deliberate, cognitive processes, requiring abilities like logical 
thinking (Brand, Laier, et al., 2009; Schiebener et al., 2011) and calculative strategy 
development (Brand, Heinze, et al., 2008). Additionally, the positive impact of feedback on 
the development of an advantageous decision-making strategy could be demonstrated (Brand, 
2008). Studies on the role of emotional processing indicated that bodily reactions seem to 
guide decisions to some extend only, playing a rather minor role, while cognitive processes
seem to be more crucial (Brand, Grabenhorst, et al., 2007; Drucaroff et al., 2011).
Regarding the dual process view on decision making the evidence supports the idea 
that the processes preceding decisions under risk conditions rather tap into the cognitive 
System 2 than into the intuitive System 1 (Brand, Laier, et al., 2009; J. S. B. T. Evans, 2003; 
Kahneman, 2003). This interpretation has also been supported by the study by Starcke and 
colleagues (2011). The study showed that decision-making performance in the GDT 
substantially decreases when a task demanding executive System 2 processes has to be solved 
in parallel. This indicated that the GDT cannot be solved in normal quality if System 2 is 
hindered from processing on the decision task. In contrast in the IGT, which is thought to be 
associated with intuitive System 1 processing, it was found that decision-making performance 
was almost unaffected by a secondary System 2 task (Turnbull et al., 2005). In combination, 
these two studies with the GDT and the IGT indicate that decision making under risk 
substantially taps into System 2 processing, while decision making in the IGT more strongly 
taps into System 1 processing.
When regarding the overview of studies with the GDT, it is particularly remarkable
that, as suggested in the model, executive functions or brain regions associated with executive 
processing have frequently been found to be closely related to decision-making performance. 
Executive functions are not only associated with decision-making performance on the level of 
bivariate correlations. They were also found to moderate effects of task variations (e.g., 
missing feedback), person characteristics (e.g., age), and external influences (e.g., misleading 
anchors) (Brand, Laier, et al., 2009; Brand & Schiebener, 2013; Schiebener et al., 2012). 
However, there are still substantial gaps in the current understanding of how executive 
functions build up the decision-making process. Several studies treated executive functions to 
some extent as a black box, although the executive system is thought to be a set of different 
subcomponents of cognitive and behavioral control functions instead of a unitary function. 
Studies on the role of different executive subcomponents are rare. In a study by Del Missier, 
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Mäntylä, and Bruine de Bruin (2010), different subcomponents were regarded in their role for 
performance in two decision-making associated tasks. In the first task, called applying 
decision rules, the participants had to solve a decision-making problem by following a 
predetermined decision-making strategy. In the second task, called consistency in risk 
perception, they had to estimate how probable specific events should occur in different spans 
of time (one year vs. five years). To detect the relationships between performances in these 
two tasks and executive functions, not only a simple bivariate correlation approach was used, 
but a structure equation model was tested. Therefore, a theory guided test battery was 
assembled. Three subcomponents of executive functions were measured with two tasks each
and analyzed on the level of latent variables. Latent variables represent the variance that is 
shared among the included tasks. The latent dimensions were shifting, updating and 
inhibition. The results showed that performances in the two tasks were related to different 
amounts to the subcomponents of executive functions. Applying decision rules was 
particularly related inhibition. The authors suggested that this relationship was due to the fact 
that the task required to selectively focus attention on the information that were relevant for 
applying the decision rule. Consistency in risk perception was related to shifting, probably 
because the task required shifting between judgment contexts. However, the study did not 
clearly address the question for the role of executive subcomponents in decision-making 
behavior under explicit risk conditions. The main reason is that the two “decision-making 
tasks” did not provide clearly risky conditions (with explicit rules for gains and losses and 
their probabilities) and, more importantly, they did not demand the participants to make 
decisions. The tasks rather asked the participants to perform operations, which may be 
involved in decision making that is to follow a decision-making algorithm (in the applying 
decision rules task) or to estimate probabilities (in the consistency in risk perception task).
Nevertheless, the study should be regarded as a valuable contribution to the literature because 
it demonstrated that different executive functions contribute to different amounts to two 
competences probably involved in decision making.
Thus, it can be concluded from the literature overview that the results of the studies so 
far did not systematically point out the role of different executive subcomponents for decision 
making under risk. The model by Brand and colleagues (2006) has also remained unspecific 
in this part. The model does not describe which executive sub-functions should contribute to 
the different steps of the process (e.g., to capturing the features of the situation or to managing 
a current strategy; see Introduction of Study 1 for further details). 
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Another point, which is so far not addressed in the model and only sparsely in the 
neuropsychological literature, is the influence of variations in the situation, especially when 
these may adapt the cognitive processes that can determine decision-making performance. In 
the PTF it was suggested that situational conditions and person characteristics affect decision-
making competence in interaction (Finucane & Lees, 2005). There have already been studies, 
which have shown that indeed the interaction between aspects of the situation and basic 
cognitive functions can predict decision-making performance. For example, it has been 
reported that misleading information about the decision situation can lead to increased risk 
taking, particularly in persons with relatively low executive functioning (Schiebener et al., 
2012). A comparable effect, but in inversed manner, has been found for the interaction 
between supporting information about the decision situation and working memory functions 
as well as executive functions. Supporting information improved the decision-making 
performance of persons with lower functioning in these domains, while it had no effect on 
persons with better functioning, who decided advantageously anyway, even without the 
support (Schiebener, Wegmann, et al., under review).
Beside these external influences, there are also other situational conditions, of which 
the possible effects on decision-making performance are still unclear. One situational 
influence that is widely known to affect human performances, higher level cognitive 
processing and control of behavior, is the presence of explicit goals (Duncan, Emslie, 
Williams, Johnson, & Freer, 1996; Latham & Locke, 1991; Locke & Latham, 2006; Locke, 
1996; Pervin, 1989). However, the role of explicit goals on making decisions strategically has 
only rarely been investigated (see Table 3, chapter 3.3, and Introduction of Study 2). 
Regarding the particular role of different executive functions and regarding the role of explicit 
goal setting, research is required to allow specifying the model in these two points. 
An additional issue that is indirectly related to the theoretical assumptions in the 
model of decision making under risk (Brand et al., 2006) and is still a gap in research is the 
measurement of decision-making performances under risk conditions in healthy individuals as 
well as patients with neurological diseases, brain lesions, or psychological disorders. The 
model implicitly assumes that decision-making behavior is relatively stable in different 
situations with equal core features. These are the information about the rules for gains and 
losses, including the number of alternatives and the probabilities for gains and losses as well 
as their heights. This assumption is also underlying in research practice and clinical practice, 
in which, particularly under risk conditions, casino-like gambling paradigms are commonly 
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used to measure decision-making performance (such as the GDT, CGT, and the PAG task;
Brand et al., 2005; Rogers et al., 1999; Sinz et al., 2008; Weller, Levin, Shiv, & Bechara, 
2007; Zamarian et al., 2008). It is thought that these gambling paradigms are models of real-
world decision situations. Like real situations they provide different options, with more or less 
favorable outcomes which can occur with certain probabilities that are more or less explicitly 
known by the decision maker (Bechara et al., 1996; Brand et al., 2006; Denburg et al., 2007). 
However, it is unclear whether the gambling situation and the casino cues in these paradigms 
produce artifacts in the measurement of general decision-making performance. This may 
particularly be the case in patients with pathological gambling because they may react 
strongly to the tasks’ addiction related gambling cues (e.g., Crockford, Goodyear, Edwards, 
Quickfall, & El-Guebaly, 2005; van Holst, van Holstein, van den Brink, Veltman, & 
Goudriaan, 2012). Furthermore, the paradigms are often inflexible and can rarely be modified 
for experimental manipulations (for further details on possible problems with the existing 
measurement methods see chapter 3.4 and the Introduction of Study 3). A flexible decision-
making paradigm would be desirable for the measurement of decision-making performance 
and for testing whether decision-making behavior remains stable when the core features of 
one decision situation (e.g., a gambling task) are transferred to a real-world oriented scenario
(e.g., deciding between car routes with different probabilities for traffic jams and different 
punishments in case of delay). 
In summary, the model by Brand and colleagues (2006) should be specified 
concerning the role of different executive functions, and the role of explicit goal setting in 
decision making under risk. Furthermore, a flexible and real-world oriented decision-making 
paradigm should be developed for the measurement of decision-making abilities in research 
and clinical contexts. In the following the theory on executive functions and goal setting is 
summarized. Thereafter, different measures of decision decision-making performances are 
described in more detail and similarities and differences between them are discussed.
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3.2. Executive functions
Executive functions can be defined as systems of cognitive control, which direct
cognition and behavior that is planned, goal oriented, flexible, and effective (Alvarez & 
Emory, 2006; Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Lezak, 1995). Nevertheless, it is still a topic of debate 
how executive functions should be defined exactly (Eslinger, Lyon, & Krasnegor, 1996; Stuss 
& Alexander, 2000). Here, it will briefly be explained how executive functions are understood 
in the literature in general and with respect to their association with working memory (chapter 
3.2.1) and will then explain which subcomponents they are thought to be comprised of 
(chapter 3.2.2).
On a relatively general level, Norman and Shallice (1980) suggested two systems of 
behavioral control (Norman & Shallice, 1980; Shallice & Burgess, 1993). The first one, the 
contention scheduling system, should be responsible for controlling automatized routine 
behaviors. This system controls the behavior in situations, in which a person has knowledge
(or “schemata” or “action plans”) available about the actions to be implemented (e.g., when 
walking through the super market, in which one knows in which order the products of one’s 
weakly usage are displayed). An automatized schedule is activated without mental effort,
which implements the required behaviors (e.g., turning left at the third shelf and taking the 
cornflakes in the second row). The second system, the supervisory attentional system, is 
supposed to take control in new, or at least non-routinized actions (e.g., when visiting a new 
supermarket for making the weekly errand). Attention needs to be directed to relevant 
information (e.g., for walking through the corridors systematically and performing visual 
search for the breakfast products), interference by irrelevant information and inadequate 
behavior needs to be inhibited and new plans and decisions have to be made. Therefore, the 
supervisory attentional system requires high mental effort. Other authors described in more 
detail how these control processes may be implemented in human cognition. Baddeley and 
Hitch (1974) suggested that suchlike cognitive and behavioral control is a function of working 
memory. This approach is described in the following section.
3.2.1. Working memory and executive control
Working memory is supposed to be responsible for maintaining information 
temporarily and is considered an active memory system that processes and manipulates 
information cognitively. Thereby, it is an important link between perception, long-term
memory, and controlled action. It can maintain representations of perceived information and
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representations of long-term memory-contents. It manipulates and integrates this information 
for example to design action-plans and to direct their conduction (Baddeley & Della Sala, 
1996; Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Miyake & Shah, 1999). There are several models of the 
architecture of working memory (for an overview see Miyake & Shah, 1999). The most 
acknowledged model is the multicomponent model, first suggested by Baddeley and Hitch 
(1974). This model assumes that working memory is not only responsible for short-term 
maintenance of information. Additionally, the so called central executive of working memory 
should control attention and information-manipulation (Baddeley, 2003, 2010). 
The multicomponent model (Baddeley, 2003) suggests a central executive and a 
buffering system. The central executive directs the manipulation of information that is 
represented in the buffering system. The three parts of the buffering system are thought to 
hold limited amounts of representations of information for limited durations. The information 
is thought to be selected from the perceptual system (e.g., spatial and phonological 
information) and from long-term memory (represented by the bottom box in Figure 4). In the 
model, executive functions are understood as a set of tools, which process on the contents of 
working memory, such as selecting information and integrating them in the development and 
application of goal oriented action plans (see also Smith & Jonides, 1999). The 
multicomponent model is depicted in Figure 4.
Figure 4. The multicomponent model of working memory adapted from (Baddeley, 2003, 2010). 
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In several studies the role of different brain structures for the suggested main 
components (central executive and buffering system) of the model have been investigated. 
The results indicated that there seem to be different brain regions and networks involved in 
the components. Thus, the results generally support the structure in the multicomponent 
model. The buffering components of working memory have found to be related to brain areas 
that are also associated with encoding of information (Jonides, Lacey, & Nee, 2005). These 
are areas in the posterior parietal cortex, which are supposed to house the content buffers 
(Cohen et al., 1997; Gathercole, 1994). An important role of widely distributed regions in the 
prefrontal cortex have been suggested by several studies’ results (Cabeza, Dolcos, Graham, & 
Nyberg, 2002; D’Esposito et al., 1995; Müller & Knight, 2006; Müller, Machado, & Knight, 
2002; Rypma & D’Esposito, 1999; Rypma, Prabhakaran, Desmond, Glover, & Gabrieli, 
1999). Especially, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex has been found to be relevant in the active 
maintenance and rehearsal of memory-contents. Interestingly the region yields higher 
activations when more content has to be rehearsed (Callicott et al., 1999). Thus, there may 
indeed be a partitioning of the buffering component (posterior parietal regions) and the 
executive maintenance and manipulation component (prefrontal cortex regions) of working 
memory, as suggested by Baddeley and Hitch (1974). 
Further studies’ results have moreover suggested that beside these main brain regions,
additional regions seem to support specific working memory components. Some of them are 
involved in the buffering- and others in the executive processing component. For example,
higher baseline levels of dopamine in the striatum predicted higher working memory capacity 
(R Cools, Gibbs, Miyakawa, Jagust, & D’Esposito, 2008). Additionally, the basal ganglia 
have been found to be associated with working memory capacity and - in interaction with the 
prefrontal cortex - with filtering of incoming information (McNab & Klingberg, 2008; Voytek 
& Knight, 2010). It was reported that the hippocampus takes a part in creating links 
(“bindings”) between different information (Henke, Weber, Kneifel, Wieser, & Buck, 1999; 
Mitchell, Johnson, Raye, & D’Esposito, 2000) and in the process of buffering information (O. 
Jensen & Lisman, 2005). The cerebellum is associated with verbal memory operations (Smith, 
Jonides, & Koeppe, 1996; Smith & Jonides, 1997). Moreover, also emotional processing in 
the limbic system seems to be relevant for working memory functioning. However, the 
underlying mechanism is not understood sufficiently yet. Amygdala activation might be 
associated with good working memory functions even if the stimuli are not emotional 
(Schaefer & Gray, 2007) but paradoxically, amygdala damage can result in increased working 
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memory capacity (Morgan, Terburg, Thornton, Stein, & Van Honk, 2012). It is unclear 
whether amygdala activation normally interferes with performance in working memory tasks 
without emotional stimuli and whether this interference is decreased when the amygdala is 
damaged (Kapur, 1996).
As can be judged from this short overview, the model by Baddeley (2003) has strongly 
been supported by empirical evidence. Therefore, the core assumption regarding a working 
memory buffering system and a central executive system is also applied in this thesis. 
However, the main topic of the work at hand is the role of sub-functions of the central 
executive for decision making. Thus the possible subcomponents of the central executive are 
discussed in the following chapter. (Subcomponents of buffering or “storage” functions of 
working memory are examined and discussed in other works, e.g. Oberauer, Süß, Wilhelm, & 
Wittman, 2003; Süß, Oberauer, & Wittmann, 2002.)
3.2.2. Subcomponents of executive functions
In the multicomponent model Baddeley (2003) considers the central executive as one 
system but suggests that it may be comprised of different subcomponents. As basic 
components that are required by any attention-control process he mentions focusing, dividing,
and shifting of attention (Baddeley & Logie, 1999; Baddeley, 2003). Indeed, patients with 
brain damages that caused the so called dysexecutive syndrome (i.e., patients with severe 
problems in controlling goal oriented behavior and cognition) did not show the same patterns 
of impairments in different executive tasks. Rather, different brain areas seemed to make 
contributions to the performance in different tasks (Burgess, Alderman, Evans, Emslie, & 
Wilson, 1998; Burgess, Veitch, de Lacy Costello, & Shallice, 2000; Stuss & Alexander, 
2000). Thus, it seems probable that there is a separation of different subcomponents. 
In the literature several arrangements into different sub-functions can be found (a well-
structured overview was provided by Jurado & Rosselli, 2007). Examples of arrangements are 
in one theory volition, planning, purposive action, and effective performance (Lezak, 
Howieson, Loring, Hannay, & Fischer, 2004) or in another theory planning, initiation, 
preservation, and alteration of goal-directed behavior (Hobson & Leeds, 2002). In the 
following, two particular approaches toward a fractionation of executive functions will be 
presented more detailed. These approaches are currently well accepted in the literature and are 
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based on behavioral and brain-imaging data. One was provided by Miyake and colleagues 
(2000) and the other one by Smith and Jonides (1999).
Miyake and colleagues (2000) suggested three basic functions of the executive system 
and investigated their separation in a behavioral experiment with healthy participants. The 
three functions were shifting, updating, and inhibition. Shifting is the ability to shift (or 
“switch”) between several tasks, cognitive operations, or mental representations. Updating is 
the function that monitors and refreshes the contents of working memory. This implies 
detecting information that is no longer required, as well as encoding new information and 
actively updating working memory with it. Inhibition means the ability to control dominant 
and automatic behavior and, if necessary, to be able to prevent oneself from executing an 
automatic but inaccurate action. In their study Miyake and colleagues (2000) investigated a 
large sample of healthy individuals with a battery of nine executive functioning tests. Always 
three were supposed to tap into one of the three functions, respectively. Using confirmatory 
factor analysis and structure equation modeling, the authors modeled the three functions as 
latent variables. The full model with all three domains was then compared to models in which 
the tests for all three functions were subsumed in one latent variable or in which the possible 
combinations of two functions were subsumed. It has been found that the full model,
suggesting three latent variables, was better represented in the data than the other models. 
This result supported the suggestion of separable executive subcomponents and the 
expectation that shifting, updating, and inhibition are separable basic functions of the 
executive system. Later, the literature has also reported data, which was in line with this 
finding (Fisk & Sharp, 2004; N. P. Friedman et al., 2008; Miyake & Friedman, 2012; 
Verdejo-García & Pérez-García, 2007). Additionally, a fourth component of behavioral 
control was found to be separable from these functions. Verdejo-García & Pérez-García 
(2007) examined 81 substance dependent participants and 37 brain-healthy controls with a 
large test-battery for executive functions and with the IGT. In a factor analysis four 
“executive” components were found: Once more updating, shifting, inhibition, and - as fourth 
component - decision making under ambiguity in the IGT. This result supports the view that 
there may be three basic executive functions and it points out that decision making under 
ambiguous conditions remains separable from them. Nevertheless, it is unclear whether 
decision making under ambiguity can be seen as a fourth component of the central executive 
of working memory, given that decisions in the IGT can be biased emotionally and rely only 
to some extent on higher cognition (see chapter 3.1.2). Furthermore, it has to be noted that the 
heuristic eigenvalue > 1 criterion was applied in the factor analysis. This criterion has been 
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criticized in the methodological literature (e.g., Conway & Huffcutt, 2003; Fabrigar, 
Wegener, MacCallum, & Strahan, 1999; Ford, MacCallum, & Tait, 1986).
In summary, there is evidence for the idea of three components to be involved in the 
general concept of executive functions. However, as pointed out by Miyake and colleagues 
themselves, the three components should be the most basic functions of the central executive, 
but do not encompass all functions. The authors suggested that “the relationship between 
these relatively basic executive functions and more complex concepts like ‘planning’ needs to 
be examined” (p.90, Miyake et al., 2000). It may be possible that there are also hierarchically 
higher positioned functions, which control or „recruit“ the basic functions for the purpose of 
implementing goal-directed behavior. A division into five functions, instead of three, was 
suggested by Smith and Jonides (1999). They reviewed brain-imaging studies with different 
executive-functioning tasks. From these studies the authors inferred that there may be five 
components of the central executive, which have been found to be associated with distinct 
regions in the prefrontal cortex. These functions are defined as follows:
Attention/inhibition: This is the ability to direct attention toward relevant information and 
inhibit irrelevant information as well as automatic or dominant responses or reactions that do 
not fit the demands of the task.
Task management: This function is responsible for reacting to different tasks and arranging 
serial processing on them by shifting between them flexibly.
Planning: This is the ability to plan the processing on several subtasks, which need to be 
solved to attain a certain goal. 
Monitoring: This is the ability to supervise the processing on sequential tasks, by updating 
and checking working memory contents and determine the next steps to take. 
Coding: This function is responsible for coding information into working memory buffers in 
order to maintain representations of the information and its time and place of appearance.
Theoretically, one can assume that these five functions may be organized in a 
hierarchical structure, with basic “lower level” functions and “higher level” functions that 
direct the lower level functions. Smith and Jonides (1999) suggested that attention/inhibition 
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and task management could be called the most basic functions of the central executive. 
However, when thinking about the definition of the five subcomponents another hierarchical 
arrangement may also be conceivable. Lower level functions may be attention/inhibition and 
coding. They are required in almost any situation, in which information is cognitively 
processed. As can also be inferred from the multicomponent model (Baddeley, 2003) as well 
as from best reasoning, it is inevitable to focus attention on information and code it into 
working memory before a cognitive operation is able to make active use of the information.
The main reason for defining the two functions as lower level is that they need to be directed, 
by the higher level functions. One may assume that the directing, clearly higher level 
functions are planning and monitoring. For example, planning requires focusing attention on 
the task’s information, to encode them, and to code one’s plan for solving the task into 
working memory. Monitoring requires to direct attention towards information that is required 
to supervise the state of the task for which the next steps need to be determined. Task 
management seems to be a function in between the two levels of hierarchy. On the one hand it 
is very basic (as suggested by Smith and Jonides, 1999), because when working on any task it 
is required that one is able to switch between the sub-operations that are required to solve the 
task. Additionally, task management is controlled by the higher level functions. For example,
in a planning-process switches between the tasks can be predetermined. On the other hand 
task management seems to be on a higher level than attention/inhibition and coding, because 
one function of task management is to direct these attention and coding processes. For 
example, task management is responsible for shifting the attention between information about 
the task. However, although, assuming a hierarchical organization of the subcomponents 
appears reasonable, it still needs to be tested empirically. Thus, a possible hierarchical 
arrangement is investigated in Study 1.
In empirical research on executive functions, a large number of different tests have 
been used to measure the diverse components of executive abilities in healthy individuals and 
patients. With many of these tests it is tried to tap specific subcomponents, but the 
involvement of other components cannot be excluded in most of the tests. Jurado and Rosselli
(2007) provided an overview about some often used tests and test batteries. Table 4 presents a 
similar selection of typical tests and indicates which domain they were originally supposed to 
measure. Additionally, and crucially for the conceptualization of Study 1, it is suggested 
which domain they probably tap in the arrangement of five components proposed by Smith 
and Jonides (1999).
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Table 4. Common tests of executive subcomponents ordered by Smith and Jonides’ components they probably 
tap (attention/inhibition, coding, task management, planning, monitoring).
Test
(+ short description)
Originally 
supposed to 
measure
Smith and Jonides’ components the test
probably taps
Author
Color Word 
Interference Test
(name printing-colors of 
color-words, instead of 
reading out the words)
inhibition/inference 
control, processing 
speed
attention/inhibition
(requires focusing attention on color and to 
inhibit the impulse of reading out the 
word)
Bäumler, 1985; 
Stroop, 1935
Go/No-Go
(react to target category 
stimuli and inhibit 
reaction to non-target 
stimuli)
attention, 
categorization, 
inhibition, reaction 
speed
attention/inhibition
(requires maintaining attention on 
emerging stimuli and inhibiting response 
to non-targets)
Mesulam, 1985
Stop Signal Task
(categorize stimuli 
categories by key stroke 
and inhibit response 
when acoustic signal 
occurs)
inhibition attention/inhibition
(requires maintaining attention on 
emerging stimuli and inhibiting response 
after acoustic signal)
Logan, 1994; 
Miyake et al., 
2000
TMT A
(connect numbers on 
paper in ascending 
order)
psychomotoric 
processing speed
attention(/inhibition)
(requires attention for visual search)
Reitan, 1958
TMT B
(connect numbers 
alternating with letters 
on paper in ascending 
order)
psychomotoric 
processing speed, 
divided attention, 
shifting
attention/inhibition, task management
(requires attention for visual search, 
inhibiting impulse of continuing 
connecting in the actual category, shifting 
between categories)
Reitan, 1958
Digit Symbol 
Substitution Test
(code digits into symbols 
as indicated in a coding-
key-table)
coding, 
psychomotoric 
processing speed, 
perceptual speed, 
coding
(requires quick coding of the information 
in the key table into working memory)
Royer, 1971; 
Wechsler, 1981
F-A-S
(name as many different 
words as possible 
starting with a particular 
letter)
verbal fluency, 
long-term memory 
access
unclear, may tap attention/inhibition for 
maintaining focus on the task, or 
monitoring to keep track of already named 
words
Benton & 
Hamsher, 1989
Five Point Test
(draw one or more 
straight lines between 
five point always 
resulting in unique 
patterns)
figural fluency, 
fluid and divergent 
thinking
unclear, may tap attention/inhibition for 
maintaining focus on the task, or 
monitoring to keep track of already used 
patterns
Regard, Strauss, 
& Knapp, 1982
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Semantic, categorical 
fluency tasks
(name as many words as 
possible alternating 
between two categories, 
e.g., sports and fruits)
verbal fluency, 
long-term memory 
access, shifting, 
cognitive flexibility
task management
(requires efficiently shifting between the 
categories and the strategies of memory 
search and word selection)
Aschenbrenner, 
Tucha, & 
Lange, 2000
Go/No-Go with 
flexibility demand
(like Go/No-Go, but 
target in one block are 
non-targets in the next 
and there are partly 
overlapping stimuli-
attributes, e.g. blue bird 
in one, red bird in other
category)
attention/inhibition, 
shifting
attention/inhibition, task management
(requires the same as Go/No-Go, but 
additionally flexible switching between the 
target categories)
Verdejo-García 
& Pérez-García, 
2007
Wisconsin/Modified 
Card Sorting Test
(sort cards with symbols 
according to unknown 
sorting rule (type, 
number or color of 
symbols) to target cards
categorization, rule 
detection, cognitive 
flexibility, shifting
depending on used variable. Non-
perseverative errors: planning trial and 
error sorting and monitoring its outcomes 
is required to quickly and systematically 
finding out the new sorting rule. 
Perseverative errors: task management and
cognitive flexibility is required to shift 
smoothly to a new rule
Berg, 1948; 
Nelson, 1976
Tower of London
(sorting different colored 
rings on three bars to a 
target position)
planning, inhibition depending on used variable. Number of 
moves: logical planning is required to 
reach target position in as few moves as 
possible. Number of rule violations: 
inhibition is required to abide to the rules 
instead of intuitively sorting the rings the 
“easier” way.
Shallice, 1982
Tower of Hanoi
(sorting rings of 
different sizes on three 
bars to a target position)
planning, inhibition planning and inhibition, alike Tower of 
London, but regarded as more 
complex/difficult.
Simon, 1975
Brixton Spatial 
Awareness Test
(observing changing 
position of different 
colors circles and 
predicting the next 
position)
rule detection monitoring is required to keep upright 
information about previous circle 
positions, in order to detect the rule and to 
abide to it consequently.
Burgess, 1997
Note. Attention/inhibition and coding are only mentioned as measured constructs, if the test is suggested to 
measure particularly these domains. Principally, these functions could be mentioned in all tasks, because 
following the hypothesis of a hierarchical arrangement, it should be necessary in each of the task to maintain 
attention, inhibit false responses, and code information into working memory. However, some tasks are designed 
in the way that the main variance is supposed to be produced by individual differences in higher level functions.
Thus the lower level functions that may be involved in solving the tasks are not mentioned additionally.
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There is a considerable number of studies with these and comparable tests of executive 
components. Many studies have also investigated the neurological bases of the different 
components. Jurado and Rosselli (2007) provided an overview about the results of 
neuroimaging studies that examined brain activations in a planning task (the Tower of 
London), attentional control tasks (e.g., the Color Word Interference Test), cognitive 
flexibility tasks (e.g., the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test), and different verbal fluency tasks. In 
almost all of the studies, investigating the different domains, prefrontal cortex activation has 
been associated with performing the tasks. Particularly, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
bilaterally seems to be involved in planning (Goethals et al., 2004; Morris, Ahmed, Syed, & 
Toone, 1993) and attentional control (Collette et al., 2001; Kaufmann et al., 2005). In 
cognitive flexibility, the superior medial frontal lobe seems to be activated additionally (Stuss 
& Knight, 2002). In fluency tasks, the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex was frequently found 
to be activated (Jahanshahi, Dirnberger, Fuller, & Frith, 2000; Phelps, Hyder, Blamire, & 
Shulman, 1997). Additionally, involvements of subcortical areas, such as the striatum or the 
anterior cingulate cortex, and the thalamus were found (Periáñez et al., 2004; Phelps et al., 
1997), underlining the connections between frontal, posterior, and subcortical areas (Collette 
& Van der Linden, 2002; Elliott, 2003). Some authors concluded that the prefrontal regions 
direct behavior but in order to work accurately they rely on the functionality of other regions 
providing informational input (Alvarez & Emory, 2006; Anderson, Northam, Hendy, & 
Wrenall, 2001).
In summary, behavioral and neurological investigations yielded convincing evidence 
for the assumption that executive functions are not a unitary system but are fractionated into 
interacting subcomponents. A systematic investigation of the role of the different
subcomponents for decision making under risk conditions has not been undertaken so far. 
This topic is addressed in Study 1 of this thesis.
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3.3. Goal setting
This chapter addresses the theory about and the research on goals and goal setting with 
respect to its role for human behavior. It has often been demonstrated that goals can affect 
human performance in working on different types of tasks. This has been regarded as an 
important topic because in the industrial society it was of high interest to discover ways to 
optimize human work performances (Locke & Latham, 2002). Nevertheless, it has so far only 
very rarely been investigated how goals affect performances in decision making. In life
decisions are frequently made with conscious knowledge about the own goals for the 
consequences. Often suchlike decisions are made under risk conditions. For example, before 
driving to a business meeting one might have to choose between longer and shorter routes 
with different probabilities for traffic jams, and this decision might be made with the goal to 
save as much of one’s time as possible. In private life decisions are also made with clear 
goals. For example when choosing between money investment models one may aim to gather 
a specific amount of money until a clearly defined point in time, in order to be able to pay the 
deposit for a real estate. In Study 2, the effects of explicit outcome goals for the performance 
in the GDT will be investigated. In the following a brief overview about the literature on the 
relationships between goal setting and performance will be presented.
Early theories about motivation suggested that there are inner drives which determine 
human behavior. It has been assumed that these motives, such as the need for achievement, 
operate unconsciously (McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell, 1953). Later, the view 
emerged and has gradually been established that humans have conscious purposes and goals,
which influence their behavior (Ryan, 1970). In this research, goals have been defined as „the 
object or aim of an action, for example, to attain a speciﬁc standard of proﬁciency, usually 
within a speciﬁed  time  limit”  (Locke & Latham, 2002, p. 1). Several studies have been
conducted that investigated how conscious goals affect behavior and performance and what 
the mechanisms behind the goal-performance relationship might be (for summaries see e.g., 
Locke & Latham, 2002, 2006). The central finding is that goals improve performances in
numerous different tasks (Locke & Latham, 1990) such as solving anagrams (Shah & 
Kruglanski, 2002), learning the contents of a university course (Latham & Brown, 2006), or 
in sport activities (Locke & Latham, 1985). However, the magnitude of improvement was 
found to depend on core attributes of the goal, specific mechanisms within the person, and 
moderating variables, such as attributes of the situation. Based on these findings, a theoretical 
model of goal setting was formulated by Locke and Latham (2002). The model is depicted in 
Figure 5.
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Figure 5. The model of goal setting with core attributes of the goal as direct influences on task performance, as 
well as variables moderating the goal-performance relationship (Locke & Latham, 2002).
The authors argue that the core attributes, which fundamentally determine the goal-
effect are the goal’s difficulty and its specificity. It has been found that the highest levels of 
effort and the best performances were attained when the goals were very high. Performance 
only decreased when reaching the goals was objectively impossible or when the limits of the 
person’s abilities was reached (e.g., Locke, 1982). Additionally, it has been observed that 
goals not only need to be difficult but also specific. Humans perform better when they have a 
clearly defined goal, instead of an ambiguous goal, such as to do ones best (Hall, Weinberg, 
& Jackson, 1987; Locke & Latham, 1990). As described in the review by Locke and Latham 
(2002), the experimentally induced effects of difficulty and specificity often had large effect 
sizes. However, in a few investigations it has been found that there are some cognitive tasks, 
such as maze-tracing tasks, in which performance was better with ambiguous goals (Sweller 
& Levine, 1982). Furthermore, persons with ambiguous goals were found to use more 
systematic problem-solving strategies than persons with explicit goals (Vollmeyer, 1996).
In the model, the effect of a goal’s core attribute on performance is suggested to be 
implemented by goal mechanisms and influenced by moderators. The first goal mechanism is 
the direction of attention toward goal relevant information. This involves the choice of goal 
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relevant activities: directing attention toward feedback about performance on goal relevant 
subtasks or choosing learning material that will help to approach the learning goal (Locke & 
Bryan, 1969; Rothkopf & Billington, 1979). The second mechanism is the insertion of effort. 
Goals can increase the amount of cognitive or physical energy an individual invests in a task 
(e.g., Bandura & Cervone, 1983). Besides increased momentary effort, a third mechanism, 
persistence, is triggered by goals. Individuals take effort for longer times when they have hard 
goals (LaPorte & Nath, 1976). As fourth mechanism, goals activate cognitive strategies. It is 
suggested that when being faced with a performance goal humans automatically begin to 
retrieve strategies from long-term memory or to develop new strategies for the given task by 
using available skills or knowledge (Latham & Baldes, 1975; Wood & Locke, 1990).
Additionally to the mechanisms triggered by goals Locke and Latham (2002)
suggested that three moderators affect the relationships between goal core, goal mechanisms,
and task performance. The main moderator is the personal commitment to the goal. 
Commitment comprises the experienced self-efficacy and the subjective evaluation of the 
goal’s importance. Individuals show stronger goal induced performance improvements if they 
experience mastery over the means that are required to reach the goal and if they evaluate the 
goal as important, for example after participating in its formulation (Erez, Earley, & Hulin, 
1985). The overall commitment is also suggested to be affected by previous experiences with 
the tasks, involving a person’s satisfaction with the own performance, and with the rewards 
that have followed performing on the task (Locke & Latham, 2002). These experiences are 
thought to determine the willingness to commit to new challenges and affect the commitment 
to the actual goal. The second moderator is feedback about the progress towards the goal. 
Persons need to be informed about their progress in order to determine whether goal 
mechanisms (e.g., effort or persistence) need to be increased in order to perform according to 
what the goal requires (Matsui, Okada, & Inoshita, 1983). The third moderator is the tasks 
complexity. This is a moderator because it influences the individual’s success of developing 
and applying a good strategy for the task. People differ in their ability to develop problem 
solving strategies. When the problem is simple the effect of goal setting on performance is 
large because in most individuals the goal triggers the development of an accurate goal-
oriented strategy. When the problem is more complex the effect of goal setting becomes 
smaller because only some of the people manage to develop a good strategy (Wood, Mento, & 
Locke, 1987).
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This model of goal setting assumes that several cognitive operations are responsible 
for realizing the effects of goals on performances. Among them are the direction of attention, 
processing of feedback, monitoring of success, or the development of strategies (Locke & 
Latham, 2002). These operations, which are suggested to be particularly induced by goals that 
are specific and difficult, are also thought to be directed by the central executive system
(Baddeley, 2003; Miyake et al., 2000; Smith & Jonides, 1999). Thus, executive functions are 
defined as functions responsible for realizing goal oriented behavior and cognition (see 3.2
and Lezak et al., 2004) and the same cognitive operations are also suggested to be involved in 
advantageous decision making under risk conditions (Brand et al., 2006). However, there are 
only a few studies, which have addressed the role of goals for decision making. These studies 
allowed only limited conclusions because the methods had shortcomings and the findings 
partly contradicted each other. In some studies, it has been found that goals can cause more 
advantageous decision making under ambiguity and under risk, but only under the influence 
of specific situational manipulations (Hassin, Bargh, & Zimerman, 2009; Schiebener et al., 
2012). Other studies reported increased risk taking, especially when the actual state of 
outcome was below the goal (D. Knight, Durham, & Locke, 2001; Lopes & Oden, 1999; 
Payne, Laughhunn, & Crum, 1980, 1981) (for more details please refer to the Introduction of 
Study 2). Given this scarcity of data, Locke and Latham (2002) called for studies on the 
relationship between goals and decision making. Furthermore, in case that the effects of goals 
on decision-making performance are comparable to the effects of goals on cognitive tasks, 
goal setting should be included as a variable in the specified model of decision making under 
risk conditions, which is aspired in this thesis. Thus, the role of goals for decision making 
under risk is investigated in Study 2.
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3.4. Assessment of decision-making competence
When aiming at investigating decision-making behavior it has to be regarded that 
decision-making competences can be assessed with a number of different tasks. This chapter 
is about a selection of the tasks that have previously been used in neuropsychological studies 
and in clinical diagnostic. It has to be noted that these tasks have not been developed to 
describe decision-making behavior or decision-making strategies in general. Most of the tasks 
have originally been developed in order to reveal decision-making impairments in patient 
population and to reveal the reasons for these impairments, such as reduction in 
neurocognitive functioning or emotional processing (Bechara et al., 1994; Brand et al., 2006; 
Sinz et al., 2008; Zamarian et al., 2008). Furthermore, the tasks have been applied to 
investigate the mechanisms involved in decision making in healthy individuals (e.g., Bayard, 
Raffard, et al., 2011; Brand, Laier, et al., 2009; see also the overview in chapter 3.1.3 and 
Table 3).
In the following four of these tasks will be compared. The IGT, the CGT, and the 
GDT because these have been mentioned as the most important decision-making tasks in 
neuropsychological research (Gleichgerrcht et al., 2010). As a fourth task the PAG task is 
included in the comparison because this has frequently been applied in recent studies (e.g., 
Schiebener et al., 2011; Zamarian et al., 2008, 2011). The aim of this chapter is not to 
describe the tasks in detail, but to point to similarities and differences between them
(descriptions of the tasks can be found in 3.1.3 and in the Methods section of Study 3). The 
comparison will take place along three criteria: The tasks’ levels of ambiguity, situational 
stability, and complexity. The level of ambiguity is chosen as a criterion because one core 
attribute of a task is to what extent it measures decision making under ambiguity or under risk
and this can determine the amount of different cognitive and emotional processes involved in 
processing on the task (Brand et al., 2006; Schiebener et al., 2011). Situational stability has 
been chosen because the introduced models of decision making suggest long-term strategies 
to be involved in decision making. The stability of the situation should crucially determine the 
possibility to develop a long-term strategy (Brand, Fujiwara, et al., 2005; Brand et al., 2006). 
Complexity is a criterion because it may be important for the amount of cognitive demands
that are required to process the decision-making situation accurately (e.g., to understand the 
rule for gains and losses) (Finucane & Lees, 2005). 
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Level of ambiguity. The IGT is the only tasks of the selected three tasks, which has 
been designed as measure of decision making under ambiguity. It is the most ambiguous task, 
because no explicit information about the possible outcomes and their probabilities is
provided to the decision maker. Furthermore, the number of trials is not mentioned and the 
final capital is displayed only graphically, not as exact amounts (Bechara et al., 1994; 
Bechara, 2007). In the GDT, CGT, and the PAG task the participants are explicitly informed 
about the rules for gains and losses and their probabilities. However, some ambiguity is 
involved because in all cases the exact numerical probabilities can only be calculated instead 
of being explicitly given in numerical format. In the GDT, they can be calculated by dividing 
the number of sides the die has by the number of numbers the participant bets on. In the CGT 
the ratio of blue and red boxes determines the winning probability. In the PAG task the ratio 
of blue and red cubes determines the winning probability in the lottery gamble. The CGT and 
the PAG involve some further ambiguity because the tasks do not inform about the number of 
trials to be played. Additionally, in the CGT the participant does not know the amount of the 
next bet. After having decided for one or the other color, a bet amount is displayed for five 
seconds and then it is raised automatically by the computer. The participant has to press a 
button in order to bet the currently displayed amount or can wait for the next, unknown,
higher amount. In the PAG task some ambiguity is caused by the probability presentation 
format. It is improbable that the participants manage to count the 24 red or blue cubes in order 
calculate the probability. Thus the decision can presumably only be made on the basis of an 
estimation of the ratio. By contrast, in the GDT, there is no further ambiguity than the already 
mentioned probability presentation format. All other information is explicitly provided (e.g., 
the number of trials to play or the exact capital). 
Situational stability. In all four decision-making paradigms the task of the participant 
as well as the number of options to choose from remains stable. However, in the CGT and the 
PAG task the rules for gains and losses change from trial to trial. In both tasks the ratio of 
blue and red boxes or cubes changes. Additionally, the possible amounts change. In the CGT 
the ascending bet amounts are different from trial to trial and in the PAG task the fixum can 
be a gain or a loss. Furthermore, there is a ten seconds time limit for the decision in the PAG 
task. After the ten seconds, the fixum is automatically chosen and the next lottery is 
presented. In the CGT there is a five second time limit for choosing a bet amount. Thereafter, 
a higher amount is presented. In the IGT the amount of the outcomes differ from trial to trial. 
In the GDT the situation remains stable in all trials. The options are the same in all trials, as 
well as the probabilities for gains and losses and their possible heights.
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Complexity. The complexity of the task is defined by the number of available options
and the simplicity of the presentation of information about probabilities, gains, and losses. 
The CGT and the PAG task seem to have the lowest degree of complexity. In both tasks it has 
to be decided between two options, betting on blue or red in the CGT, and gambling or taking 
the fixum in the PAG task. In the CGT the betting phase that follows after the decision for red 
or blue causes additional complexity compared to the PAG task. However, in the PAG task 
the probability presentation is more complex because there are 24 blue or red items, while 
there are only ten items in the CGT. In contrast to the CGT and the PAG task, the IGT is more 
complex with regard to the number of available options (four), but there is no information 
explicitly provided about probabilities or possible gains. However, one may argue that this 
makes the task very complex, because in order to understand the task’s rules the participants 
would need to infer them from the varying amounts of gains and losses indicated in the 
feedback. Regarding the number of available options, the GDT is the most complex task 
because there are 14 alternatives. However, there are only four different amounts of money 
that can be won or lost. These are associated with the four risk classes (betting on one, two, 
three, or four numbers together) in which the options could be categorized (please note that 
this categorization requires cognitive operations of complexity-reduction, which may not be 
fully intact in all individuals). Nevertheless, the GDT has previously been regarded as a 
comparably complex task because of the possibility to apply long-term strategies: The 
participants have to decide how to gamble, instead of only whether to gamble or not, such as 
in the PAG task (Brand & Markowitsch, 2010). 
Because of the differences regarding these three criteria, advantageous decision 
making in the tasks is supposed to rely to different amounts on several cognitive domains 
(e.g., Schiebener et al., 2011). Higher levels of ambiguity might increase the demand on 
emotional/intuitive processing, because there is not enough information available for solving 
the tasks based on cognitive processing. In this case making advantageous decisions requires 
to learn from the feedback and to anticipate rewards and punishments intuitively by 
processing emotional signals in the body periphery (Bechara & Damasio, 2005; A. R. 
Damasio, 1994). Nevertheless, when the decision maker better understands the rules for gains 
and losses the contribution of executive functions should increase, as has been demonstrated 
in studies with the IGT (Brand, Recknor, et al., 2007; Y.-T. Kim et al., 2011). Furthermore, 
the dependence on feedback varies with the amount of ambiguity: When the information 
Theoretical background 62
about the rules is complete and explicit, principally no feedback needs to be required for 
finding out which alternatives are advantageous. If the situation is ambiguous the profit from 
and the dependency on feedback should increase (see also the arguments in Brand, Laier, et 
al., 2009; Brand, 2008).
The level of situational stability has been suggested to further determine the impacts of 
different executive functions on decision-making performance (Brand, Fujiwara, et al., 2005; 
Brand & Markowitsch, 2010). In situations that vary from trial to trial, such as in the CGT 
and the PAG task, cognitive flexibility may be required (Zamarian et al., 2011). Additionally, 
in the PAG task, best performance is achieved if switches are made between choosing the 
fixum and the lottery: In high winning probability conditions it is advantageous to switch 
from the very save, conservative fixum to gambling in the lottery. In other words, deciding 
conservatively is not always the best option in the task. Thus, it is suggested that the PAG 
task measures decision-making performance sparsely influenced by the general tendency to 
avoid risks (Sinz et al., 2008). In the CGT and the PAG tasks the time for making decisions is 
limited and therefore advantageous decision making may also require a certain amount of 
attention and a minimum speed of processing. In the more stable tasks, the GDT and the IGT, 
the development of long-term strategies is possible. Particularly, in the GDT a reasoned long-
term strategy can be planned from the very beginning. Furthermore, the success of this 
strategy can be monitored over the course of the task by using the feedback of previous trials. 
Additionally, it is possible to revise the strategy if necessary. Thus, reasoning abilities and 
higher level executive functions have been found to be involved in decision making in the 
GDT (see e.g., Brand, Laier, et al., 2009; Euteneuer et al., 2009, and chapter 3.1.3).
The complexity of the task may affect the cognitive effort that is required to find out 
which alternatives are advantageous. For example, if there are more options, more 
information about their attributes need to receive attention and to be coded into working 
memory representations. Comparing these options with regard to their favorability (e.g., in 
terms of expected values) should then also be more taxing with regard to cognitive effort. The 
load on memory may additionally be increased when the feedback varies from trial to trial, 
like in the IGT.
These differences between the tasks and the associated varying demands on cognitive 
and emotional processes were suggested as explanations for differential decision-making 
impairments of patient populations in one task, but not in the other. For example, this has 
been reported for patients with Parkinson’s disease who were sometimes found to be impaired 
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in the IGT (e.g., Delazer et al., 2009; Ibarretxe Bilbao et al., 2009). However, sometimes they 
were not impaired in the IGT, but in the GDT (Euteneuer et al., 2009). Another study found 
that they were impaired in the CGT (Roshan Cools et al., 2003), while a further result 
suggested that they were impaired in the PAG task, but only when they had symptoms of 
dementia (Delazer et al., 2009). These results seem to be in inconsistent. One reasons for the 
inconsistent findings might be that impairments in decision making are due to the medication 
the patients received (Roshan Cools et al., 2003). However, it remains unclear how the 
existing differences between the tasks affected the differential results. Therefore, the results’ 
interpretability is constrained. The differences between the tasks may be regarded as a 
methodological problem. A further problem of the tasks is caused by a similarity. All of them 
take place in gambling scenarios and have only little in common with real-world decision-
making situations. This may decrease the ecological validity of measurement. It would be 
desirable for theoretical research and for clinical diagnostics to have a common decision-
making scenario, which consist only of a minimum of gambling cues, and in which the level 
of ambiguity, the level of stability, and the level of complexity could be varied systematically. 
The first step into this direction is taken in Study 3 of this thesis. In this study, a new 
framework for the assessment of decision-making competences is evaluated. This framework 
allows the implementation of several decision-making problems within one common story 
line in which experimental manipulations can be flexibly realized.
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4. Conclusion from theoretical background
After this literature review it becomes obvious that decision-making research is a 
broad field, in which a lot of knowledge has already been gained about the emotional and 
cognitive factors that determine the competence to choose advantageously in different 
situations. Nevertheless, there are still remarkable gaps in the theoretical approaches, 
especially regarding decisions under risk conditions. Furthermore, in research practice and 
clinical application decision-making abilities are still inconsistently measured. In this thesis 
theoretical as well as practical progress is aspired. First, the theoretical model of decision 
making under risk conditions is supposed to be specified. Therefore, research is necessary, 
particularly regarding the contributions of different executive subcomponents to the decision 
making-process. Additionally, the effects of goal setting on decision making should be 
investigated. Second, this thesis aims at evaluating a unitary method for the measurement of 
decision-making abilities. This is supposed to be useful in research and in clinical diagnostic. 
These theoretical and methodological progresses are not only important for 
understanding how advantageous decisions under risk are made and how they may be 
improved in everyday lives of healthy individual. The findings might also support the 
development of domain-specific techniques for therapy and training programs for patients,
who suffer from problems with making advantageous decisions.
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5. Study 1: Contributions of different executive functions to decision 
making under risk conditions - Test of a structural equation model.
5.1. Abstract
The complex process of decision making under risk is supposed to recruit executive 
functions. Several studies showed that advantageous decision making is often accompanied 
by good executive functioning. How single components of the executive function system 
contribute differentially to the decision-making process has not been clarified so far. We 
investigated direct and indirect influences of different executive functions on performance in 
a laboratory decision-making task, the Game of Dice Task (GDT). Based on Brand’s model of 
decisions under risk (2006) and the definition of executive functions by Smith and Jonides 
(1999) we modeled three latent variables, representing the executive domains supposed to be 
involved in decision making. The domains were situation processing (consisting of coding 
and attention/inhibition tasks), flexibility (including task management tasks), and strategy 
management (measured by planning and monitoring tasks). The results of a structural 
equation model indicated that particularly the latent dimension strategy management 
influenced decision making under risk directly, while situation processing and flexibility had 
no direct but an indirect effect: Mediation analysis suggests that situation processing affects 
decision making mediated by strategy management. As supposed in the model of decision 
making under risk, especially higher level control processes including planning and 
monitoring seem to affect decision-making performance. Lower level functions such as 
coding, and attention/inhibition are elementary components that are required for the 
functioning of the higher level processes.
5.2. Introduction
5.2.1. Overview
Executive functions are considered as a set of different functions of cognitive control. 
They control goal oriented behaviors in several environmental contexts (see e.g. Lezak et al., 
2004). It is supposed that these functions are fundamentally involved in decision making, 
especially under risk conditions. In these situations, strategies can be planned and applied, 
given that the decision situation provides explicit information about the rules for the 
occurrence of positive or negative outcomes (Brand et al., 2006). In several previous studies 
correlations between advantageous decision making under risk and performances in executive 
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tasks have been reported (e.g., Brand et al., 2009; Euteneuer et al., 2009), but it has not been 
demonstrated yet, to what extent different sub-functions of the executive system contribute to 
the processes in decisions under risk. In the work at hand, we use a structural equation model 
(SEM) approach to investigate the role of different executive functions and their interactions 
for decision-making performance under risk conditions.
In the following, the previous theoretical considerations and empirical findings that 
lead to the question of the current work will shortly be reviewed, with a focus on relationships 
between measures of decision making and measures of executive functions. The assumptions 
summarized in Brand’s model of decision making under risk (Brand et al., 2006) and in Smith 
and Jonides’ model of executive functions (Smith & Jonides, 1999) will be used to derive the 
hypothesized SEM that aims at decomposing the role of different executive functions in 
decisions under risk.
5.2.2. Decision making and executive functions
In real life and in laboratory research decisions are often made under ambiguity or risk 
(see Yates & Stone, 1992 and chapter 3.1). Under conditions of ambiguity the decider does 
not know the rules and probabilities for the occurrence of potential positive and negative 
consequences. Therefore, the decision needs to be rather based on emotional reactions learned 
from the feedback of previous trials. These emotional reactions, often perceived as hunches 
and guesses, can bias toward choosing from advantageous alternatives, and can prevent 
individuals from choosing disadvantageous alternatives (Bechara et al., 1997). Previous 
studies with the IGT provided evidence for the assumption that bodily emotional reactions (so 
called somatic markers) can bias the decision maker toward the advantageous alternatives 
(Bechara et al., 1994, 1999; Blakemore & Robbins, 2012; Dunn et al., 2006). To what extent 
cognitive functions also predict behavior in the IGT is still discussed. While some works 
suggest that good IGT performance does not require conscious cognition (Bechara et al., 
1997; Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 2005; Toplak et al., 2010) others report that 
cognitive processes, like executive functions and conscious knowledge about the cards 
contingencies are also fundamentally involved in decision making in the IGT (Gansler, 
Jerram, Vannorsdall, & Schretlen, 2011; Maia & McClelland, 2004). Regarding decisions 
under ambiguity in the IGT, there has already been an SEM study investigating the role of 
individual differences in cognitive abilities for decision-making performance (Gansler et al., 
2011). In this study three latent dimensions of cognitive functioning were defined: attention, 
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general neuropsychological ability, and executive functions. The dimensions were used as 
predictors of IGT performance in the initial 40 trials and the last 60 trials of the task. It was 
found that particularly in the latter trials if the IGT basic attention functions as well as higher 
executive control functions predict IGT performance. This result also supported the idea that 
particularly, in the later trials the participants seem to arrive at an understanding about the 
attributes of the decks. This may also explain why the behavior in the later trials of the IGT is 
correlated with decision-making behavior under objective or “explicit” risk conditions (Brand, 
Recknor, et al., 2007; Y.-T. Kim et al., 2011). (For detailed information on the topic of 
decision making under ambiguity please refer to chapter 3.1.2.)
In decisions under clearly objective risk conditions, the rules for gains and losses are 
explicitly available to the decider. The probabilities linked to the given alternatives are either 
provided explicitly or are at least calculable. When additionally these rules remain stable over 
duration of the decision task, the decider can develop and apply cognitive strategies from the 
beginning (Brand, Heinze, et al., 2008). The processes probably involved in decision making 
under risk have been described on the theoretical level in a model by Brand and colleagues 
(2006; described in detail in chapter 3.1.3 and depicted in Figure 3). The beginning of the 
decision-making process is marked by the decision situation providing information about 
probabilities and possible outcomes such as gains or losses. Working memory is thought to 
hold representations of these features and to recall experiences with the given or other 
decision situations and knowledge about certain situational aspects. Executive functions are 
supposed to process on the working memory contents with the task to categorize options, to 
select information, and to develop decision strategies, as well as to apply them systematically. 
These operations are supposed to lead to the decision. After the decision, there may be 
feedback about the outcome. This can be handled on two routes: A cognitive and an 
emotional route. On the cognitive route executive functions are required to use feedback for 
conscious monitoring of the decision strategy’s success and for the revision of the current 
strategy. On the emotional route the feedback causes an emotional reaction making it possible 
to automatically develop hunches and guesses (somatic markers) toward the options that are 
less risky than others. As can be seen, the role of executive functions is assumed at different 
stages of the model, but it is not specified in detail which executive functions are required 
within the different cognitive processes and how they collaborate with each other.
When considering the literature, it is apparent that there is so far no unitary definition 
of executive functions (see chapter 3.2). Nevertheless, the different existing definitions 
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principally agree that executive functions are control systems allowing humans to regulate 
behavior that is planned, goal oriented, flexible, and effective (Anderson, Anderson, & 
Jacobs, 2008; Jurado & Rosselli, 2007; Lezak et al., 2004; Shallice & Burgess, 1996). For this 
purpose executive functions participate in a working-memory system, in which they have the 
task to manipulate the information held in short term storage (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; 
Baddeley, 1998; Smith & Jonides, 1999). Furthermore, models propose different 
arrangements of sub-domains of executive functions. A relatively detailed taxonomy of five 
sub-domains was suggested by Smith and Jonides (1999). The five domains have been found 
to be differently allocated in areas of the prefrontal cortex. The domains and their tasks are: 
attention and inhibition (directing attention to relevant cues and inhibiting irrelevant 
information and reactions), task management (organizing sequential operations on complex 
tasks by scheduling subtasks and switching attention between them), planning (sequentially 
planning subtasks to advance toward a goal), monitoring (determining the next step in a 
sequential task by checking and updating working memory contents), and coding (coding 
representations in working memory, and linking them to time and place of occurrence). (For 
more details on subcomponents of executive functions please refer to the theoretical 
background section 3.2.2.)
Smith and Jonides (1999) pointed out that there should be different levels of executive 
functions. They defined attention/inhibition and task management as “the most elementary” 
(p. 1596; Smith & Jonides, 1999) functions and by that probably meant that these two 
functions have to perform basic processes that are necessary to perform other higher level 
functions, such as planning and monitoring. For example, planning different tasks requires to 
focus attention on them and to switch between them. In other literature on executive functions 
different levels have also been assumed. For example, a subdivision into three functions has 
often been used. These three are inhibition, updating and shifting (N. P. Friedman et al., 2006, 
2008; Jurado & Rosselli, 2007; Miyake et al., 2000; Miyake & Friedman, 2012; Salthouse, 
Atkinson, & Berish, 2003). Miyake and colleagues (2000) pointed out that this division is not 
exhaustive, but covers only the most basic functions of the executive system, and it omits 
higher level functions, like planning and monitoring.
The role of executive functions for decision making under risk has frequently been 
investigated using the Game of Dice Task (GDT; Brand et al., 2005). The task provides 
explicit rules for gains and losses and their probabilities, and these rules remain stable over 
the task’s duration (for a detailed description of the GDT see 3.1.3 or the methods section 
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5.3.3). The GDT has recently been mentioned as one of the most important measures of 
decision making (Gleichgerrcht et al., 2010) and has been used in various studies with 
different patient populations, for example patients with schizophrenia (Fond et al., 2012), 
binge eating disorder (Svaldi et al., 2010), narcolepsy (Bayard, Abril, et al., 2011), or restless 
legs syndrome (Bayard et al., 2010). Especially, decision-making performance of patients 
with specific neurological disorders, resulting in executive dysfunctions, was compared to 
performance of healthy control participants. Examples are patients with prefrontal cortex 
damage (Brand, Kalbe, et al., 2004), Korsakoff’s syndrome (Brand, Fujiwara, et al., 2005; 
Brand, Pawlikowski, et al., 2009), Parkinson’s disease (Brand, Labudda, et al., 2004; 
Euteneuer et al., 2009; Rossi et al., 2010), or Alzheimer’s disease (Delazer et al., 2007). In 
various studies also other decision tasks than the GDT were used to investigate the roles of 
executive function deficits for decision making under risk (e.g., Rogers et al., 1999; Manes et 
al., 2002; Sinz et al., 2008).
The results from such behavioral studies lead to the relatively clear conclusion that 
executive functions are important in making decisions under risk conditions. Together with 
impairments in executive functions the patients showed, compared to healthy controls, more 
preference for the highly risky options in the GDT. Additionally, correlations between 
performances in executive functioning tests and decision-making performance were observed 
and had moderate or sometimes high effect sizes (Brand, Pawlikowski, et al., 2009; Drechsler 
et al., 2008; Euteneuer et al., 2009; Fond et al., 2012; Mäntylä, Still, Gullberg, & Del Missier, 
2012). In healthy participants the role of executive functions in risky choice situations has 
also been investigated, in order to understand the mechanisms contributing to normal healthy 
decision-making behavior. In line with the findings in patient samples relationships between 
executive domain tests and decision tasks were found (Brand, Laier, et al., 2009; Brand & 
Markowitsch, 2010; Del Missier, Mäntylä, & Bruine de Bruin, 2012; Schiebener et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, participants with very good executive abilities seem to be less negatively 
influenced by distracting information about the decision situation (Schiebener et al., 2012). 
Additionally, it has been demonstrated that not only executive functions, but also working 
memory functions, which are closely related to the executive system, are required for making 
good decisions under risk (Starcke et al., 2011).
In healthy individuals variances in decision making were explained by executive 
functions in the low to moderate effect size range (variance explanations about 5-30%). This 
indicates that of course other person variables (such as impulsivity; Bayard et al., 2011) and 
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situational influences (such as task complexity or acute stress; Brand & Markowitsch, 2010; 
Finucane & Lees, 2005; Starcke & Brand, 2012) should affect choice behavior. The evidences 
from behavioral studies addressing the role of executive functions where also supported by 
brain functioning studies examining brain activations while decisions under risk were made 
(Labudda et al., 2008; R. D. Rogers, Owen, et al., 1999). These showed activations in regions 
involved in higher level executive processes, especially responsible for working memory 
functions, behavioral flexibility, and conflict management (e.g. dorsolateral and orbitofrontal 
prefrontal cortex, as well as anterior cingulate cortex).
As can be judged from this short literature review, there has already been a high 
number of studies that have made valuable contributions to our understanding of the relations 
between decision making and executive domains (see also chapter 3.1.3 and Table 3). 
However, detailed conclusions concerning the composition of the executive mechanisms 
underlying decision making under objective risk conditions remain unattained. One of the 
reasons is that neuropsychological background testing was often not designed for theory 
driven analysis but rather for simple comparisons of some basic neurocognitive functions 
(e.g., Brand et al., 2005; Zamarian et al., 2010). If broader executive assessment had been 
applied, this was not used for advanced statistical evaluation (e.g., Drechsler et al., 2008). 
Another reason is that, especially in patient studies, sample sizes are often too small for 
complex path- or structural equation modeling. Furthermore, samples in decision-making 
research are often artificial because of over proportional representation of students and young 
participants (Chu & Spires, 2000; Cokely & Kelley, 2009; Lejarraga & Gonzalez, 2011; 
Samuels & Whitecotton, 2011; Schiebener et al., 2012, to mention only some). Investigating 
samples with such narrow ranges in age and educational status may on the one hand help to 
reduce variance that is not controlled for. On the other hand the “real” variance in cognitive 
functions that are age sensitive (Boone, 1999; Charlton et al., 2008; Grady, Springer, 
Hongwanishkul, McIntosh, & Winocur, 2006; Salthouse et al., 2003; Salthouse & Miles, 
2002; R. West, 2000) may only poorly be represented in such samples.
Because of the mentioned methodological limitations, in most cases only zero-order 
correlations or sometimes multiple regressions have been reported between decision-making 
performances under risk and standard measures of different executive sub-functions. Most of 
these analyses yielded low to moderate effect sizes. In the following, we shortly sum up some 
of the found simple relationships between measures of different executive functions and of 
decision making, to see whether conclusions about the differential involvement of executive 
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sub-functions can be made. Correlations between decision tasks and the Wisconsin Card 
Sorting Test (WCST; Berg, 1948; Heaton et al., 1993; Nyhus & Barceló, 2009) or its 
modified version (MCST; Nelson, 1976) have been reported in several studies (e.g., Brand et 
al., 2006; Brand et al., 2009; Schiebener et al., 2012, 2011). The test is referred to as an 
executive task supposed to measure higher level functions, like planning, monitoring, rule 
learning, problem solving, or categorization (see also Miyake et al., 2000). With performances 
in n-back paradigms (A. R. A. Conway et al., 2005) also moderate correlations have been 
found previously (Starcke et al., 2011). This task is often used as test of working memory 
functions, but requires not only working memory capacity but also executive processes, 
especially monitoring (A. R. A. Conway et al., 2005). Furthermore, decision making 
significantly correlated with time needed in the Trail Making Test (TMT; Reitan, 1958) in 
version A and B (Schiebener et al., 2011; Zamarian et al., 2008) or only in version B but not 
A (Brand, Laier, et al., 2009). Version A is supposed to measure psychomotoric processing 
speed while version B is regarded to tap into inhibition as well as shifting abilities and into 
divided attention. Correlations between decision making and simple attention/inhibition tasks, 
like the Color Word Interference Test (CWIT; Bäumler, 1985; Stroop, 1935) were reported 
around zero and not significant (Brand, Fujiwara, et al., 2005). Unfortunately, only few 
studies applied theory guided test batteries of executive functions together with decision-
making tasks. Drechsler and colleagues (2008) reported correlations between GDT 
performances and the scores of the Behavior Rating Inventory of Executive Function (BRIEF; 
Gioia et al., 2000), in which parents of adolescents were asked to rate executive abilities of 
their children in different sub-domains (e.g., inhibition, shifting, working memory, planning, 
and monitoring; please note the problems concerning the validity of questionnaire measures 
of executive functioning; Toplak et al., 2012). In the small samples of 24 healthy participants 
the correlations descriptively seem to be stronger when regarding executive abilities of rather 
higher levels (shifting, monitoring, organization), but weaker in basic functions (initiation, 
inhibition, working memory) (In the study, the GDT was played two times. Here, we refer 
only to the correlations from the first time the task was administered). In contrast, in the 
patient group of 23 patients with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), the 
correlations were descriptively higher with the scores of the basic functions, inhibition, and 
initiation. This indicates that problems with these abilities explain a part of the decision 
making problems in ADHD. 
This analysis of previously reported zero-order correlations in healthy individuals 
seem to indicate that correlations have frequently been found between decision making under 
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risk and higher level executive functions, but less steadily with very basic functions. But still, 
as mentioned above, a systematic approach with a clear prior conceptualization of executive 
functions is missing. This gap is supposed to be filled with the current study.
5.2.3. The current study – a latent dimension model to test the role of 
different executive functions in decisions under risk
In this work we apply the division into five executive functions, as suggested by Smith 
and Jonides (1999): attention/inhibition, task management, planning, monitoring, and coding. 
We decided to apply this taxonomy because it includes very basic components as well as 
higher level functions which potentially direct the basic components. Based on this structure, 
we model the executive components within different parts of the decision-making process as 
it has been proposed in Brand’s model (Brand et al., 2006). As outlined above, the model 
suggests that executive functions should participate in different cognitive procedures, 
accounting for advantageous decision making.
The most basic procedure is the perception of the relevant information offered by the 
situation as well as the implementation of this representation in working memory. We call this 
function situation processing. As the second function, Brand’s model (Brand et al., 2006)
supposes that decision options need to be categorized by their features and accordingly they 
should be evaluated cognitively. The main features of the options are their possible gains and 
losses and their probabilities. For categorization and cognitive evaluation it is required to 
resolve the cognitive conflict between possible gains and their related probabilities. The 
conflict is that favorably high gains are related to unfavorably low winning probabilities, 
while low gains are related to high winning probabilities. Resolving this conflict appropriately 
should require the ability to be flexible by sharing attention and by shifting between the two 
categories (gain heights vs. probabilities). Therefore, we call this function flexibility. As the 
third function, Brand’s model suggest that a decision strategy is developed, its application 
planned, and its success monitored. This possibly leads to an adaption of the strategy. This 
function is called strategy management. 
Within the three processes – situation processing, flexibility, and strategy management 
– different executive functions, as defined by Smith and Jonides (1999), should be required. 
Situation processing should include coding and attention/inhibition. Information about the 
decision situation needs to be coded into working memory representations and attention is 
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necessary to process the relevant features of the situation. Inhibition is important to suppress 
the processing of irrelevant information and to inhibit unplanned behaviors (Hobson & Leeds, 
2002; Miyake et al., 2000; Smith & Jonides, 1999). Flexibility should require task 
management abilities, including shifting of attention, and switching effectively between 
relevant categories (gains/probabilities) (Miyake et al., 2000; Smith & Jonides, 1999; 
Verdejo-García & Pérez-García, 2007). Strategy management should include planning and 
monitoring functions. These are necessary to plan a strategy, perform actions according to the 
strategy as well as monitoring its success (Borkowsky & Burke, 1996; Smith & Jonides, 
1999). Based on the specifications in Brand’s model, it can be assumed that the very 
elementary situation processing is not directly involved in the final decision-making process, 
but is a precondition, required by the two higher level processes – flexibility and strategy 
management – which should directly affect decision-making behavior under risk conditions. 
For example, the higher level process strategy management includes monitoring of the 
success of a decision-making strategy. This monitoring function should “recruit” lower level 
situation processing, because this is necessary to make monitoring possible (Smith & Jonides, 
1999). In detail, for monitoring it is necessary that attention is focused on the heights of 
occurring gains or losses and that this information is coded into working memory. Part A of 
Figure 1 depicts Brand’s model of decision making and highlights the processes in which 
executive functions should pronouncedly be involved. Part B of Figure 6 shows the 
empirically testable model that projects these executive functions. The current study was 
designed in order to test whether this model will find empirical support and in order to 
describe the executive processes’ differential influences on decision-making performance 
under risk conditions.
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Figure 6. The model of decision making under risk conditions and the suggested latent variable model of 
executive functions.
Part A. The model of decision making under risk, as suggested by Brand et al. (2006). Executive functions 
should particularly participate in three sub-processes: (1) basal processing of the decision situation, (2) 
categorizing alternatives and their risks, (3) and developing and managing a decision strategy initially as well as 
by monitoring the feedback from a series of decision trials. In the figure, the processes in which executive 
functions should be pronouncedly relevant are colored in full black.
Part B. The latent variable model that is tested in the study at hand. It projects the assumptions in Brand’s model, 
suggesting three processes, which mainly require executive functions. Basal executive functions, like coding 
situation features into working memory and holding attention on relevant features, are supposed to be the 
precondition for two more complex processes. These two are flexibility and strategy management. Flexibility, as 
representing task management functions, is assumed to participate in categorization and conflict management 
(e.g., the conflict of high possible gains being connected to high risk). The executive functions required for 
strategy management guide the development, the application, monitoring, and the revision of strategies, initially 
as well as in reaction to feedback.
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To test the model, we gathered a large sample of participants with a respectable age 
range and heterogeneous in education and actual professional status. All participants 
completed the GDT and an extensive battery of executive tests, with at least two tests,
representing each of the three latent executive domains (situation processing, flexibility, 
strategy management).
5.3. Method
5.3.1. Participants
In total, 270 brain-healthy participants (113 males, 157 females), aged 18-86 years (M 
= 34.44 years, SD = 16.35 years) were assessed. Of them, 96 (36 %) were students. All were 
recruited by local advertisement and tested at the department of General Psychology: 
Cognition, at the University of Duisburg-Essen. They were paid €20 for participation, 
students received credits for courses. None of the participants had a history of neurological or 
psychiatric diseases, as determined by screening interview and self-report questionnaire. The 
study was approved by a local ethics committee. Participants who were 50 years or older were
screened for dementia with the DemTect (Kalbe et al., 2004), but none of them showed signs 
of dementia (DemTect scores were 13 or higher).
5.3.2. Instruments/Procedure
As a measure of decision making under risk, the GDT was used (Brand, Fujiwara, et 
al., 2005). After the GDT, a series of neuropsychological tests was administered to the 
participants. In the following we present the paradigms used to tap the three executive 
domains supposed to be involved in decision making: situation processing (coding, 
attention/inhibition), flexibility (task management), strategy management (monitoring, 
planning). More detailed descriptions of the tasks can be found in Lezak et al. (2004). Please 
note that the tasks are not suggested to tap exclusively the domain which we assigned them to. 
The multivariate CFA and SEM approaches used in this study, build latent variables from the 
manifest measures (i.e., the used tasks). The latent variables then represent the variance that is 
shared among the manifest variables assigned to one domain. Therefore, it is in preparation 
for CFA and SEM analyzes, not sufficient to regard, which domain the task was originally 
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supposed to measure. Instead, when assigning manifest variables to latent dimensions, it has 
in the first place to be considered, which tasks strongly share what is aimed to be represented 
by the latent variable.
Additionally to the executive tests, the LPS subtest reasoning was applied to all 
participants in order to estimate general intelligence (Horn, 1983). Furthermore, subsamples 
but not all participants additionally completed the IGT, further tests of executive functions as 
well as questionnaires of which the data are not reported here. Overall the investigation lasted 
1.5 to 2.5 hours (about two hours on average). All experimenters were experienced with 
neuropsychological investigations and were carefully trained in the correct administration of 
the tasks.
5.3.3. Decision making under risk – Game of Dice Task
The Game of Dice Task (GDT; Brand et al., 2005) measures decision making under 
risk conditions. In the computerized task participants have the goal to increase the fictitious 
capital of €1,000 in18 throws of one virtual die. Each time before the die is thrown, 
participants guess which number (1-6) will occur. Then the die is thrown and the participants 
win if they have guessed correctly and lose if they have guessed wrong. They can bet on one 
single number or a combination of two, three, or four numbers. Participants win if the chosen 
number or one of the numbers among the chosen combination is thrown. If one of the other 
numbers is thrown, they lose. For example, they can bet on one single number, such as the 
number “2”. Then the die is thrown. If the number “2” occurs on top of the die, €1,000 is 
won. If one of the other numbers occurs (the 1, 3, 4, 5, or 6), €1,000 is lost. When betting on 
two numbers, such as on the numbers “1” and “2”, the related gain/loss is €500. The die is 
thrown and €500 is won if the number “1” or “2” occurs and €500 is lost if one of the other 
numbers occurs (the 3, 4, 5, or 6). Analogously, the participants can also bet on three numbers 
or on four numbers. Each option is associated with explicit, stable gains and losses and 
probabilities: €1,000 gain/loss for the choice of a single number (winning probability 1:6), 
€500 gain/loss for two numbers (winning probability 2:6), €200 gain/loss for three numbers 
(winning probability 3:6), and €100 gain/loss for four numbers (winning probability 4:6). 
Participants are instructed about all rules for gains and losses as well as the number of trials. 
Accompanied by distinct sounds, the actual gains/losses are presented on the screen after each 
throw and the actual overall capital is as well as the number of remaining rounds are 
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permanently actualized and visualized (for a detailed description of the GDT see Brand et al., 
2005). 
The alternatives can be grouped into “highly risky”, “disadvantageous” decisions (one 
or two numbers with a winning probability less than 34%) and “lowly risky”, “advantageous” 
decisions (three or four numbers with a winning probability of 50% and higher). In the lowly 
risky decisions it is most probable that choosing them should lead to a positive balance in the 
long run, because the winning probabilities are 50% or higher, promising at least to retain the 
starting capital of €1,000. Highly risky alternatives should result in a negative balance, 
because the winning probabilities are below 34%.
Main measures. As measure of GDT performance, a net score is calculated by 
subtracting the number of high risk choices from the number of low risk choices. A positive 
net score indicates advantageous choice behavior.
5.3.4. Executive domains
5.3.4.1. Situation processing (coding, attention/inhibition)
5.3.4.1.1. Digit Symbol Substitution Test
The Digit Symbol Substitution Test (Wechsler, 1981) is a paper-pencil task supposed 
to measure coding and processing speed. Participants are required to draw simple symbols 
below 63 one-digit numbers (1-9). The symbols, which are supposed to be drawn below the 
digit, are defined in a coding key table. The test time is 90 seconds.
Good performance in this task requires particularly fast and correct coding of new 
information into working memory. Participants who are fast in remembering the symbols for 
each digit can make more correct responses in the given time. 
Main measure. Performance in the Digit Symbol Substitution Test is measured by the 
number of correct symbols drawn below the given numbers.
5.3.4.1.2. Trail Making Test part B (TMT B)
The TMT B (Reitan & Wolfson, 1995; Reitan, 1958) is a measure of processing speed 
with focus on inhibitory control (attention/inhibition). In this paper-pencil-task, participants 
are confronted with a sheet showing encircled numbers (1-13) and letters (A-L). They are 
Study 1: Subcomponents of executive functions in decisions under risk 78
instructed to connect numbers and letters alternating in numerical, respectively alphabetical 
order, starting with 1, proceeding to A, followed by 2, B, etc., and ending with 13. 
Good performance in this task requires attention in order to maintain fast 
psychomotoric processing, as well as efficient inhibition of the automatic impulse to simply 
draw a line to the next number or letter in the order. Often, TMT B performance is measured 
with a residual score or a difference score in which the performance in the TMT A is 
subtracted out. Then the TMT B can be regarded as a measure of cognitive flexibility. We use
only the TMT B raw score here in order to have a measure that represents the individual 
efficiency of attention and inhibition processes instead of cognitive flexibility.
Main measure. The measure of performance in the TMT B is the time needed to fulfill 
the task (shorter times indicate better performance).
5.3.4.1.3. Color Word Interference Test (CWIT) – Interference trial
The interference trial of the CWIT (Bäumler, 1985; Stroop, 1935) is a paper task 
assessing attention and inhibition with a focus on interference control. Participants are 
confronted with a list of 72 repeating color words on a piece of paper. The meaning of each 
word differs from its ink color. The possible words and possible ink colors are red, blue, 
green, and yellow. Participants are asked to name the ink color of each word in the printing 
order as quickly as possible. Therefore they have to inhibit the impulse to simply read the 
words. 
Good performance in this task requires attention and efficient inhibition of the 
automatically interfering impulse to read out the word, instead doing what is required, that is 
to name the color. As with the TMT B, for the CWIT also the raw score is used instead of a 
residual or difference score because the test was employed as a measure of attention/inhibition 
instead of cognitive flexibility.
Main measure. The performance in the CWIT is measured by the time needed to name 
the 72 colors (shorter times indicate better performance).
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5.3.4.2. Flexibility (task management)
5.3.4.2.1. Semantic shifting
A semantic shifting verbal fluency task from the Regensburger Wordfluency Test 
(Aschenbrenner et al., 2000) was used as measure of task management functions (flexibility, 
shared attention, shifting). In this test, participants are asked to name as many fruits and sports 
as possible, in alternating sequence (sport-fruit-sport-fruit etc.) using each sport/fruit only 
once. The time limit was two minutes.
Good performance in this task requires task management functions, particularly 
efficient shifting between the two categories and between used strategies (e.g., naming fruits 
in the order they are arranged in the supermarket).
Main measure. The main measure of this task is the number of correctly named words.
5.3.4.2.2. Go/No-Go
The Go/No-Go task (Verdejo-García & Pérez-García, 2007) is a reaction task that 
substantially requires cognitive flexibility and category control. In the computerized 
paradigm, one of four possible drawings is presented on the screen: a black mouse, a black 
duck, a blue bird, or a red bird. Participants are instructed to press a key as quickly as possible 
in case the presented picture belongs to the target category and to inhibit a reaction if the 
presented stimulus does not belong to the target category. The task consists of four blocks 
with 20 stimulus presentations. In the first and third block, the drawings of the mouse and the 
blue bird serve as target category, in the second and fourth block, the duck and the red bird 
are the targets. Each drawing is presented for maximally 1,000 ms, with an inter-stimulus 
interval of 900 ms. Feedback is given in form of two distinct sounds lasting 600 ms. The task 
is practiced in two tests trials with 10 stimuli presentations in each trial.
Good performance in this task requires not only attention for fast and correct reacting, 
but especially management of changing tasks and different categories. Four categories have to 
be managed in alternation and with partially overlapping attributes (reacting to the bird can be 
both, right and wrong, depending on the color). Furthermore, participants need to switch 
efficiently between the changing target stimuli, in order to prevent false reactions, for 
example to non-target stimuli, which have been target stimuli in previous trials. Therefore, 
performance in the Go/No-Go has previously been reported to be related to task management 
functions (e.g., to shifting; Verdejo-García & Pérez-García, 2007).
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Main measure. Two variables are used to measure performance in the Go/No-Go. 
These are the average time needed for correct reactions (shorter times indicate better 
performance) and the number of correct responses (with a possible range from 0 to 80).
5.3.4.3. Strategy management (monitoring, planning)
5.3.4.3.1. Modified Card Sorting Test (MCST)
The MCST (Nelson, 1976) is a modified version of the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test 
(WCST; Berg, 1948) tapping into planning and monitoring, as well as rule learning, and 
categorization. In this computerized paradigm, participants are confronted with a deck of 
cards displaying a certain number (1-4) of shapes (square, circle, triangle, or star) in a certain 
color (blue, red, green, or yellow). They are asked to sort every card that appears on the 
screen to one of four target cards without knowing what sorting rule to apply. The cards can 
be sorted by the number of shapes, the shape itself or the color of the shapes. Visual and 
acoustic feedback is given so that participants can use it to find out the correct sorting rule. 
After six correctly sorted cards, participants are notified that the rule has changed and then 
they have to find out the new sorting rule. 
The task requires the participants to monitor previously used sorting rules and the 
previously received feedback. Then they have to plan the next sorting trials according to this 
information. Therefore, the task is used as a measure of monitoring and planning. In the 
literature the MCST is also called a measure of cognitive flexibility, particularly when the 
number of completed categories or the number of perseverative errors are used as variables. 
Main measure. In order to tap monitoring and planning instead of cognitive flexibility, 
the number of non-perseverative errors was used as main measure of MCST performance. A 
non-perseverative error is made when a card is incorrectly sorted but not according to the 
sorting rule of the previously completed category. Fewer non-perseverative errors indicate 
better performance in the MCST).
5.3.4.3.2.Balanced Switching Task (BST)
The BST is based on a voluntary task switching paradigm used by Arrington and 
Logan (2004). The newly developed BST was used to asses monitoring and planning 
functions. In this computerized task participants have to work on four tasks and have to 
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switch between them voluntarily with the aim to proceed to equal amounts on each of the 
tasks. The BST contains two sets of stimuli (A: two-digit numbers from 01 to 99 and B: 
abstract geometric shapes with diagonal hedging). In each set, the participant can work on one 
of two tasks at a time. In set A, task 1 is to indicate whether the presented number is odd 
(press “d” on the keyboard) or even (press “f”). Task 2 is to indicate whether the number is 
below 50 (“j”) or above 50 (“k”). In set B, task 1 is to indicate whether the diagonal hedging 
within the shape is going to the upper left (“d”) or to the upper right (“f”). Task 2 is to 
indicate whether the shape is oriented vertically (more high than broad, “j”) or horizontally 
(more broad than high, “k”). By pushing on the space bar the participants can switch between 
the sets A and B. Within the sets, they can switch between the tasks 1 and 2, by simply 
switching between the response keys (“d”, “f”/“j”, “k”). Only one stimulus is presented at a 
time and the participants have to apply only one of the four tasks with each presented 
stimulus. 
The participants are informed that they have three aims: to work on all tasks as equally 
often as possible, classify the stimuli as correct as possible, and work on as many stimuli as 
possible (by making fast reactions). They are also informed that switching between the sets 
with the space bar would be associated with a loss of time. This rule was used to increase the 
load on monitoring abilities. It can be assumed that the rule causes a motivation to stay for 
longer times with one task. These longer times increase the effort of monitoring, how long 
and often they have worked on the other tasks before and the effort of remembering to make 
further switches. 
The participants are not informed about the duration of the task and the stimulus 
presentation times. The task is administered two times, each time for exactly four minutes. 
Each stimulus is presented until the participant responds, but maximally for 1,000 ms. The 
inter-stimulus interval was 500 ms, a switch between sets A and B costs 1,250 ms of the 
overall time. All subtasks and the overall task are practiced and the experimenters made sure 
that the task was fully understood before the main task started.
Good performance in the BST requires monitoring and planning of working progress 
in different tasks. The participants have to monitor that there are other tasks to work on. Also 
they have to monitor, how often and how much they have worked on the different tasks in 
previous trials. Furthermore, good performance in the task can be reached by planning and 
applying a strategy for systematic switching between the tasks.
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Main measure. For each participant, the so called deviation score was computed. The 
formula for the score equals the formula for computing the standard deviation of a sample. 
For each participant the deviation score provides the deviation from the optimally equal 
performance. A deviation score of 0% indicates optimal performance, i.e. each task was 
performed equally often. A deviation score of 43% indicates worst possible performance 
showing that the participant has worked only on one task. In detail, it was computed which 
percentage of the overall number of presented stimuli was presented within each of the four 
tasks (e.g., number of presented stimuli in task 1 divided by the number of overall presented 
stimuli). In the formula below, this value is denoted by the variables taskA1, taskA2, taskB1, 
and taskB2. From this value the optimal value of equal performance (25% in each task) was 
subtracted and the result squared. This was done for each task. The results were summed and 
then divided by four. From this result the root was taken. 
deviation score = √{[(taskA1 – 25)² + (taskA2 – 25)² + (taskB1 – 25)² + (taskB2 – 25)²]/4}
5.3.4.3.3. 3-back task
The 3-back task was originally designed as a test of working-memory updating, but 
taps into the executive domain of monitoring (A. R. A. Conway et al., 2005). In the 
computerized 3-back task, participants monitor the identity of digits from ‘‘0’’ to ‘‘9’’, which 
are presented randomly and participants have to indicate whether or not the actual number is 
equal to the one presented three numbers before. Numbers are displayed for 500 ms and the 
inter-stimulus interval is 2,750 ms. Visual feedback is given with a green check mark for a 
right response and a red cross for a false response. Numbers that equaled the one presented 
three numbers before were presented with a probability of 33% (Schoofs, Preuss, & Wolf, 
2008). All participants completed five blocks with 24 presented numbers per block. The first 
block served as practice. 
Good performance in the task requires efficient and fast monitoring of working 
memory contents, as well as fast and correct responding to stimuli. 
Main measure. The 3-back performance is measured by the percentage of correct 
responses in the last four blocks.
Study 1: Subcomponents of executive functions in decisions under risk 83
5.3.5. Statistical analyses
Statistical standard procedures were carried out with IBM SPSS Statistics (version 
20.0, 2011, SPSS inc. IBM, Chicago). Pearson correlations were calculated to test for zero-
order relationships between two variables. The SEM analysis was computed with MPlus 6 
(Muthén & Muthén, 2011). There were no missing data. Before testing the full model, the fits 
of the latent dimensions were also tested using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) in MPlus. 
For both, SEM and CFA, maximum likelihood parameter estimation was applied.
For the evaluation of model fits we applied standard criteria (Hu & Bentler, 1999, 
1995). The fit indices were: χ² test (significant values indicate that the data does not fit with 
the model), standardized root mean square residual (SRMR; values below .08 indicate good 
fit with the data), comparative fit indices (CFI/TLI; values above .90 indicate a good fit, 
values above .95 an excellent fit), and root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA; 
“test of close fit”; a value below .08 with a significance value below .05 indicates acceptable 
fit). For applying mediator analysis it was required, according to Baron and Kenny (1986), 
that all variables included in the mediation should correlate with each other.
5.4. Results
In the following, the results will be reported in five steps beginning with presenting 
the descriptive values of the sample’s performance in the neuropsychological test battery, 
followed by the correlations between performance in the GDT and the executive test battery. 
Thereafter, a CFA with the three latent dimensions will be applied to verify the arrangement 
of manifest variables within the three latent dimensions. In the next step the results of the 
SEM of the full model will be reported, followed by the mediation analysis of the 
hypothesized mediation effects.
5.4.1. Neuropsychological performance
The description of the sample including estimated intelligence, performances in the 
executive tests and the GDT can be found in Table 5. 
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Table 5. Descriptive values of the sample’s performances in the intelligence estimation test, the GDT and the 
executive functioning tests.
Range M SD
IQa 85 - 140 117.46 12.11
GDT net score b -18 - 18 8.07 10.06
Digit symbol c 30 - 63 55.57 8.67
CWIT d 42 - 180 70.39 17.45
TMT B d 20 - 266 64.20 29.94
Semantic shifting c 12 - 40 25.08 4.56
Go/No-Go reaction time d 430.80 – 804.85 585.83 57.61
Go/No-Go correct reactions c 44 - 80 75.57 5.14
MCST e 0 - 31 7.27 5.63
BST f .00 - .43 .09 .09
3-back c .04 - .98 .65 .17
a estimated with subtest reasoning of the Leistungsprüfsystem [German intelligence test battery] 
b net score (number of low risk decisions – number of high risk decisions)
c number/percentage of correct responses
d time needed (higher scores represent worse performance)
e number of non-perseverative errors (higher scores represent worse performance)
f Deviation score (percentage of deviation from optimally balanced performance on all four tasks)
The mean scores in the GDT and the other common neuropsychological tests were all 
in the normal range, as known from other investigations (e.g., Brand et al., 2009; Jensen &
Rohwer, 1966; Lineweaver et al., 1999; Sheridan et al., 2006; Tombaugh, 2004; Verdejo-
García & Pérez-García, 2007).
5.4.2. Correlational analyses
The correlations between the main measures of the applied tests are shown in Table 6.
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Table 6. Correlations between GDT net score and tests of executive functions.
1 
GDT
net 
score 
b
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
2 Digit symbol c .22**
3 TMT B d -.22** -.52**
4 CWIT d -.15* -.58** .43**
5 Semantic shifting c .05 .20** -.21** -.15*
6 Go/No-Go reaction time d -.05 -.25** .21** .24** -.15*
7 Go/No-Go correct reactions c .19** .23** -.25** -.17** .16** -.21**
8 MCST e -.21** -.31** .21** .21** -.16** .12* -.24**
9 BST f -.22** -.35** .34** .32** -.18** .07 -.25** .30**
10 3-back c .23** .47** -.40** -.43** .12* -.22** .21** -.34** -.44**
b net score (number of low risk decisions – number of high risk decisions)
c number/percentage of correct responses
d time needed (higher scores represent worse performance)
e number of non-perseverative errors (higher scores represent worse performance)
f deviation score (percentage of deviation from optimally balanced performance on all four tasks) 
* p ≤ .05
** p ≤ .01
Most of the measures of executive functions are significantly correlated with the GDT 
net score with low to moderate effect sizes. Only the number of correct responses in the 
semantic shifting task and the reaction times in the Go/No-Go are not correlated with the 
GDT. Age was inversely correlated with the GDT net score (r = -.25, p < .001) and with 
performances in all measures of executive functions (rs from -.20 to -.54, ps < .001), except 
semantic shifting (r = -.01, p = .90).
5.4.3. Latent dimensions in CFA
In order to systematically test the proposed theoretical model, we first tested the factor 
model, which means that it is tested whether the latent dimensions are acceptably represented 
by the manifest variables. Therefore, CFA analysis was performed with the three latent 
dimensions. Overall, the CFA model yielded an excellent fit with the data. The χ² test of 
model fit indicated no significant difference between model and data, χ² = 24.43, df = 24, p = 
.437. The RMSEA was .01 with p < .001, the CFI was 1.00, the TLI was 1.00, and the SRMR 
was .03. 
The first latent dimension “situation processing” was well represented by the scores in 
the Digit Symbol Substitution Test, the TMT B, and the CWIT as intended. The second latent 
construct “flexibility” was significantly represented by the semantic shifting task, Go/No-Go 
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reaction times for correct responses, and the number of Go/No-Go correct responses. The 
third theoretically argued dimension “strategy management” was well represented by the 
scores in the MCST, the BST, and the 3-back. In all three latent constructs, the manifest 
variables significantly loaded on the latent factor. The factor loadings and standard errors can 
be found in Table 7. 
Table 7. Coefficients of the manifest variables’ loadings on the latent dimensions, tested with CFA in MPlus.
Latent 
dimension
Manifest variables β SE
Situation 
processing
Digit symbol .81*** .04
TMT B -.65*** .04
CWIT -.70*** .04
Flexibility Semantic shifting .35*** .08
Go/No-Go reaction time -.44*** .08
Go/No-Go correct reactions .46*** .08
Strategy 
managment
MCST .47*** .06
BST .60*** .05
3-back -.74*** .05
*** p ≤ .001
The CFA indicates that the latent dimensions are acceptably represented by the 
manifest variables. Only in the dimension flexibility the factor loadings were weaker (from 
.34 to .47) but sufficient, given that they loaded significantly on the latent dimension and that 
the model fitted excellently with the data. The internal consistencies within the three 
dimensions  were  relatively  low  (Cronbach’s  α:  situation  processing:  .75;  flexibility:  .34; 
strategy management: .64). This is not surprising given that low consistency has been 
described previously for measures executive functions (Denckla, 1996; Rabbitt, 1997). Low 
consistency probably occurs because the variance in the tasks measuring executive 
components is not exclusively produced by individual differences in the component they are 
supposed to measure. The tasks also demand other neurocognitive performances to different 
amounts (e.g., processing speed, numeracy, etc.). Potential problems of low internal 
consistency are encountered by the CFA because the latent variables represent the variance 
that is reliably shared within the manifest variables of a latent factor (Brown, 2006). Thus, in 
summary, the suggested model of executive sub-functions can be accepted.
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5.4.4. Full SEM
The proposed complete theoretical model with GDT net score as dependent variable 
yielded an excellent fit with the data. The χ² test was not significant, χ² = 32.10, df = 31, p = 
.412, suggesting that the data do not significantly differ from the model. The RMSEA was .01 
with p < .001, the CFI was 1.00, the TLI was 1.00, and the SRMR was .03. The model with 
all factor loadings and β-weights is shown in Figure 7.
Figure 7. The full SEM with latent and manifest variables. 
Bold faced numerals and arrows with full lines are significant at p ≤  .05,  arrows  with  dashed lines are not 
significant. The standard errors of the regression estimators can be found in the parentheses. As can be judged 
from the factor loadings, the latent dimension are acceptably represented by the manifest variables. In total, 12 % 
of the variance of the GDT net score is explained. Decision-making behavior is significantly predicted by 
strategy management, while situation processing and flexibility do not affect the performance in the decision-
making task. Abbreviations: BST = Balanced Switching Task, CWIT = Color Word Interference Test, GDT = 
Game of Dice Task, MCST = Modified Card Sorting Test, TMT = Trail Making Test. 
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Overall, 12% of the variance in decision making in the GDT were significantly 
explained by the regression model (R² = .12, p = .012). Remarkably, the regression coefficient 
β from the three latent dimensions to GDT net score indicate that only strategy management 
significantly affected GDT performance (β = -.34, p = .025; note that the β-weight is negative 
because better performance in the tests is represented by lower test values, given that e.g., the 
number of errors are used). The two other latent variables, situation processing (β = -.04, p = 
.425)  and  flexibility  (β  =  .07, p = .362), did not significantly contribute directly to the 
explanation of decision-making behavior in the GDT.
5.4.5. Mediator analyses
Mediator analyses were computed in order to analyze whether situation processing 
functions affect GDT decision making indirectly, mediated by the higher level functions, 
flexibility and strategy management. The indirect effect from situation processing over 
flexibility to GDT net score was not significant (β = .05, p = .362). In contrast, the mediator 
effect from situation processing over strategy management to GDT net score was significant 
and had a moderate regression-weight (β = .27, p = .030). 
5.5. Discussion
The aim of this study was to decompose the role of different executive functions for 
decision making under risk conditions, measured with the GDT. We tested a theoretically 
argued model, projecting the processes of deciding under risk, as suggested by Brand and 
colleagues (2006), and based on the arrangement of executive functions as suggested by 
Smith and Jonides (1999). We defined three sub-processes of decision making, in which 
executive functions were supposed to participate: situation processing (including coding and 
attention/inhibition), flexibility (including task management), and strategy management 
(including monitoring and planning). The model assuming these processes to predict decision 
making fitted excellently with the data. The observed amount of variance explanation (i.e., 
12%) in the decision-making task can be regarded as a respectable proportion. Thus, the SEM 
results supported the assumption that executive functions are fundamentally involved in 
decision making under risk. Moreover, it was found that not all executive sub-domains 
directly contribute to the prediction of decision-making behavior. Only those higher level 
functions that are probably required for the management of strategies, directly influence 
Study 1: Subcomponents of executive functions in decisions under risk 89
decision making in the GDT. However, basic situation processing functions have an indirect 
impact, because they are substantially involved in strategy-management functions.
The correlations between the GDT net score and tests of executive functions already 
indicated relationships, thereby supporting the general assumption of a relation between risky 
decision making and executive functions, as raised in Brand’s model and shown in various 
previous studies (e.g., Brand et al., 2009; Drechsler et al., 2008; Euteneuer et al., 2009; Sinz et 
al., 2008 and many more cited in the Introduction, 5.2). However, even in this large sample 
the correlational analysis could again not help to answer the question, which executive 
domains contribute to decision making to what extent. Analogue with the results of previous 
studies, it was not possible to detect any informative pattern in the correlations. The 
correlations had comparable heights, independent of whether the tests measured basal 
attention/inhibition abilities or higher level functions, such as planning or monitoring.
Modeling the main functions as latent variables on the basis of the theory of decision 
making as well as the theory of executive functions helped to arrange the tests according to 
three underlying constructs. The CFA analyses indicated that the dimensions were sufficiently 
represented by the test scores (Note that the combinations of tests are in line with 
arrangements in previous studies using other executive tests and are also in line with 
theoretical approaches on executive functions; Borkowsky & Burke, 1996; Smith & Jonides, 
1999; Miyake et al., 2000; Verdejo-García & Pérez-García, 2007).
The overall SEM, which tested the effects of these functions on GDT performance, 
confirmed the assumptions made in Brand’s model of decision making under risk conditions: 
Especially higher level functions, including monitoring and planning abilities, yielded an 
effect on decision-making behavior. This dimension was called strategy management because 
it is assumed in Brand’s model and reported in the literature that executive functions 
contribute to developing a calculative strategy and to applying it (Brand, Heinze, et al., 2008), 
to monitoring its success under consideration of the feedback as well as to revising it (Brand, 
Laier, et al., 2009; Brand, Pawlikowski, et al., 2009). For example, development and 
application of a strategy can imply a first assessment of probabilities (see also Schiebener et 
al., 2011) and consciously developing a plan for a certain number of following decisions 
(Brand, Heinze, et al., 2008). Speculatively speaking, such a first strategy may resemble 
“probability matching”. In this strategy the participant would plan four choices for four-
number options and two for other options, given that the winning probability in the four 
number combination is 4:6 (an irrational, but often applied strategy in simple probability 
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problems; Fiorina, 1971; R. F. West and Stanovich, 2003). A subsequent application of this 
strategy as well as its revision would involve especially monitoring functions: A working 
memory representation of previous choice behavior (how often the four number combination 
and other combinations have been chosen) would need to be kept upright, together with the 
memory of feedback, which had followed from these choices. Successful monitoring can then 
result in an optimization of the initial strategy, e.g., when the participant recognizes that the 
two choices for other, more risky alternatives resulted in high losses. In this case the 
probability matching strategy might be dismissed and replaced by the rational maximization 
strategy. This would be choosing four numbers in every trial and accepting the occasionally 
occurring low losses. Participants with weak abilities in planning or monitoring could fail in 
one or more of these points’ steps: In development and application of a first strategy, in 
monitoring of its success and/or in improving the strategy.
Therefore, the involvement of these higher level functions of the executive system is 
reasonable. Furthermore, it is in line with theoretical considerations that lower level functions, 
coding and attention/inhibition, as represented in the situation processing dimension, do not 
directly contribute to decision making under risk (Brand et al., 2006). However, the mediator 
analysis indicated that these functions are the precondition for strategy management functions 
and thereby indirectly influence decision making. This result is reasonable, because good 
strategy management beforehand requires to code information about the decision situation 
into working memory. This includes representations of the task’s rules, the given decision 
options, their possible outcomes, and also the experience from previous trials. Furthermore, it 
is necessary to focus attention, namely on the actual overall money capital or the heights of 
gains and losses following a choice. Additionally, it is necessary to inhibit automatic 
impulses, such as emotionally initiated urges to depart from the current strategy, for example, 
by having an unplanned try with a risky alternative that lures with a possible quick high gain. 
The question remains why flexibility – representing task management functions – did 
not significantly affect decision making in the GDT. We had expected that the ability to 
flexibly shift between categories would be involved in resolving the conflict between the 
heights of outcomes and the risks associated with these. This had been suggested by the 
observed brain activity in the anterior cingulate cortex in a very similar dice problem
(Labudda et al., 2008). The behavioral data with executive functioning tests now suggest that 
the role of flexibility is less pronounced than had been hypothesized. However, there may 
remain two methodological reasons for the absence of an influence of flexibility. The first is 
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that conflict resolving is undertaken by functions included in the dimension strategy 
management, implying tests in which beside the main processes of planning and monitoring, 
it is also necessary to be cognitively flexible. For example in the MCST, it is necessary to 
switch to a new sorting technique quickly or in the BST participants need to smoothly release 
themselves from one task and switch to another. However, the variables that were used to 
measure MCST and BST performance should explicitly not tap into the flexibility domain, 
like perseverative errors in the MCST or switching costs in the BST would have. The second 
reason may be that the dimension flexibility was not optimally represented by the tests used. 
Although the tasks included in this latent variable (semantic shifting, Go/No-Go) should tap 
into the flexibility domain (see e.g., Verdejo-García & Pérez-García, 2007), future studies 
should aim at investigating the role of flexibility for decision making by using flexibility 
tasks, which share more variance that can be ascribed to flexibility abilities. 
The results of this study have implications for the theory on decision making under 
risk, as well as for clinical application. They support the assumptions in Brand’s model and 
beyond that they enhance our understanding of the neurocognitive processes involved in 
decision making, not only by showing that executive functions are fundamentally involved in 
decision making under risk, but also which executive functions contribute to decision-making 
performance and how they collaborate in influencing decision-making performance. For 
application in clinical contexts, in therapy, and in cognitive training it can be deduced that 
higher level executive functions as well as lower level functions should be focused when 
aiming at improvements of decision-making abilities. Impairments in decision making can be 
grounded on reduced functions in coding, attention/inhibition, as well as planning and 
monitoring. Thereby, the results also support the findings of previous works, that problems 
with mastering complex requirements in life can result from defects in different executive 
domains (Burgess, 2000). 
In the future, further neurocognitive processes involved in decision making under risk 
should be decomposed, not only with a focus on executive functions. Especially, it seems to 
be a logical step to examine the role of different working-memory functions (storage, 
processing, supervision; see e.g., Oberauer et al., 2003) and their interaction with executive 
functions in predicting decision making under risk. The main reason is that the strategy 
management domain, with the strongest impact on GDT performance, was composed of tests, 
probably strongly collaborating with working-memory functions. For example, performance 
in the BST should involve the working-memory function, which has been called supervision 
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(Oberauer et al., 2003). Also, the 3-back task should tap into typical storage and updating 
abilities (A. R. A. Conway et al., 2005; Oberauer et al., 2003).
Furthermore, it is still unclear how executive functions contribute to a particular 
strategy choice in risky situations. R. F. West and Stanovich (2003) reported that participants 
with better scores in a general cognitive ability measure more often decided for the rational 
maximization strategy instead of using irrational strategies. However, the literature on 
decision-making strategies and heuristics has previously neglected to pursue individual 
differences in specific cognitive abilities as explanations for variations in strategy choice 
(Appelt et al., 2011).
Additionally, to improving our understanding about the neuropsychological 
mechanisms involved in decision making, the results of this study also have implications for 
the current view on the structure of executive functions. The different executive sub-functions 
that were investigated empirically so far were concentrated on the basic functions inhibition, 
shifting, and updating (Miyake et al., 2000; Verdejo-García & Pérez-García, 2007). The more 
complex structure as it was suggested by Smith and Jonides (1999) also includes higher level 
functions - planning and monitoring - but was not yet investigated in larger samples. In the 
current study, three sub-functions were identified, which involve lower and higher level 
processes: situation processing, flexibility, and strategy management (which could also be 
called “monitoring”). Situation processing seems to include basic operations that are 
responsible for incorporating the features of a complex real-world situation into a working-
memory representation. The other two functions - flexibility and strategy management - make 
use of the basic function, probably directing its application toward a higher goal. The idea of 
one basic component of executive functions and two additional, more specifically operating 
components is in line with recent work by Friedman, Miyake and colleagues (N. P. Friedman 
et al., 2008; Miyake & Friedman, 2012). Therein, the original model of three very basic 
functions was extended. It was pointed out theoretically and based on empirical data that there 
may be one common executive functioning component and two specific components. The 
common executive function represents shared functions that are involved in the two specific 
components. The two specific components, updating-specific and shifting-specific, were 
suggested to be unique additional functions. The authors reported that the common executive 
functions were closely associated with performance in tasks that have originally been used to 
measure inhibition in the three component model. The results of our study go hand in hand 
with this finding, since we also found attention/inhibition processes to be major components 
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of the more specifically operating functions, strategy management and flexibility. Thus, the 
structure of executive functions that manifested in our large dataset with 270 participants is in 
line with the literature. Additionally, the structure may extend existing ideas by also regarding 
complex, higher level control functions. In order to further understand the organization of the 
executive system, this structure may be tested against other arrangements of executive 
functions that have previously been suggested in the literature (for a review see Jurado &
Rosselli, 2007).
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6. Study 2: Effects of goals on decisions under risk conditions: Goals 
can help to make better choices, but unrealistic high goals increase 
risk-taking
6.1. Abstract
Although decisions in real life are often made under the influence of goals, empirical 
studies on goals in decision-making performance are rare. Theoretically, explicit goals may 
improve decision-making performance by triggering higher cognitive effort in strategy 
development. In contrast, theories also suggest that unrealistic high goals may increase 
disadvantageous risk-taking. We tested the effects of explicit goals for the outcome in a 
modified version of a frequently used decision-making task, the Game of Dice Task. The 
modification allowed increased influence of cognitive strategies by providing control over the 
number of decision trials. On the one hand, subjects with an explicit goal made higher 
percentages of advantageous decisions from the task’s beginning. On the other hand, subjects 
with exceptionally high goals took more disadvantageous risks. Goal setting probably 
improves analytical processing, which benefits the development of advantageous decision-
making strategies, but only when the goal is realistic and not too high.
6.2. Introduction
In many domains of everyday life, reaching a desired goal depends upon making 
advantageous decisions. Nevertheless, there is only some research, which investigated how 
goals affect decision-making performance. Therefore, in a review addressing the effects of 
goals on human behavior, Locke and Latham (2002) stated that relationships between goals 
and risk handling would need further examination. In this manuscript, we address the effects 
of goals on decisions under risk conditions, measured by a frequently used gambling task, the 
Game of Dice Task (GDT; Brand et al., 2005).
Several empirical studies in different psychological disciplines dealt with the role of 
goal setting, striving, and monitoring for human performance (see chapter 3.3). So far, 
researchers assume that goals are fundamentally integrated in behaviors containing effort, 
persistence, and self-regulation, and that goals often cause better performances in different 
situations (Elliot & Fryer, 2008). Monitoring ones current behavior with respect to its goal-
orientation is responsible for maintaining and improving performances over longer spans of 
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time (for research, theories, and reviews on goal effects see e.g., Elliot & Fryer, 2008; Latham 
& Locke, 1991; Lewin, 1931, 1935; Locke & Latham, 1990; Pervin, 1989; Pervin & John, 
1999). 
These effects on performance depend on specific attributes of the goals. The core 
attributes are their specificity (that the goal is explicitly known to the person and is clearly 
measurable) and their difficulty (how challenging is it to reach the goal; see Locke & Latham, 
2002). The main findings about these two attributes are that goals have stronger positive 
effects, the more specific and the more difficult they are (Locke and Latham, 2002). It is said 
that a specific and difficult goal can improve performance because it triggers so called goal 
mechanisms (Locke & Latham, 2002): The direction of attention toward the goal-relevant 
information and subtasks that are required to reach the goal, the increase of cognitive and 
bodily effort, the increase of persistence and the development and application of goal oriented 
cognitive and behavioral strategies.
But how may goals affect decision-making performance? One may assume that 
explicit and difficult goals improve decision-making performance, because the goals trigger 
increased attention on the relevant attributes of the decision situation, an increase of cognitive 
effort for evaluating the characteristics of the decision options, leading to an improved 
development of a decision-making strategy, and more persistence in adhering to the 
developed strategy. Such a positive relationship between goals and decision making would be 
in line with results from neuropsychological research. Goal monitoring and goal-oriented 
behavioral control are considered to tap into higher level executive functions, which are 
related to frontal lobe brain areas and are necessary for the strategic utilization of individuals’ 
resources (Duncan et al., 1996; Levine et al., 2000; Manly, Hawkins, Evans, Woldt, & 
Robertson, 2002; Smith & Jonides, 1999). In this point, goal-directed behavior and decision 
making have a commonality: Frontal brain areas and executive processes are also known to be 
important for making advantageous decisions, especially under conditions of risk (e.g., Brand, 
Labudda, & Markowitsch, 2006; Brand, Laier, Pawlikowski, & Markowitsch, 2009; Del 
Missier, Mäntylä, & Bruine de Bruin, 2010, 2012; Drechsler, Rizzo, & Steinhausen, 2008; 
Euteneuer et al., 2009; Labudda et al., 2008; Wilbertz et al., 2012). Thus, it may be possible 
that handling goals is involved in the cognitive processes of advantageous decision making 
and that for this reason explicit goal setting could enhance decision-making performance.
In contrast, other theoretical approaches state that very high goals, or very high 
motivation may rather cause increased risk-taking, which is often disadvantageous in real life 
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decisions and in laboratory decision-making tasks (Bechara, 2001; Brand et al., 2006). For 
example the Yerkes-Dodson law, predicts that performance should be best when the current 
motivation is medium but performance decreases when motivation becomes too high 
(Broadbent, 1965; Teigen, 1994; Yerkes & Dodson, 1908). Furthermore, Atkinson (1957) 
suggested that people who have strong need for achievement have an increased preference for 
immediate risks. Heath, Larrick, and Wu (1999) assumed that goals act as new reference 
points in the value function, which was proposed in the prospect theory (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979). Therefore, individuals are supposed to be satisfied with the outcome of their 
decisions, if it is above the goal and dissatisfied if the outcome is below it. Furthermore, they 
should seek riskier options, if they are below their goal or threatened not to reach it. In 
contrast, they should chose saver options, if they are already above the goal. Support for this 
relationship of goals and risky decision making has been found in studies in which subjects 
had to choose between different lottery gambles with varying probabilities for gains and 
losses (Lopes & Oden, 1999; Payne et al., 1980, 1981).
So far, only few studies have addressed the roles of goals for decision-making 
performance. In these studies it has been focused on decisions under ambiguity and decisions 
under risk (for the definitions of the two types of decision situations see chapter 3.1). In order 
to examine effects of unconscious goal pursuit in decisions under ambiguity (in the IGT), the 
task was once administered to subjects who were beforehand primed on performance 
motivation (Hassin et al., 2009). Hassin and colleagues (2009) found that the induced 
unconscious goal pursuit had a positive effect on the last 50 trials of the used task version 
with 250 trials (Hassin et al., 2009). Although this manuscript does not focus on the roles of 
goals for decisions under ambiguity, but for decision making under risk, this result is relevant 
here. The reason is that in the later trials of the IGT, the underlying rules (that the decks C and 
D are better than A and B) become aware to the subjects (Bechara et al., 1997). Therefore, 
relations have been found between decision-making behavior in the IGT and decisions under 
risk measured by the GDT. Especially in the late trials of the IGT, decision-making 
performance was found to be correlated with decision making in the GDT (Brand, Recknor, et 
al., 2007; Y.-T. Kim et al., 2011; Noël et al., 2007). 
In another study it was examined how goals with varying difficulties affect risk-taking 
behavior in a multiplayer computer game (Knight, Durham, & Locke, 2001). In the computer 
game, called BOLO, the subjects steered virtual tanks. In teams, they tried to earn points by 
destroying as many enemy emplacements as possible and lose as little tanks as possible. The 
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enemy emplacements would also try to destroy any tank that entered their firing range. The 
subjects had to decide whether to attack an emplacement or not. Attacking an enemy 
emplacement was especially risky when it stood close to other emplacements. In this case, 
making an attack was risky, because it was likely that the subjects’ tank would unwillingly 
enter the firing range of the other emplacement. There were also emplacements, which stood 
close to trees. Behind the trees, tanks could shelter while attacking. According to these 
circumstances, the emplacements were categorized as low risk, moderate risk, or high risk 
emplacements. The subjects’ risk-taking was measured by the number of attacks against 
emplacements in the three categories. The teams were assigned to differently high goals for
the number of points they were supposed to earn. The teams’ behaviors showed that higher 
goals caused more risky attacking behavior. Furthermore, higher goals lead to higher point 
scores in the game. The results therefore suggested that higher goals increase risk-taking. In 
the case of BOLO, however, this was also associated with better task performance (higher 
amount of points received).
These empirical results, with the IGT or BOLO, allow only limited conclusions about 
the effects of goals on decision-making performance. The main reason is that they partly have 
methodological constraints. In the IGT-study by Hassin and colleagues (2009), goals were not 
specific, but unconscious (a priming condition was used to induce unconscious goal pursuit). 
In the multiplayer game BOLO, as used by Knight et al. (2001), the decisions were made in 
groups and it is unclear whether this had an effect on risk-taking (increased risk-taking of 
groups was reported earlier, e.g. in Kogan & Wallach, 1967; Pruitt & Teger, 1969). 
Additionally, task performance in the computer game was probably influenced by the 
individuals’ psychomotoric processing speeds, reactions times, and other variables, which 
may have also been affected by the goals.
Because of these constraints in the past studies, we aimed at investigating the effect of 
goals for strategic decision making in a controlled and approved environment. In our first 
goal-study, which has been conducted before the study we report in the manuscript at hand, 
we used the GDT, a frequently applied decision-making task in neuropsychological research
(see chapters 3.1.3, 3.4 or e.g., Bayard, Raffard, & Gely-Nargeot, 2011; Brand et al., 2009; 
Euteneuer et al., 2009; Gleichgerrcht, Ibánez, Roca, Torralva, & Manes, 2010). In the study 
(Schiebener, Wegmann, Pawlikowski, & Brand, 2012), the subjects defined a goal before 
playing the GDT in the standard 18-trial version. The results revealed no immediate effect of 
goals on GDT performance. However, goals were related to choice behavior in two ways. 
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Firstly, goals together with executive functions interactively influenced the negative impact of 
an anchor effect on GDT performance. The anchor was triggered by social comparisons with 
extraordinary successful players. Therefore, a top ten list with very high gains was presented. 
This presentation caused very disadvantageous decision making, but the negative effect was 
influenced by goals: With goals there was a reduction of the anchor effect in subjects with 
high executive functions, but an increase of the anchor effect, in subjects with lower executive 
functions. Additionally, there was a moderate to high inverse correlation between the height 
of the self-set goals and the performance in the GDT. This indicated that higher goals may be 
related to more disadvantageous (i.e. very risky) choices. Therefore, it seems that explicit 
goals play a role in decisions under risk but this depends on situational circumstances and 
individual differences in executive functions.
However, the influences of goal mechanisms (effort, persistence, and strategy 
development; Locke & Latham, 2002) may have been limited, because the GDT has several 
restrictions. Restrictions are for examples the fixed number of decision trials, the 
predetermined options to choose from, or the amounts of money that can be bet. 
Therefore, we used a modified GDT version in the current study. In this we deleted 
one of the restrictions: the limitation of decision trials. In this new version, the “GDT open 
end”, the subject could freely decide when to end the game. This provides more strategic 
control and allows the subjects to plan their decision strategies with enhanced influence of 
goal mechanisms. In consideration of an explicit goal, subjects might make more cognitive 
and behavioral effort and be more persistent in enduring making many decisions for the lowly 
risky alternatives, although these only slowly lead toward an increase of the money capital. 
Furthermore, a subject could plan this behavior strategically. He/she could, for example, 
define the goal to reach a gain of €2,000 (so he would have to win additional €1,000 to the 
start capital). To achieve this target he/she may apply the following strategy: choose one 
number (gain/loss €1,000) maximally three times, if the goal is not attained thereafter, be 
persistent in choosing a four numbers option (expecting to win €100 in 4 of 6 trials and to lose 
€100 in 2 of 6 trials) until the intended capital is exactly reached.
The main question of the current study is whether goal setting in advance of the task’s 
beginning has an effect on behavior in such a task version. We expect that goal setting 
improves the overall performance in this version of the GDT because the goal setting process 
triggers enhanced cognitive processing. Additionally, we want to examine, how goal oriented 
decision-making behavior develops over different phases of the task, in order to differentiate 
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between an effect of the deliberate goal-setting process (which should influence decisions 
from the task’s beginning) and the goal-monitoring process (which may cause better 
maintenance of decision-making performance over task duration).
In summary, the three aims of the current study are to determine (1) whether goals 
positively affect strategic decision making in a GDT version with open end, (2) how goal 
setting and goal monitoring differently contribute to possible effects of goals, and (3) whether 
very high goals and are related to disadvantageous decision making.
6.3. Method
6.3.1. Subjects
Seventy-seven subjects participated in the study. They were aged 18 to 65 years (mean 
age = 26.36, SD = 10.17 years), 39 were females, and mean school-education was 12.77 
years, SD = 0.83). Testing took place at the Department of General Psychology – Cognition, 
University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany. None of the subjects had a history of neurological or 
psychiatric disease as determined by a screening interview. The study was approved by a local 
ethics committee.
6.3.2. Design
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. In the experimental group 
(n = 37, females n = 19) the subjects had to define a goal before starting the GDT, in the 
control group (n = 40, females n = 20) the GDT was played without prior goal setting. 
The groups did not differ in gender, χ² (1, N = 77) = 0.01, p = .906, age, t(75) = -0.64, 
p = .527, school-education t(75) = 1.01, p = .316 or intelligence as estimated by the logical 
reasoning subtest of the German intelligence test battery (Horn, 1983), t(75) = 1.20, p = .236.
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6.3.3. Instruments
Game of Dice Task: version “open end”
The Game of Dice Task (GDT; Brand et al., 2005) is a computerized task, which 
measures decision making under risk conditions. In the GDT, the subject has the task to gain 
as much fictitious money as possible and to lose as little of it as possible, by betting on the 
throws of a single virtual die. The subject has a start capital of €1,000 by. Before each throw, 
the subject has to guess, which number (1-6) will occur next. He/she can bet on a single 
number or on a combination of numbers. The subject wins if the number thrown is identical 
with the number he/she has bet on, or is one of the numbers in the combination he/she has bet 
on. Otherwise the subject loses. Each option is associated with explicit and stable gains and 
losses as well as winning probabilities: €1,000 gain/loss for the choice of a single number 
(winning probability 1:6; expected value -€666.67), €500 gain/loss for two numbers (winning 
probability 2:6; expected value -€166.67), €200 gain/loss for three numbers (winning 
probability 3:6; expected value €0), and €100 gain/loss for four numbers (winning probability 
4:6; expected value €33.33). For example, the subject can bet on a combination of two 
numbers (e.g., the “3” and the “4” together), which will result in a gain of €500 when the “3” 
or the “4” is thrown, but it will result in a loss of €500 when one of the four remaining 
numbers not chosen is thrown (e.g., “1”, “2”, “5” or “6”). Before beginning the task, rules are 
explicitly described in the test instruction, containing explicit information about the rules for 
gains and losses, and the amounts of money associated with each of the different possible 
options. Gains and losses are permanently visualized on the screen. After each throw, the gain 
or the loss is indicated on the screen accompanied by a distinct sound (the jingle of a cash 
machine for a gain; a dull tone for a loss). The current total capital and the number of the 
remaining trails are also displayed on the screen (for a detailed description of the GDT see 
Brand et al., 2005). 
In the present study we used a modification of the GDT. It was modified regarding the 
number of decision trials. In contrast to the original GDT, in which 18 decisions have to be 
made, subjects were allowed to play as long as they wanted. They were explicitly instructed 
that they could end the game whenever they wanted by clicking on a designated button in the 
task’s interface. The subjects did not know that the task would automatically be terminated 
after a maximum of 60 trials. After the instructions, the subjects in the goal condition were 
asked to define a goal, which means the final account (in €) they wanted to achieve. Subjects 
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in the control condition started directly after the instructions without setting a specific goal for
their final capital. 
GDT variables. We used eight variables to describe decision-making behavior in the 
GDT. 
(1) Percentages of decisions for each of the four risk classes: These are the numbers 
of decisions for one single number, for two numbers, for three numbers, or for four numbers, 
each in relation to the overall number of trials a subject had played. 
(2) Percentage of low risk decisions: We measure the percentage of low risk
(“advantageous”) decisions over the whole task. The alternatives in the GDT can be grouped 
into low risk, advantageous decisions (three or four numbers with a winning probability of 
50% and higher) and high risk, disadvantageous decisions (one or two numbers with a 
winning probability below 34%). Choosing the low risk alternatives should lead to a positive 
balance in the long run. Even the three-number alternative, can be regarded as a good choice, 
although it has an expected value of zero. It is a good choice, because it promises to retain the 
start capital of €1,000. In contrast, the high risk alternatives result in a negative balance with 
high probabilities. This separation into low risk and high risk decisions has been applied in a 
lot of previous studies because it has proven to accurately measure decision-making abilities 
in healthy samples and patient populations (to mention only some examples: Bagneux, 
Bollon, & Dantzer, 2012; Bayard et al., 2011; Euteneuer et al., 2009; Wilbertz et al., 2012). 
However, the analysis of low risk vs. high risk decisions is superficial, because it 
neglects differences between the two alternatives allocated within high risk and low risk, 
respectively. For example, by classifying the one- and the two number alternatives into one 
class (high risk), one ignores that the expected value of the one number alternative (expected 
value = -€666.67) is four times lower than the expected value of the two number alternative 
(expected value = -€166.67). Thus, we computed the following expected value score, 
indicating the average expected value per decision.
(3) Expected value per decision: The variable indicates the average expected value per 
decision (expected value per decision = summed expected values of all decisions/number of 
decision trials). The numbers of choices for each alternative is multiplied with the 
alternative’s expected value and these products are summed afterwards. In other words, the 
decisions are weighted by the expected value. The resulting score was divided by the number 
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of trials played, in order to measure decision-making performance relative to the number of 
trials.
(4) Additionally, we analyzed the overall pattern of behavior (1), and the expected 
value per decision (3) in three blocks of task duration: the first 33%, the second 33% and the 
third 33% of the decisions, which were made. Note that the absolute number of trials was 
different for each subject, because the number of trials was not fixed in this modified GDT 
version. 
(5) Final capital: This is the real final capital a subject has reached (final capital = start 
capital + gains - losses).
(6) Expected final capital: This is the theoretically expected outcome given the 
subjects’ choices and the expected values of their choices (expected final capital = start 
capital + summed expected values as explained in (3)). 
(7) Number of trials: This is the number of trials a subject has played before ending 
the GDT.
(8) Aspired goal: This is the subject’s self-set goal for final capital.
As one main measure of performance, we choose variable number three, the expected 
value per decision, because it is a simple single measure of the overall advantageousness of 
decisions.
6.3.4. Statistical analyses
Statistical analyses were carried out using SPSS Statistics version 19. Kolmogorov-
Smirnov-Test was used as test for normal distribution. Impact of goal setting on GDT 
performance was tested by t-tests. The pattern of choices between the different alternatives in 
the GDT, the development of decision-making behavior over the three blocks as well as the 
comparison between sub-groups with differently high goals was compared with repeated 
measures ANOVA. Relationships between two variables were analysed by Pearson 
correlations. 
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6.4. Results
First, we tested whether decision-making performance differed between subjects with 
and without goal setting. The overall patterns of decisions for the four alternatives (one 
number, two numbers, three numbers, and four numbers) was comparable in both groups. The 
patterns can be found in Figure 8. 
Figure 8. The patterns of choices in the GDT, expressed in the percentages of choices for one single number, 
two numbers, three numbers and four numbers.
On average, the subjects in both groups preferred alternatives with lower risks over 
alternatives with higher risks. The inner subject effect of alternative was significant, F(1.34, 
100.55) = 76.01, MSE = 8.84, p < .001, ηp² = .50, but the interaction between alternative and 
goal was not, F(1.34, 100.55) = 1.22, MSE = 0.14, p =  .286,  ηp² = .02, indicating no 
significant effect of goals on the overall pattern of decision-making behavior. The means of 
the cumulative measures of GDT performance can be found in Table 8. 
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Table 8. Results of the GDT in the two conditions.
with goal
M (SD)
without goal
M (SD) t p d
Low risk decisions in % 89.06 (13.42) 80.99 (19.14) 2.15 .035 0.49
Expected value per decision (€) -8.55 (42.28) -34.59 (71.85) 1.96 .054 0.44
Expected final capital (€)
Final capital (€)
511.63 (1700.66)
518.92 (2020.70)
-166.76 (2738.41)
-310.00 (3471.41)
1.32
1.29
.193
.201
0.30
0.29
Number of trails
Aspired goal (€)
35.27 (17.50)
2162.16 (934.03)
(Range 500-5000)
36.03 (17.83)
-
-0.19 .852 0.04
These mean comparisons indicate that subjects who had defined a goal performed 
better in the GDT. In the performance variables, the positive effects had moderate sizes, with 
Cohen’s d’s from 0.30 to 0.49. The two main performance variables, low risk decisions in % 
and expected value per decisions were significant at the level p ≤ .05. The difference between 
the two final capital variables did not reach significance. 
In the following it is analyzed whether the development of decision-making 
performance gives a hint on the question, whether the goal setting or the goal monitoring 
process is responsible for the positive effect of goals. Therefore, we analyzed whether goals 
influenced decision-making performance over the course of the task. We divided the number 
of trails for each subject in three equal blocks and calculated the expected values per decision 
in each of the three blocks. It was found that descriptively, in both groups, decision-making 
performance decreased over the course of the task (see Figure 9).
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Figure 9. Comparison of the expected values per decision, in the first 33% (block 1), the second 33% (block 2) 
and the third 33% (block 3) of the GDT’s duration. 
It can be seen that GDT performance decreased in the later trials, but this decrease was found in both groups, 
with and without explicit goal setting.
With repeated measures ANOVA we compared the expected values per decision 
between the three blocks (block 1, 2, and 3) as within subject factor and the condition (with 
and without goal) as between subject factor. The results showed no significant effect of block, 
F(1.86, 139.38) = 1.81, MSE = 4604.70, p = .170, ηp² = .02, and no interaction between block 
and group, F(1.86, 139.38) = 0.55, MSE = 1398.45, p = .565 ηp² = .01. This result indicates 
that performance was in both groups relatively stable over the duration of the task, and this 
stability was not dependent on whether the subjects had explicitly defined a goal.
To test whether preferences between the four different alternatives in the GDT, 
differed between the three blocks of task duration, we calculated an analogue analysis with 
the overall pattern of choice between GDT’s four classes of alternatives. The percentages of 
choices for the alternatives was used as within subject factor (four levels: one number, two 
numbers, three numbers, four numbers) and block as within subject factor (three levels: block 
1, 2, and 3) and group as between subject factor (with/without goal). There was a significant 
main effect of alternative, F(1.32, 99.02) = 75.85, MSE = 26.99, p <  .001, ηp² = .50 and a 
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significant interaction between alternative and block, F(3.44, 258.00) = 2.60, MSE = 2.60, p = 
.045,  ηp² = .03, indicating that the pattern of preference changed over the three blocks. 
However, this effect did not interact with explicit goal setting: The interaction between 
alternative and group, F(1.32, 99.02) = 1.13, MSE = 0.40, p = .308, ηp² = .02, and the three-
way interaction between alternative, block and group, F(3.44, 258.00) = 1.30, MSE = 0.70, p
= .273, ηp² = .02, were not significant and had small effect sizes. In summary, the analyses of 
decision-making behavior in the course of the task indicate that performance was relatively 
stable over task duration independent of whether a goal had been set or not. 
In the following the aspired goals and their relations with GDT performance were 
analyzed, in order to test whether very high goals are associated with more risk-taking. The 
defined goal was reached or exceeded by 18 of the 37 subjects (48.6%). The heights of the 
self-set goals were positively correlated with the percentage of decisions for the risky 
alternative betting on two numbers (r =.41, p = .013) and inversely correlated with the 
percentage of low risk decisions (r = -.36, p = .027), the expected value per decision (r = -.27, 
p = .111), and the expected final capital (r = -.29, p = .087) but not with the real final capital 
(r = -.05, p = .754). The correlation between goal-height and the number of trials was positive 
(r = .46, p = .004). The correlations suggest that higher goals were related to more risky 
decision making and higher goals were associated with playing more trials in the task.
In an additional analysis we addressed the question, whether goals which are 
unrealistic, are particularly related to risky decision making. We used the data to find out 
which goal heights may be defined as unrealistic. In the 40 subjects who had not defined a 
goal, 28 (70.00%) had a fictitious money outcome below €2,000, 5 subjects (12.50%) reached 
exactly €2,000 and 7 (17.00%) reached more than €2,000. Thus, a goal above €2,000 was 
defined as unrealistic in this GDT version. According to this definition we separated the 
subjects in the goal condition into three goal-height subgroups: goal below €2,000 (n = 10; 
expected value per decision M = €3.45, SD = €33.52), goal exactly €2,000 (n = 15, expected 
value per decision M = €4.28, SD = €33.71) and goal above €2,000 (n = 12; expected value 
per decision M = -€34.61, SD = €48.86). The expected values per decision were then 
compared between these three groups. An ANOVA with goal-height group as between subject 
factor and expected value per decision as dependent variable showed a significant main effect 
of goal-height group, F(2, 34) = 3.92, MSE = 6029.58, p =  .029, ηp² = .19. The single pair 
comparisons reveal that subjects with a goal above €2,000 made significantly more risky 
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decisions than subjects with a goal of exactly €2,000, p = .045. This analysis demonstrates 
that especially subjects with an unrealistic goal above €2,000 made riskier decisions. 
6.5. Discussion
We investigated the effect of goals on decisions under risk in a modified version of a 
gambling task, the GDT (Brand et al., 2005). In the task version used in this study, the 
subjects could autonomously control the number of choice trials. The main result is that
subjects who had to set explicitly an individual goal before beginning with the task, made 
relatively more advantageous decisions than subjects who did not have to define an individual 
goal. Nevertheless, goals and decisions seem to have an ambivalent relationship. They cause 
better decisions on average, but goals that are very high are associated with more risk-taking
behavior.
The average positive effect can be explained in line with the theory on the mechanisms 
involved in goal setting (e.g., Locke & Latham, 2002) and also in line with the literature on 
decision making (e.g., Brand, Heinze, Labudda, & Markowitsch, 2008). As will be explained 
in the following it is plausible that setting an explicit goal triggers cognitive goal mechanisms 
that can improve decision-making performance. In our first goal study with the GDT 
(Schiebener et al., 2012), goals had no direct influence on decision making, but only under 
certain situational and individual circumstances. Another study (Brand et al., 2008) showed 
that persons who deliberately develop their choice strategies make more advantageous 
decisions. A third study reported the accuracy of choices to be positively affected by the 
encouragement to endeavour in deliberation before making a decision (Thomas & Millar, 
2012). Therefore, it is probable that prior goal definition can operate as trigger for analytical-
executive processes, which are positively related to decision making in the GDT (Brand, 
Laier, et al., 2009; Euteneuer et al., 2009). The request to define a goal presumably triggers a 
more elaborate process of task comprehension and strategy development, because reflecting 
accurately about which final balance to aspire principally requires an analysis of the current 
decision situation (Brand et al., 2006). For example, the subjects need to process on the 
amounts of possible gains and losses and to determine the steps, which are necessary to reach 
certain gains in allowance of the underlying probabilities. However, the goal-setting effect 
could not be observed in our first goal study with the 18-trial standard version of the GDT. 
The results of the current study, suggest that the reason might indeed have been that the 
normal GDT is relatively restrained. Particularly, there are restraints with regard to the 
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subject’s possibilities to apply goal mechanisms (i.e., to increase cognitive effort for strategy 
development, and to be persistent in behaving advantageously). In contrast, when subjects 
have the opportunity to decide how many decisions to make, and therefore have increased 
control over whether they can attain their goal, defining a goal helps to make 
advantageous/low risk decisions. 
Regarding the progress of choice behavior over the three phases of the GDT it was 
found that performances of the subjects in the goal group and of those in the control group 
significantly decreased in the later trials. However, this decrease was observed with and 
without explicit goal setting. These data suggest that not all of the three goal mechanisms –
effort, persistence and strategy improvement (Locke & Latham, 2002) – affected decision-
making behaviour. In particular, it may be possible that especially strategy development was 
improved by goal setting. Subjects with goals performed better from the first block on, 
probably because they had a more goal-oriented strategy from the very beginning. In contrast, 
subjects with and without explicit goals made comparable effort (the number of decision trials 
made was not different between the groups) and showed comparable persistence (in both 
groups performance slightly decreased over the three blocks). Therefore, it seems to be rather 
the goal setting than the goal monitoring process, which is responsible for improved decision 
making when having to define a goal.
Beyond the positive effect of goal setting on decision-making performance – which 
was revealed on the level of general mean comparisons – there seems to be also a negative
relationship between the height of the goals and decisions. This result is in line with the 
findings of our previous study with the GDT (Schiebener et al., 2012) and also with reports of 
other authors who found higher goals related to riskier strategies (D. Knight et al., 2001). 
Therefore, it seems that goals are ambivalently related to decision-making under risk: They 
can cause more advantageous decision making, but can also be a threat, when they are too 
high and thus unrealistic. Nevertheless, it is still unclear, what the mechanisms behind the 
negative relationship between goal-height and decision-making performance may be. 
Possibly, decision makers with unrealistic self-set goals tend to choose the riskier alternatives, 
because these lure with high gains, which offer the chance to reach the high goal in few trials. 
Furthermore, it may be possible that in risky situations, the adequacy of a goal’s difficulty can 
be important (J. W. Atkinson, 1958). In the GDT the adequacy of goal setting and decision-
making performance should be affected by the magnitude of the initial comprehension of the 
decision situation’s rules for gains and losses and the associated probabilities. Individuals 
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with a rather weak initial comprehension of the task’s rules may set themselves inadequate, 
very high goals, and later make less advantageous decisions in the task, both as a result of 
their inferior task-comprehension.
The results do not only improve our understanding of goals in strategic decision 
making, but also encourage future research and have implications for real-life issues. In future 
studies, the mechanism behind the relationship between goal height and risky decision making 
should be examined. These studies could, for example, experimentally manipulate goal 
heights and analyze whether their effects on decision making under risk, are moderated by 
cognitive, particularly executive, functions. Persons who often make decisions under risk in 
real life (e.g., in managerial positions) might profit from the current study’s findings. Goal 
setting can be applied as an instrument, which helps to plan decisions more strategically. 
However, goals are only helpful when they are realistic and not too high. Our conclusion is, 
when a decision situation is principally controllable by an individual, realistic goals are 
helpful for making advantageous decisions. When the goals are too high, risk-taking behavior 
increases.
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7. Study 3: Truck dispatcher task: A new methodological framework 
for applying standard neuropsychological decision-making tasks
7.1. Abstract
In neuropsychological decision-making research several different tasks are used to 
measure decision-making competences in patients and healthy study-participants. 
Unfortunately, the existing tasks are often inflexible for modification, use different scenarios, 
and include several gambling cues. Therefore, comparisons between participants’ 
performances in different tasks are difficult. We developed the Truck Dispatcher Framework 
(TDF), in which different decision-making tasks can be designed within one unitary, flexible, 
and real-world oriented story line. To test the story line TDF-analogues of three standard 
decision-making tasks (Game of Dice Task, Probability-Associated Gambling task, Iowa 
Gambling Task) were developed. In three experiments with brain-healthy participants the 
behavior in standard decision-making tasks and the TDF-analogues of them were compared. 
Similar behaviors indicate that the TDF-tasks measure decision making appropriately. Thus, 
the TDF is recommended for experimental and clinical research because it allows examining 
decision-making competences in tasks with different demands but taking place within one 
unitary story line.
7.2. Introduction
In research and clinical application, a multitude of paradigms is used for the 
measurement of decision-making behavior and competence. Unfortunately, it can’t be 
excluded that differences in the framing plots of the tasks weaken the comparability of their 
results. Furthermore, most of the tasks are inflexible regarding experimental modification, 
which means that they cannot be modified with respect to complexity etc. easily. An 
additional aspect, which may produce limitations concerning the generalization of the results 
to real-life decision-making abilities, is the gambling associated environment in the common 
decision-making tasks. The aim of the work at hand was to develop a new decision-making 
framework for research and for examination of decision-making competences in clinical 
context. Requirements for such a framework should be the following:
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1. It should be adaptable for different research and diagnostic questions.
2. Those adaptions should be realizable within one story line.
3. The story line should provide reality oriented decision-making problems.
4. The story line should be poor in typical gambling-cues.
5. The story line should allow for the projection of main features of standard 
neuropsychological decision-making tasks. 
The motivation for developing a framework with these attributes originates from 
considerations of weaknesses of the decision-making tasks as they are currently used in 
research. In the last decades, psychological science has shown increased interest in human 
decision-making processes. Research on decision making has been conducted with different 
orientations, including general psychological, economic and neuropsychological foci (see e.g., 
Bechara, 2011; Gleichgerrcht et al., 2010; Weber & Johnson, 2009). One growing field of 
decision-making research is allocated within the neuropsychological domain. The main aims 
here are decomposing the neuropsychological and biological bases of cognitive and emotional 
mechanisms in decision making, as well as characterizing difficulties with decision making in 
different patient populations (e.g., Brand, Labudda, & Markowitsch, 2006). For these aims a 
variety of decision-making tasks has been developed. These tasks try to simulate decision 
situations as they also exist in real life albeit reduced with regard to their complexity (see e.g., 
Bechara, Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1996; Denburg et al., 2007). Decision situations in 
real life and in the laboratory have common features: A person has two or more options to 
choose from, these options have different possible outcomes that vary in favorability and in 
the probability of occurrence, and the availability of information about possible outcomes and 
their probabilities can also vary. 
Most of the decision-making research is concerned with decisions under ambiguity 
and risk (see chapter 3.1 and Yates & Stone, 1992). For measuring decision-making behavior 
under ambiguity the most frequently used task in neuropsychological studies is the Iowa 
Gambling Task (IGT; Bechara, 2007; Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994; 
Bechara, Tranel, & Damasio, 2000). For the measurement of decision making under risk 
different tasks have been applied. Only some examples are the Game of Dice Task (GDT; 
Brand, Fujiwara, et al., 2005), the Probability Associated Gambling task (PAG task; Sinz, 
Zamarian, Benke, Wenning, & Delazer, 2008; Zamarian, Sinz, Bonatti, Gamboz, & Delazer, 
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2008), the Cambridge Gambling Task (Rogers et al., 1999), the Cups Task (Levin & Hart, 
2003), the Columbia Card Task (Figner, Mackinlay, Wilkening, & Weber, 2009), or the 
Balloon Analogue Risk Task (Lejuez et al., 2002).
This manuscript mainly concentrates on decision-making under risk conditions. The 
tasks mentioned have similarities and differences, which result in problems when aiming at 
comparing the tasks’ results (see also chapter 3.4). The main commonalities are those, which 
justify their classification as decision tasks addressing decisions under risk: The outcomes 
have a numerical format (monetary fictitious gains and losses), and probabilities for gains and 
losses can be computed or relatively accurately estimated with the given information about 
the tasks’ rules. Thus, the exact expected values of the available options can be calculated. 
Another feature shared by many of the tasks is that the interfaces and metaphors are 
constituted of cues as they normally occur in real-life gambling situations, for example in 
casinos. The GDT uses dices, the Columbia Card Task uses cards, and the PAG task uses 
lotteries. For many participants, be it patients or healthy individuals, these gambling situations 
are very different from the situations, in which they make decisions in real-life. Furthermore, 
there may be aversions against gambling in general because some participants generally deny 
playing for money in real life. Additionally, it is often comprehensibly argued that some of 
the tasks are measures of goal-oriented, strategic and analytic decision making, which should 
principally also occur in real life (Brand, Heinze, et al., 2008; D. Knight et al., 2001; Lopes & 
Oden, 1999; Schiebener et al., 2012). Nevertheless, best reasoning suggests that the provided 
gambling situations may only weakly operate on the participants’ motives and may not be 
recognized by the subjects as being related to any “strategic” behavior but rather to simple 
luck. Principally, specific memories of experiences with the gambling cues, such as the 
memory of good or bad luck with a certain number on a die, could also affect the behavior of 
participants (Brand et al., 2006).
Furthermore, the gambling cues may affect the behavior of specific patient populations 
(Brand et al., 2006). For instance reduction in decision making performance has been found in 
pathological gamblers in decisions under risk in the GDT (Brand, Kalbe, et al., 2005), or the 
Coin Flipping task, and the Cups Task (Brevers et al., 2012) as well as in decisions under 
ambiguity in the IGT (Rossi et al., 2010). In these studies, tasks with gambling cues have 
been used intentionally to investigate the dysfunctional mechanisms contributing to the 
gambling problems as they occur in the patients’ real lives. However, given that the tasks 
make use of the gambling cues, the generalizability of the results is limited, because the 
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participants’ pathological cue reactivity (e.g., craving reactions) might affect functions which 
are also involved in decision making (e.g., executive functions or working memory; Brand et 
al., 2006; Crockford, Goodyear, Edwards, Quickfall, & El-Guebaly, 2005; Field & Cox, 2008; 
van Holst, van Holstein, van den Brink, Veltman, & Goudriaan, 2012; Kushner et al., 2008). 
The state of the patients’ decision-making abilities in situations without gambling cues 
therefore remains unclear. For investigations with patients as well as with healthy participants 
it would be desirable to have a decision-making scenario, which has a more application-
orientated story line with a more comprehensible performance goal, as it might be known 
from real life (e.g., “earn as much valuable possessions as possible”, or “make a good job”, 
instead of “win as much money as possible by gambling”).
Another problem with the existing tasks is the lack of comparability among them. For 
example, the tasks differ from each other with regard to the scenarios they provide (cards 
games, lotteries dice games and so on), number of alternatives, the heights of gains and losses, 
or the styles of probability presentations. This variance in task design offers problems for 
patient studies as well as for the investigation of theoretical assumptions with experimental 
studies. One main problem is the poor comparability of results from the different tasks. There 
are for example studies, which revealed differential impairments and correlates in decisions in 
task measuring decisions under ambiguity vs. other tasks, measuring decisions under risk. For 
example when patient populations were impaired in decision making under ambiguity, but not 
under risk it was interpreted that the patients have impairments in mechanisms contributing to 
advantageous decision making under ambiguity, while the mechanisms contributing to 
decisions under risk were regarded as being intact (Bayard et al., 2010; Brand, Grabenhorst, et 
al., 2007; Brevers et al., 2012; Euteneuer et al., 2009; Zamarian et al., 2008). Although these 
interpretations are principally comprehensible, the differences in the used tasks’ scenarios, 
numbers of alternatives, or heights of gains and losses may have confounded the observed 
divergent or convergent impairments in different types of decision situations. It would be 
helpful for experimental research and in clinical application to be equipped with tasks that can 
be varied in one certain aspect (e.g., the amount of ambiguity), but to keep all other aspects 
stable (e.g., the general scenario, the number of alternatives, the heights of gains and losses, 
and the probabilities).
Unfortunately, the existing gambling tasks have only a low degree of flexibility in 
terms of potential modifications, for example when aiming at increasing the tasks’ 
complexity. For example, the GDT works with a 6-sided die, which is naturally restricted to 
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certain ranges of probabilities for the occurrence of possible dice events (from 1:6 to 6:6). 
Furthermore, typical feedback in most tasks is restricted to gain and loss events: In the GDT 
the rolled number either was correctly guessed, or it was not, which then leads to a gain or a 
loss; in the IGT there is a specific gain, and sometimes there is also a specific loss. The lists of 
examples for inflexibilities of tasks could be continued indefinitely. Thus, it would require 
awkward changes in the existing tasks architecture as well as the story line to add variations 
in feedback events (e.g., different reasons for positive or negative outcomes, which vary in 
emotional valence or intensity). These limitations in flexibility reduce the tasks’ usefulness 
for experimental investigations in which systematic variations are required (e.g., researchers 
as well as clinical neuropsychologists may want to vary a task’s complexity, its outcome 
probabilities, or its heights of gains and losses).
In summary, the main weaknesses of the existing neuropsychological gambling tasks 
are their abundance of gambling-cues, their limited comparability, because of the use of 
different scenarios, and their poor flexibility for application in experimental investigations. 
Therefore, we designed a new scenario – a framework – which aims to overcome the existing 
shortcomings. In the following we explain the new framework’s story line, in which various 
decision-making situations under ambiguity and under risk can be realized.
7.2.1. The Truck Dispatcher Framework
The new computerized decision-making environment is called Truck Dispatcher 
Framework (TDF). Its story takes place in a fictitious country called “Cognitia”. Here, the 
participant is starting a new job in a logistics enterprise, a company called “TruckTrans”. 
He/she is the dispatcher, responsible for making decisions about the routes that the company’s 
trucks take when transporting goods to business customers. The participant’s aim is to lead 
TruckTrans to economic success by attaining the best financial outcomes from the given 
orders. For this, it is necessary to minimize the costs for any transport and to maximize the 
resulting revenue. Occurring costs for TruckTrans are for example caused by the working 
hours of the truck-drivers or by the fuel required for a tour. Consequently, costs are higher if 
the route strongly strains these resources (because the route is long and/or takes much time) 
and lower if it conserves resources (because the route is short and/or fast). Revenue is reached 
by delivering goods to TruckTrans’ customers in time. However, delivering in time is always 
threatened because trucks might get stuck in traffic jams that cause a delay. In this case the 
customers charge contractual penalties, possibly making such a delivery a loss-making 
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business. Thus, the participant has to decide for routes that lead to positive revenue. The 
routes which the participant has to choose from can be associated with different possible gains 
(in case of delivery in time), and costs (in case of traffic jam) and the probabilities for these 
outcomes.
The story line of the TDF is flexible and capable to adapt, add, or remove story details 
in order to realize various decision-making problems. Thus, in the context of this story line, 
various tasks can be implemented in the TDF, and their features can be manipulated. For 
example the number of decision options can be varied (number of possible routes to take), as 
well as the options’ probabilities for traffic jams, or the options’ attributes (different types of 
routes, such as city streets or highways), or the type of feedback (reasons for traffic jam, as 
well as different punishments and rewards, other than only monetary ones).
The aim of the current study was to validate this scenario. Therefore, we investigated 
whether it is possible to base different, frequently used neuropsychological decision-making 
tasks on the common story line of the TDF. We used two standard tasks measuring decisions 
under risk conditions. Additionally, we also tested one task measuring decision making under 
ambiguity. The question was whether the TDF tasks would allow for a valid measurement of 
the same underlying construct, which the original tasks measure. If they did, it can be 
concluded that the story line of the TDF does not produce problems in the measurement of 
decision making and thus the TDF can be recommended for the application in experimental 
research and for first testing in clinical contexts in the future.
For this study, the core features of the original tasks were implemented within the 
story line of the TDF. These core features are the rules for gains and losses, their probabilities, 
the number of decision options, and the number of trials (Brand et al., 2006). However, the 
story line in which these features were implemented was – obviously – different in the TDF. 
Furthermore, there were very small differences in the probability presentation formats, as well 
as the user interfaces. These differences may affect decision-making behavior in the TDF 
(even irrelevant surrounding information can affect decision making, see e.g., the literature on 
framing and anchoring Englich, Mussweiler, & Strack, 2006; Epley & Gilovich, 2006; 
Kühberger, 1998). If they do, these effects need to be described, in order to be able to evaluate 
performances in TDF tasks adequately in future studies and in clinical application.
In the current study, three TDF-tasks were tested on brain-healthy participants. The 
focus of this study lay on tasks measuring decisions under risk conditions. Therefore, the 
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Game of Dice Task (GDT; Brand, Fujiwara, et al., 2005) and the Probability-Associated 
Gambling (PAG) task (Delazer et al., 2007; Zamarian et al., 2008) were used. In an additional 
Experiment we also tested whether the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; Bechara et al., 1996, 
2000), the standard task assessing decisions under ambiguity, could also be implemented 
within the TDF.
Each participant played both the original task and the TDF version, either beginning 
with the original task or with the TDF task. It was tested whether the overall patterns of 
behavior were comparable across both tasks and whether performances in both tasks 
correlated with each other. If the main features of the original tasks have successfully been 
integrated in the TDF counterparts, the patterns of behavior should be comparable. Given the 
differences in the story line or probability presentation formats, small systematic differences 
in behavior may also occur, but must not affect the general pattern of behavior. Additionally, 
the measures in the original and the TDF task should be correlated.
In the following, the literature on the tested decision-making task is shortly 
summarized. Additionally, it is explained which behavior in the task can be defined as typical 
(i.e., normal for brain-healthy subjects). This is important to evaluate whether the pattern of 
the participants’ behavior in the TDF counterpart can be regarded as comparable to the 
behavior in the original task, indicating that projecting the main features of the original task 
has been successful.
7.2.2. Game of Dice Task (GDT)
The GDT is a computerized task, assessing decision making under risk conditions 
(Brand et al., 2005). In each of 18 decision trials, the participants have to guess which number 
will be thrown next by a single virtual six-sided die. The GDT has been developed in order to 
examine the impact of executive functions on strategic decision making under risk conditions
(see also chapter 3.1.3 and Brand, Fujiwara, et al., 2005). For this aim it was important that 
the decision situation has explicit rules for gains and losses as well as their probabilities and 
that these rules remain stable over the whole duration of the task. It was suggested that in this 
stable situation executive functions, like categorization, set-shifting or planning should be 
important for the development, application and revision of advantageous long term strategies 
(Brand, Heinze, et al., 2008).
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So far, the GDT has been used in numerous studies with patient samples and healthy 
participants. For example, in patients with Parkinson’s disease (Brand, Labudda, et al., 2004; 
Euteneuer et al., 2009), alcoholic Korsakoff’s syndrome (Brand, Fujiwara, et al., 2005; Brand, 
Pawlikowski, et al., 2009), attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (Drechsler et al., 2008), 
Alzheimer’s disease (Delazer et al., 2007), pathological gambling (Brand, Kalbe, et al., 2005), 
binge eating disorder (Svaldi et al., 2010), narcolepsy (Bayard, Abril, et al., 2011; Delazer, 
Högl, et al., 2011), restless legs syndrome (Bayard et al., 2010), and Urbach Wiethe disease 
(Brand, Grabenhorst, et al., 2007) it was shown that impairments in executive functions as 
well as in the emotional processing of feedback can result in reduced decision-making 
performance in the GDT. In a review about decision making in patients with 
neurodegenerative diseases, the GDT was mentioned as one of the most important tasks in 
clinical and neuropsychological decision-making research (Gleichgerrcht et al., 2010). In 
studies with healthy participants the role of executive functions, logical thinking, feedback 
processing, calculative strategy development, age-associated cognitive decline (e.g., Brand et 
al., 2008; Brand, Laier, Pawlikowski, & Markowitsch, 2009; Brand & Markowitsch, 2010; 
Brand & Schiebener, 2012; Schiebener, Zamarian, Delazer, & Brand, 2011) as well as 
perfectionism and impulsivity (Bayard, Raffard, et al., 2011; Brand & Altstötter-Gleich, 
2008) for GDT performance has also been described.
It can be inferred from these studies that a normal decision-making pattern of healthy 
participants is reflected in a preference for the advantageous alternatives, resulting in a 
positive net score. When regarding the pattern of all choices between the four risk classes 
healthy participants more often choose the alternatives with higher winning probabilities and 
less often choose alternatives with lower winning probabilities. However, it was sometimes 
found that slightly more choices were made for the combination of three numbers than for the 
combination of four numbers (e.g., Brand et al., 2004). A TDF version of the GDT was tested 
in Experiment 1.
7.2.3. Probability-Associated Gambling (PAG) task
The PAG task is a computerized task also measuring decision making under risk 
conditions (see also chapter 3.1.3 and Sinz et al., 2008; Zamarian et al., 2008). In the task, 
participants are asked to decide between taking a fixum (a fixed gain or loss of €20) or 
gambling in a lottery for which the probabilities for winning and losing are displayed by the 
ratio of red and blue cubes in an urn.
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The PAG task was developed to examine decision-making behavior under risk 
conditions in a situation, in which the amounts of gains and losses and their probabilities are 
explicit but change from trial to trial. Additionally, the task provides a situation with a conflict 
between taking a risk and deciding for the most conservative option. In other tasks, such as 
the GDT, the most conservative choice, with the lowest risk is at the same time the most 
advantageous choice (at least on the long run). In the PAG task it is sometimes more 
advantageous to take a risk (choosing the lottery gamble), instead of deciding conservative 
(take the fixum), because the expected value of the gamble is higher than the amount of the 
fixum. Thus, the task is supposed to measure decision-making performance without being 
undermined by the participant’s general tendency to avoid risks.
The PAG task was used in a number of studies, mostly for the examination of patient 
populations. Patients with Alzheimer’s disease (Sinz et al., 2008), Parkinson’s disease 
dementia (Delazer et al., 2009), mild cognitive impairment (Zamarian, Weiss, et al., 2010), 
and after traumatic brain injury (Bonatti et al., 2008) showed a decreased performance in the
original PAG task or modified versions of it. These effects were associated with reduced 
executive functions and problems with integrating information from different sources or with 
adapting decision strategies. Older aged individuals (Zamarian et al., 2008), patients with 
Parkinson’s disease without dementia (Delazer et al., 2009) and patients with temporal lobe 
epilepsy (Bonatti et al., 2009) showed normal performance in the PAG task although they 
displayed problems with decision making under ambiguity (as measured by the IGT). 
Overall, studies showed that a normal, healthy pattern of decision making in the PAG 
task constitutes choosing the lottery more often in the higher and less often in the lower 
winning-probability conditions. A TDF version of the PAG task was tested in Experiment 2.
7.2.4. Iowa Gambling Task (IGT)
In addition to the two main studies, we also aimed to evaluate the possibility to design 
a TDF version of the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). This task is supposed to measure decision 
making under conditions of ambiguity. Participants have to choose cards from four decks. No 
information is provided about the probabilities for gains and losses or their possible heights. 
Immediately after each choice the computer indicates the amount of gained money. At 
unpredictable times, an amount of loss of money follows the win. From this feedback the 
participants can learn that the task has two advantageous decks leading to a positive capital in 
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the long run. The other two decks are disadvantageous leading to a highly negative capital in 
the long run. 
The IGT was originally developed to test the somatic marker hypothesis (see also 
chapter 3.1.2 and Bechara et al., 1994; Bechara & Damasio, 2005; A. R. Damasio, 1994), 
assuming that in healthy persons, advantageous decision making can be learned automatically, 
because it is guided by bodily emotional reactions to rewards and punishments. The task 
attempts to model real life decision making by providing a situation, in which outcomes of 
different options and the probabilities of these outcomes are ambiguous. Gains and losses 
from the different decks are not obvious and seem to occur unsystematically, thus preventing 
the participant to be able to detect the probabilities for different outcomes. Participants have 
to follow their intuitive hunches and guesses, probably created by the emotional reactions to 
the task’s feedback (e.g., Bechara et al., 1997). 
The IGT has been used in an uncounted number of studies with patients and healthy 
individuals. From the results of studies with patients who had lesions in the prefrontal cortex 
(Bechara et al., 1997, 1996; Bechara, 2004; Northoff et al., 2006) or to the amygdala 
(Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2003; Gupta et al., 2010) and from studies with patients with 
psychiatric disorders (Haaland et al., 2007; Must et al., 2006; Smoski et al., 2008) it was 
concluded that particularly emotional reactions to feedback and the bodies anticipation of it 
are important for decision making in the IGT.
Other studies also investigated the roles of cognitive functioning for the behavior in 
the task both in healthy individuals and patients (Brand, Recknor, et al., 2007; Maia & 
McClelland, 2004, 2005; Toplak et al., 2010; Turnbull et al., 2005). In summary, it seems that 
although emotions are very important for decisions in the IGT, there is also an influence of 
conscious knowledge about the task’s contingencies and cognitive abilities, which predicts 
decision-making performance, at least in the later trials when the rules for gains and losses 
have become aware to the participant (Brand, Recknor, et al., 2007; Y.-T. Kim et al., 2011). 
For reviews about cognitive and emotional correlates of decision making in the IGT refer also 
to Buelow and Suhr (2009) and Dunn, Dalgleish, and Lawrence (2006).
The decision-making pattern of normal, healthy participants typically shows an 
ascending learning curve over the tasks duration, with increasing preference for the two 
advantageous decks (e.g., Turnbull et al., 2005). Often, it has also been reported that the 
learning curve slightly descends in the last block of the task (e.g., Torralva et al., 2012; 
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Verdejo-García, Benbrook, Funderburk, David, & Bolla, 2007). A TDF version of the IGT 
was tested in Experiment 3.
7.3. Experiment 1 (GDT)
7.3.1. Method
7.3.1.1. Participants
A total of 120 brain-healthy participants (55 males) took part in Experiment 1. They 
were aged 18-75 years, M = 29.17 years, SD = 13.51 years. Participants were recruited by 
local advertisement and tested at the department of General Psychology: Cognition, at the 
University of Duisburg-Essen. None of them had participated in one of the other studies 
reported here, or in a comparable study in the department. They received no financial 
compensation, but students received credits for courses. None of them reported a history of 
neurological or psychiatric diseases, as determined by a self-report questionnaire. The study 
was approved by a local ethics committee. 
7.3.1.2. Materials
7.3.1.2.1.Original task: GDT
As already described in the Introduction, the GDT is a computerized game with dice. 
In first part of the instruction, a screenshot of the game’s surface is shown to the participants 
and the task is explained as follows: 
“This is a game of dice. Your task is to win as much money and to lose as little money 
as you can. You start with a balance of €1,000. In a total of 18 rounds, one die is thrown and 
you are supposed to guess the correct number each time. The result of each throw is random. 
Before each new throw, you are to choose one single number or a combination of several 
numbers. If the result matches your guess, you win. Otherwise you lose.”
The principle of the GDT is then additionally illustrated by using examples of possible 
bets, supported by screenshots, which illustrate exemplary gambling situations. For each 
possible risk category (betting on one, two, three, and four numbers) one example is explained 
in the following manner:
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“You can also bet on two numbers together, for example, the number 3 and 4. If the 
result is one of these two numbers you win €500. If the result is any of the other numbers, i.e., 
1, 2, 5, or 6, you lose €500.” 
By means of these examples, the participants are informed that the available options 
are related to specific amounts of gain or loss (from €100 for bets on combinations of four 
numbers to €1,000 for bets on one single number). Additionally, a summary of the rules is 
presented before the task starts. The key features of the GDT are indicated in more detail in 
Table 9.
7.3.1.2.2. TDF version of the GDT: TDF-GDT
In the TDF-GDT participants have the goal to earn as much fictitious money as 
possible and to lose as little as possible. First the story (or the “scenario) is explained to the 
participants. They are informed that they are in the role of a dispatcher of the fictitious 
logistics company TruckTrans, which is based in the fictitious country Cognitia. As truck 
dispatchers, the participants have to decide which routes the trucks take to drive to the 
customers. The principle of the game is then explained as follows:
“On six working days of a week it is allowed to drive with trucks on Cognitia’s 
highways. Planning the tours for the trucks cost-effectively is a demanding task because there 
are several possibilities to let the trucks drive to the customer. There are not only routes over 
single highways but also over combinations of several highways. Depending on how many 
highways the truck uses, it takes different amounts of time to deliver the goods. If it uses more 
highways the delivery takes longer. Then the costs for TruckTrans are higher and the profit is 
lower. If the truck drives over few or even only one highway, it arrives earlier at its 
destination. Thus, the costs for TruckTrans are lower and the profit is higher. 
Please note: The quicker TruckTrans promises to deliver the goods, the higher is the 
gain, but the higher is also the contractual penalty, if the goods are note delivered in time.
However, on the tours to the customers a truck can get into a traffic jam. Then 
delivering the goods on time fails. This results in a contractual penalty for this tour and 
means financial loss for TruckTrans.”
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After the explanation of the story, the user interface is presented to the participants and 
their concrete task is explained to them, while the parts of the user interface, which are 
explained, are highlighted: 
“You make decisions for the routes on 18 days. Your starting capital is €1,000. On the 
left side you can see how often there were traffic jams on the particular routes. Note, that it is 
irrelevant whether there was a traffic jam on one route at the day before. There could be a 
traffic jam at the next day or it could be free. You can send the truck on single highways or on 
several highways. On the right side you see how much money you can win or lose with tours 
on the available routes. Depending on the number of highways on a route, the truck needs 
different amounts of time for delivering the goods. When the truck uses few highways it will 
reach its destination quicker. Therefore, the costs for TruckTrans are lower and the profit is 
higher. If the truck drives on several highways, it takes longer. Then the costs for TruckTrans 
are higher and the profit is lower. However, the truck can also get into a traffic jam. In this 
case it will not succeed in delivering the goods in time. This results is the indicated 
contractual penalty, which means loss for TruckTrans.”
Like in the GDT, there are 14 options for the decision, and the options can be 
categorized into four risk classes (driving over one single highway, combinations of two, 
three, or four highways). The possible choices are also explained using examples, such as the 
following:
“You may for example let the truck drive over two highways, for example, H18 and 
H22. On this route there is a traffic jam on 4 of 6 days, and on 2 of 6 days the route is free. 
You cannot know whether the route is free today. The traffic situation of the previous day is 
also irrelevant. If the route is free, the truck arrives in time and you earn €500. If the truck 
gets into a traffic jam, it arrives too late and you lose €500.”
The key features of the GDT have all been applied in the TDF-GDT, as presented in 
the direct comparison in Table 9. Find pictures of the GDT and the TDF-GDT in Figure 10.
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Table 9. The key features of the GDT and the way they were implemented in the TDF-GDT.
Key feature GDT TDF-GDT
Scenario dice game logistics company
Probability coding 6-sided die routes with probabilities for traffic 
jam on 6 days
Choice alternatives number combinations highway combinations
Number of alternatives 14 die combinations 14 routes
Risk classes (gain/loss)
1:6 (€1,000)
2:6 (€500)
3:6 (€200)
4:6 (€100)
4 different types of number 
combinations
one single number
combinations of two numbers
combinations of three numbers
combinations of four numbers
4 different lengths of routes
direct route over one highway
detour over two highways
detour over three highways
detour over four highways
Number of trials 18 die throws 18 truck tours
Visual feedback green or red colored amount of 
gain or loss, total capital
green or red colored amount of 
profit or costs, total capital
Auditory feedback gain: jingle of a cash machine, 
loss: dull tone
gain: quickly passing truck, loss: 
noise of traffic jam
Figure 10. The left half the figure shows the user interface of the GDT. On the right half it shows the user 
interface of the TDF-GDT. 
Both tasks have equal numbers of alternatives with equal gains and losses related to them. The starting capital is 
also equal in both tasks. A difference between the two tasks is that the probabilities are not explicitly provided in 
the GDT, but they are in the TDF-GDT.
Measures. Decision-making behavior in both tasks, the GDT and the TDF-GDT, is 
first analyzed in the overall pattern of choices, by counting the number of choices for the 
different alternatives, i.e., the number of choices for the four risk classes (one 
number/highway, two numbers/highways, three numbers/highways, or four 
numbers/highways). As cumulative measure of decision-making performance the net score is 
used. Based on the outcome probabilities, the given alternatives can be grouped into low risk 
(advantageous) and high risk (disadvantageous) options. Choices for alternatives with 
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winning probabilities of 50% or higher are advantageous (GDT: bets on three or four 
numbers, TDF-GDT: tours over three or four highways). Choosing them consequently 
promises to end the task with at least as much money as with which it was started. The other 
choice alternatives are disadvantageous because the winning probabilities are below 34%. 
Choosing these alternatives will result in more losses than profits (GDT: bets on one or two 
numbers, TDF-GDT: routes over one or two highways). The net score is calculated by 
subtracting the number of disadvantageous choices from the number of advantageous choices.
7.3.1.3. Statistical analyses
For the statistical analyses SPSS version 20.0 was used. Comparisons of means were 
computed with t-tests or with repeated measures ANOVAs. For multiple mean comparisons 
Bonferroni’s correction was used. Relationships between two variables were described with 
Pearson’s product-moment-correlation coefficient.
7.3.2. Results
In the first step of our analysis, we tested the behaviors in the two tasks for sequence 
effects, in order to determine whether data of the whole group (those who performed the 
original GDT at first and those who performed the TDF-GDT at first) can be used for further 
comparisons between the tasks. A repeated measures ANOVA was computed using the 
number of decisions for the risk classes (one, two, three, and four numbers/highways) and 
task (GDT, TDF-GDT) as within subject factors and sequence (GDT first, TDF-GDT first) as 
between subject factor. We found no significant effect of sequence as the interaction between 
risk class and sequence was not statistically relevant, F(2.12, 249.64) = 1.41, p = .245, ηp² = 
.01. Therefore, the data were analyzed independent of the sequence of task administration.
In the next step we compared the behaviors in the two tasks. As can be seen in Figure 
11, the pattern of behavior in both tasks was comparable to the pattern, which is known from 
previous GDT studies: On average participants preferred alternatives with lower risk over 
alternatives with higher risk. However, in the GDT preference steadily increased with 
decreasing risk, while in the TDF-GDT preference for the lowest risk alternatives (four 
highways) and the second lowest risk alternatives (three highways) were relatively similar.
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Figure 11. The figure shows the decision-making behavior in the GDT and the TDF-GDT.
It describes the mean number of decisions in the four different risk categories, that is one single number/one 
highway, combinations of two numbers/two highways, combinations of three numbers/three highways, and 
combinations of four numbers/four highways. As can be seen the overall pattern of behavior is comparable in 
both task: There is a preference for options with higher winning probabilities.
To compare the behavioral patterns, we computed a repeated measures ANOVA with 
the risk class and task (GDT, TDF-GDT) as within subject factors. There was a main effect of 
risk class, F(2.13, 253.16) = 26.35, p < .001, ηp² = .18, as well as an interaction between risk 
class and task, F(2.55, 303.57) = 6.20, p = .001, ηp² = .05. This result indicates that there were 
differences in the behavior in the two tasks. Single pair comparisons between the numbers of 
decisions for equivalent risk categories in the two tasks showed that in the TDF-GDT 
significantly more decisions for one highway were made than decisions for one single number 
in the GDT, p < .001. The differences between the other three risk categories were not 
significant, ps > .017 (please note that the Bonferroni corrected significance threshold was p = 
.0125). To test whether the participants showed the normal general pattern in both tasks - that 
is a preference for alternatives with lower risks - additional repeated measures ANOVA with 
only the variables of the GDT or the TDF-GDT were computed. In the GDT there was a 
significant effect of risk class, F(2.11, 251.07) = 28.96, p < .001, ηp² = .20. The single pair 
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comparisons showed significant differences between the risk categories, ps ≤ .001, except for 
the difference between the number of choices for combinations of three and four numbers, ps 
< .99. 
For the TDF-GDT the pattern was also significant as indicated by the effect of risk 
class, F(2.37, 282.06) = 9.11, p < .001, ηp² = .07. The single pair comparisons showed 
significant differences between the means of decisions for highly risky alternatives (one and 
two highways) compared to lowly risky alternatives (three and four numbers), ps < .05. The 
comparisons between three and four highways as well as between one and two highways were 
not significant, ps > .38. This analysis indicates that the average preference for lower risks, as 
it is known from GDT-studies, was present in the TDF-GDT.
The net scores of the two tasks are depicted in Figure 12. The net score in the GDT 
was significantly higher, t(119) = -3.33, p = .001, d = 0.32.
Figure 12. The mean net scores in the GDT and the TDF-GDT.
The mean net score in the TDF-GDT was smaller than the net score in the original GDT and the effect size of the 
differences was small. The error bars represent standard deviations.
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The correlations between the variables of the two tasks can be found in Table 10. As 
can be seen, there were moderate correlations between the numbers of decisions for 
alternatives within the four risk classes and the net scores of the original GDT and the TDF-
GDT. 
Table 10. Correlations between the variables of the GDT and the TDF-GDT.
highways net score
one two three four
GDT one number .32** .14 -.20* -.15 -.29**
two numbers .32** .39** -.06 -.42** -.42**
three numbers -.15 .07 .23* -.12 .06
four numbers -.26** -.38** -.03 .45** .38**
net score -.40** -.35** .15 .38** .46**
* p ≤ .05 (two-tailed)
** p ≤ .01 (two-tailed)
7.3.3. Discussion
In summary, the results of Experiment 1 show that decision-making behavior in the 
TDF-GDT was comparable to the behavior in the GDT in this sample and also to the GDT 
behavior as it is known from previous studies (e.g., Brand, Laier, et al., 2009). In both tasks 
the participants preferred less risky options over riskier options, showed a positive overall 
performance (i.e., positive net scores) and the performance measures correlated moderately 
between the tasks. These results indicate that the core features of the GDT have successfully 
been integrated in the story line of the TDF-GDT. The slight differences between 
performance indicators in the two tasks (more risky decisions in the TDF-GDT) may be due 
to several reasons (e.g., the more complex cover story, or the other probability-presentation 
format in the TDF-GDT), which could be examined in upcoming studies. Given the 
conceptual correspondences of the two tasks, and the comparable behavioral patterns of the 
participants as well as the correlations shown, the slight differences in behavior do not affect 
the conclusion that the TDF-GDT seems to measure the same underlying construct as the 
GDT.
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7.4. Experiment 2 (PAG task)
7.4.1. Method
7.4.1.1. Participants
In total 124 participants (53 males) took part in Experiment 2. Their age was 18-62 
years, M = 28.98 years, SD = 10.74 years. The criteria for inclusion and exclusion were the 
same as in Experiment 1.
7.4.1.2. Materials
7.4.1.2.1. Original task: PAG task
In the PAG task (Sinz et al., 2008; Zamarian et al., 2008) participants have to decide 
between taking a fixed amount of gain or loss and gambling in a lottery. The principle of the 
task is explained in the instructions as follows: 
“The following task is a gambling task. Please imagine that you are the participant in 
a lottery and you have the aim to win as much money as possible. Your task: In each trial you 
have the choice between two options and you are supposed to decide for one of them: 
Option 1(left half of the screen): You take the fixum. Then, depending on the trial, 
either a small amount of money is subtracted from your capital (€20) or this amount (€20) is 
added to your capital. Please regard the plus or minus sign ahead of the number.
Option 2 (right half of the screen): You gamble for €100. Explanation: In the grey box 
there are different amounts of red and blue cubes. From these the computer draws one in 
each trial. If a red cube is drawn, you win €100, because the red cubes are the winning cubes. 
If a blue cube is drawn, you lose €100, because the blue cubes are the losing cubes.
In each trial you have ten seconds time for deciding for one of the two options.”
If no decision is made, the fixum is chosen automatically. The participants are not 
explicitly told that they have to make 40 decisions, that there are always 24 cubes, and that the 
ratio of red and blue cubes changes pseudo-randomly between four different ratios that define 
the winning probability (3:21 or 12.5%, 9:15 or 37.5%, 15:9 or 62.5%, and 21:3 or 87.5%). 
They also do not know that every probability occurs five times with the positive and five 
times with the negative fixum.
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Which choice is advantageous and which is disadvantageous depends on the ratio of 
red and blue boxes. If the winning probability is high (62.5% or 87.5%) it is advantageous to 
play the gamble and disadvantageous to take the fixum (irrespective of whether it is positive 
of negative). If the winning probability is low (12.5% or 37.5%) it is always advantageous to 
decide for the fixum and disadvantageous to gamble. 
7.4.1.2.2. TDF version of the PAG task: TDF-PAG task
In the TDF-PAG task, the participants have to decide between a fixed sum of gain or 
loss and a chance event, analogue to the PAG task. They decide whether a truck uses the 
highway or the country road to drive to the customer. Like in the TDF-GDT, first the framing 
story is explained, including the information that TruckTrans is a logistics company, aiming 
to maximize profits by delivering the goods to the customers in time, that longer routes are 
associated with higher costs, and that contractual penalties will follow if a truck arrives at its 
destination with delay. The principle of the TDF-PAG is then described as follows:
“It is discriminated between routes over the highway and routes over the country road. 
Normally, the country road is the slower option and causes higher costs and less profit for 
TruckTrans. In contrast, it is possible to drive faster on the highway and the truck arrives 
earlier at its destination. The costs are lower and the gain is higher. However, in Cognitia 
there can also be traffic jams. Therefore, before each choice for a route, the map of Cognitia 
is displayed. This shows the current traffic jam situation in the country. Then you have to 
consider whether you chose the country road and thereby accept longer driving time. It can 
however also not be guaranteed that the country road is always free, but you will be informed 
about this before you chose the route. Please note: The quicker TruckTrans promises to 
deliver the goods, the higher is the contractual penalty, if the goods do not arrive at the 
customer in time. So, chose the route, which appears to provide the quickest arrival and 
thereby the highest profit, given the current conditions.”
Then the tasks surface is explained to the participants, while always the relevant part 
of the surface is highlighted: 
“You decide for the routes on 40 days. Your starting capital is €1,000. On the left side, 
the map shows the actual traffic jam situation in Cognitia. The red trucks show that they are 
in a traffic jam. The blue trucks display a free highway. Note, that only the current traffic jam 
situation is relevant. 
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On the right side, the situation on the country road is presented. The country road is 
either free or blocked. You are now asked to make your decision based on the current traffic 
jam situation and the situation on the country road: You can chose either the country road, 
with which you can win or lose €200, or the highway with which you can win or lose €1,000. 
Please tick your choice with the mouse. The choice will be symbolized with a black dot. For 
your decision you have ten seconds. If you do not decide within ten seconds, the country road 
is chosen automatically.”
Then the options are explained using an example: 
“You may for example choose the country road because of many traffic jams on the 
highway, although you know that the country road is blocked. You lose €200. You may also 
send the truck on the highway, despite many traffic jams. If you get into a traffic jam you lose 
€1,000. If the highway is free, you gain €1,000. If you decide to send the truck on the country 
road, because of many traffic jams and because you know that the country road is free, you 
win €200.”
Like in the PAG task the participants are neither informed about the exact number of 
blue and red trucks on the map nor about their ratio (like in the PAG task, the number of red 
and blue items could be counted by the participant). The possible ratios of red and blue trucks 
are equivalent to those in the original PAG task and therefore winning probabilities are also 
the same. The key features of the PAG task have all also been realized in the TDF-PAG, as 
presented in the direct comparison in Table 11. Pictures of the PAG task and the TDF-PAG 
task can be found in Figure 13.
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Table 11. The key features of the PAG task and the way they were implemented in the TDF-PAG.
Key feature PAG task TDF-PAG
Scenario lottery logistics company
Probability coding ratio of red and blue cubes ratio of trucks on free highways 
(blue) and on highways with 
traffic jams (red)
Choice alternatives 2: fixum, lottery gamble 2: country road, highway
Risk classes (gain/loss) 4 different ratios of red and blue 
cubes:
3:21, 9:15, 15:9, 21:3
4 different ratios of trucks on free 
highways and in traffic jams:
3:21, 9:15, 15:9, 21:3
Occurrence of the different 
probabilities
each probability occurs five times 
with the positive and five times with 
the negative fixum
each probability occurs five times 
with a free and five times a 
blocked country road
gains/losses fixum: €20
lottery: €100
country road: €200
highway: €1,000
Number of trials 40 lotteries 40 truck tours
Visual feedback visualization of pulled cube, amount 
of gain or loss, total capital
green or red colored amount of 
profit or costs, total capital
Auditory feedback gain: applause, loss: dull tone gain: quickly passing truck, loss: 
noise of traffic jam
Figure 13. The left part of the figure shows the interface of the PAG task, the right side shows the TDF-PAG 
task. 
In both tasks there are two options: choosing the save amount of gain or loss (fixum/country road) or choosing 
the option with uncertain outcome (lottery gamble/highway). In both tasks the probabilities for gains and losses 
in the uncertain option are visualized by the ratio of red and blue items (cubes/trucks). There are two differences 
between the two tasks: The number of remaining trials is explicitly provided in the TDF-PAG task but not in the 
PAG task. The monetary amounts in the TDF-PAG task are all ten times higher than the monetary amounts in 
the original PAG task.
Measures. Decision-making performance in the PAG task and the TDF-PAG task is 
measured by the frequency of decisions for gambles (PAG task: choosing the lottery; TDF-
PAG task: choosing the highway) in the different ratios of blue and red items (cubes or truck 
symbols; 3:21: “low winning probability”, 9:15: “moderately low winning probability”, 15:9: 
“moderately high winning probability”, 21:3: “high winning probability”). Higher numbers of 
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decisions for gambles in the two high winning probabilities indicate better decision-making 
performance; higher numbers of gambles in the low winning probabilities indicate worse 
performance.
7.4.1.3. Statistical analyses
The methods for the statistical analyses were the same as in Experiment 1.
7.4.2. Results
First, the behavior in the two tasks, the original PAG task and the TDF-PAG task, 
were controlled for sequence effects. A repeated measures ANOVA was computed using the 
number of gambles in the four probability conditions (low, moderately low, moderately high, 
and high winning probabilities) as well as task (PAG task, TDF-PAG task) as within subject 
factors and sequence (PAG task first, TDF-PAG task first) as between subject factor. There 
was neither a significant interactions between sequence and task, F(1, 122) < 0.01, p = .966, 
ηp² < .01, nor between sequence and the number of gambles in the four probabilities, F(1.78, 
216.50) = 0.05, p = .936, ηp² < .01. Therefore, the behavior in the two tasks was compared 
independent of sequence. 
In both tasks, participants made more decisions for lottery/highway in higher winning 
probability conditions and less of these decisions in lower winning probability conditions (see 
Figure 14). The pattern is comparable in both tasks, but it seems that the participants 
systematically made more gambles in the TDF-PAG in all probability conditions.
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Figure 14. The figure shows the mean number of decisions for the “gambling” option (lottery/highway) in the 
PAG task and the TDF-PAG task. 
In both tasks there is a comparable pattern, with more decisions for the gambling option when the winning 
probabilities of the gambles were higher. There is a higher preference for gambling in the TDF-PAG task, as can 
be judged from the higher position of the TDF-PAG task curve.
The repeated measures ANOVA supported this impression, showing a significant 
effect of task, F(1, 123) = 20.05, p < .001, ηp² < .14, and an interaction between task and the 
number of gambles in the four probabilities, F(2.24, 275.27) = 3.83, p = .019, ηp² = .03. 
Single pair comparisons of the means frequencies of decisions for gambling in the analogue 
probability conditions in the PAG task and the TDF-PAG task revealed that in the TDF-PAG 
significantly more decisions for gambles were made in the two low probability conditions, ps
< .004. The differences in the two high probability conditions were not significant, ps > .111 
(the Bonferroni corrected significance threshold was p = .0125). To test whether the normal 
PAG task pattern - more gambles in higher winning probability conditions - was present in 
both tasks repeated measures ANOVAs with only the variables of the PAG task or the TDF-
PAG task were performed. In the PAG task the effect of the mean frequency of gambles in the 
four probability conditions was significant, F(1.83, 225.41) = 559.25, p < .001, ηp² = .82. All 
single pair comparisons between the probabilities were also significant, ps < .001. When 
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regarding the TDF-PAG only there was also a significant effect of the mean frequency of 
gambles in the four probability conditions, F(2.05, 252.07) = 547.25, p < .001, ηp² = .82. The 
single pair comparisons were all significant, ps < .001. This result shows that the normal 
behavior, as it is known from previous PAG task studies, was also present in the TDF-PAG 
task.
In Table 12 the correlations between the variables of the two tasks are shown. As can 
be seen, the correlations between the analogue variables in the two tasks had low to moderate 
effect sizes.
Table 12. Correlations between the numbers of gambles in the four winning probability conditions of the PAG 
task and the TDF-PAG task.
TDF-PAG Task
low winning 
probability
moderately 
low winning 
probability
moderately 
high winning 
probability
high winning 
probability
PAG task low winning 
probability
.35** .22* -.16 -.24**
moderately low 
winning 
probability
.28** .27** -.13 -.12
moderately high 
winning 
probability
-.11 -.07 .20* .25**
high winning 
probability
-.17 -.06 .18 .34**
* p ≤ .05 (two-tailed)
** p ≤ .01 (two-tailed)
7.4.3. Discussion
The results of the Experiment with the PAG task and a TDF version of the PAG task 
show that decision-making behavior in the two tasks was comparable. As known from 
previous PAG task studies, participants made on average more choices for lottery 
gambles/highways when the related winning probabilities were higher (Schiebener et al., 
2011; Zamarian et al., 2008). A difference was found in the frequency of gambling in the low 
winning probability lotteries. When the winning probabilities were low or moderately low the 
participants made more decisions for the highway in the TDF-PAG than decisions for the 
lottery in the PAG task. This slightly more risky behavior does however not affect the 
conclusion that the general pattern is comparable between the two tasks, given that the general 
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gambling patterns were closely connected to the winning probability in the gamble, as 
indicated by the high observed effect sizes of the lotteries’ winning probabilities (in both tasks 
the ηp² of the inner subject variable “probability” was .82). The correlations between the 
numbers of decisions for gambles in the four different probability conditions were in the low 
to moderate range. In summary the results indicate that the features of the PAG task have 
successfully been integrated in the TDF story line and that the TDF-PAG task measures the 
same underlying construct as the standard PAG task.
7.5. Experiment 3 (IGT)
7.5.1. Method
7.5.1.1. Participants
The sample was comprised of 40 brain-healthy participants (21 males). They were 
aged 19-54 years, M = 26.65, SD = 9.43 years and had a mean school-education of M = 12.26 
years, SD = 1.94 years. The inclusion and exclusion criteria were the same as in Experiment 1 
and 2.
7.5.1.2. Materials
7.5.1.2.1. Original task: IGT
The IGT is a computerized task, in which the participants’ chose between four decks 
of cards. They are instructed as follows:
“You will now play a game with cards. Your task is to choose one card from one of the 
four decks. Then you will win money. Sometimes additionally a loss follows after the gain. 
You are supposed to try to win as much money as possible and to lose as little of it as 
possible. There are good and bad decks, but you have to find out yourself which decks are 
good and which are bad.
The participants do neither know the number of trials (which is 100) nor the gains and 
losses that will follow the choices from the decks. Immediately after each choice the computer 
indicates the amount of gain accompanied by a distinct positive sound. At unpredictable 
times, an amount of loss follows, together with a negative sound. There are two advantageous 
decks, C and D, providing low gains, and only low occasional losses. Choosing them 
consistently will in the long run lead to a positive money balance. The other two decks, A and 
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B, are the disadvantageous ones. They offer high gains, but occasionally very high losses. In 
the long run, choosing these decks very often, will lead to a high negative money balance. 
7.5.1.2.2. TDF version of the IGT: TDF-IGT
In the TDF-IGT the participants’ can chose between four routes to the customer. Like 
in the two other TDF versions first the general story of the game is explained. Then the 
specific principle of the TDF-IGT is described:
“You task is to organize the tours of the trucks in the way that TruckTrans earns as 
much money as possible and loses as little of it as possible. Your starting capital will be 
€1,000. In Cognitia it is also possible that a truck gets into a traffic jam on its tour to the 
customer. This causes a contractual penalty, which is a financial loss that is accounted beside 
the payoff for the delivered goods. Whether there was a traffic jam on a route the day before 
is irrelevant for the situation at each new day. Independent from what happened the days 
before, the truck may get into a traffic jam or the route may be free. When planning a certain 
tour you can unfortunately not know whether there will be a traffic jam on the route you 
chose. However, in Cognitia there can be routes, on which traffic jams are more frequent, 
while there are other routes on which traffic jams occur less frequent. Therefore some routes 
are more advantageous than others.” 
Analogue to the IGT, the participants are not told that the two routes in the lower row 
are advantageous, resulting in low profits, and only low occasional contractual penalties. In 
the long run, choosing them consistently will lead to a positive money balance. The other two 
routes in the upper row are the disadvantageous, with higher short term profits but 
occasionally very high contractual penalties. In the long run, choosing these routes will lead 
to a high negative money balance. All the contingencies for gains and losses are exactly the 
same as in the IGT (Bechara et al., 2000). The key features of the IGT and how they are 
implemented in the TDF-IGT are shown in Table 13. A picture of the IGT and the TDF-IGT 
can be found in Figure 15.
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Table 13. The key features of the IGT and the way they were implemented in the TDF-IGT.
Key feature IGT TDF-IGT
Scenario card game logistics company
Probability coding no explicit probability information no explicit probability information
Choice alternatives 4 cards 4 routes
gains/losses as defined in Bechara et al., 2000 as defined in Bechara et al., 2000
Number of trials 100 card selections 100 tours
Visual feedback green colored amount of gain or 
loss, total capital as bar
green or red colored amount of 
profit or costs, total capital as 
exact sum
Auditory feedback gain: jingle of cash machine, loss: 
dull tone
gain: quickly passing truck, loss: 
noise of traffic jam
Figure 15. The left part of the picture shows the interface of the IGT, the right part the interface of the TDF-
IGT. 
Both provide four alternatives, and information about the money capital, but no information about the number of 
trials. After each decision the subjects are informed about their gain and thereafter about their loss (if there is a 
loss). Differences between the tasks are the arrangement of alternatives (vertically arranged in the IGT; grid-like 
arranged in the TDF-IGT), the visualization of the money capital (with a bar in the IGT; as number in the TDF-
IGT), and the presentation of gain and loss amounts (displayed above the cards in the IGT; displayed in a pop-up 
window in the TDF-IGT). 
Measures. According to the convention performance in the IGT and the TDF-IGT is 
measured by block-wise net scores in five blocks of 20 trials each and by an overall net score 
(number of advantageous – number of disadvantageous choices).
7.5.1.3. Statistical analyses
The methods for the statistical analyses were the same as in Experiment 1 and 2.
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7.5.2. Results
Again, the first step was to control for effects of the sequence of task administration. A 
repeated measures ANOVA with performance in each block (net scores of the five blocks) 
and task (IGT, TDF-IGT) as within subject factors and sequence (IGT first, TDF-IGT first) as 
between subject factor was computed. We found no significant interaction between the block-
wise net scores and sequence, F(3.13, 119.10) = 2.02, p = .112, ηp² = .05. The between subject 
effect of sequence was also not significant, F(1, 38) = 1.35, p = .252, ηp² = .03. Therefore, the 
data were analyzed independent of the sequence of task administration.
The groups’ learning curves in the two tasks are depicted in Figure 16. Overall, in both 
tasks there was an ascending preference for the advantageous alternatives, but the learning 
curves are slightly different. Descriptively, in the IGT performance increases steadily, while 
in the TDF-IGT performance increases particularly between block 1 and 2. 
Figure 16. The figure shows the learning curves of the IGT and the TDF-IGT. 
In both the net scores increase in later trials, but the courses of the two curves slightly differ.
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In order to compare the learning patterns in the two tasks a repeated measures 
ANOVA was computed with performance in each block and with task as within subject 
factors. This showed a significant interaction between block and task, F(3.13, 122.10) = 3.85, 
p = .010, ηp² = .09. The single pair comparisons between the bock-wise net scores in the IGT 
and their analogues in the TDF-IGT showed no significant differences, ps > .015 (please note 
that the Bonferroni corrected significance threshold was p = .01).
To test whether the learning effect that is known from the IGT-literature was present 
in both tasks, we computed repeated measures ANOVAs with the IGT data and the TDF-IGT 
data separately. In the IGT the effect of block was significant, F(2.82, 110.13) = 8.06, p < 
.001, ηp² = .17. The single pair comparisons were significant when comparing the net scores 
of the first three blocks with net scores of the last two blocks, ps < .039 (only the comparison 
between block 3 and 5 failed to reach significance, p = .062). The comparisons among the net 
scores of the first three or the last two blocks, respectively, were not significant, ps > .193. 
In the TDF-IGT the analysis also showed a significant effect of block, F(4, 156) = 
17.48, p < .001, ηp² = .31. The single pair comparisons between the blocks were significant 
when comparing block 1 with the other blocks, ps < .001, but not between all other block-
pairs ps > .560. In conclusion, the ANOVA indicates that there is a learning effect similar to 
the one that is known from studies using the IGT. The single pair comparisons show that the 
main improvement of decision-making performance took place within the course of the first 
two blocks. 
The overall net scores in the IGT and the TDF-IGT are shown in Figure 17. The two 
net scores were descriptively comparable and did not differ significantly t(39) = -0.63, p = 
.533, d = 0.12.
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Figure 17. The figure shows the mean net scores of the IGT and the TDF-IGT. 
The net score of the TDF-IGT is descriptively higher, but the difference was not significant, and the effect was 
very small. The error bars represent standard deviations.
The correlations between the variables of the IGT and the TDF-IGT can be found in 
Table 14. When interpreting the results of the correlations, the sample sizes have to be kept in 
mind, which are small for correlation analysis. The correlations reflect the slight differences 
in the block-wise learning curves. Between the analogue blocks the correlations are mostly 
very low and not significant. However, when regarding the entire table, it can be seen that 
except three correlations, all coefficients are positive, indicating that generally decision-
making performance in the IGT was positively related to the performance in the TDF-IGT.
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Table 14. Correlations between the net scores of the original IGT and the TDF-IGT.
TDF-IGT
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Block 5 net 
score
IGT Block 1 -.14 -.01 .11 .06 -.37* -.08
Block 2 .30 .19 .13 .14 .07 .21
Block 3 .01 .06 .04 .03 .01 .03
Block 4 .27 .33* .39* .29 .19 .38*
Block 5 .20 .29 .32* .23 .40* .38*
net 
score
.21 .29 .32* .24 .14 .31*
* p ≤ .05 (two-tailed)
** p ≤ .01 (two-tailed)
7.5.3. Discussion
The results of Experiment 3 suggest that the features of the IGT can also be integrated 
within the cover story of the TDF. As known from IGT studies (e.g., Fernie & Tunney, 2006; 
Turnbull et al., 2005; De Vries, Holland, & Witteman, 2008), there was an ascending learning 
curve reflecting the increasing preference for the advantageous alternatives albeit the absence 
of explicit information about the rules for gains and losses. This indicates that the main 
underlying learning process of making advantageous decisions by processing the feedback 
about previous outcomes seems to be measured by the TDF-IGT. 
7.6. General Discussion and Conclusion
The overarching question of the three studies was whether it is possible to base 
frequently used standard decision-making tasks on the common story line of the TDF, in a 
way that the TDF versions of the tasks measure the same underlying construct as the original 
tasks. Although, there were some differences in decision-making behavior when comparing 
the original task data with the data gathered using TDF versions, it can nevertheless be 
concluded that the same constructs were measured. The results show that in all tasks the main 
patterns that characterize the decision-making behavior of brain-healthy subjects in the 
original tasks could also be observed in the TDF versions. In the two tasks measuring 
decision-making behavior under risk conditions the subjects showed the typical pattern 
characterized by more frequent choices of the advantageous decision options and less frequent 
choices of the disadvantageous decision options (e.g., Brand, Fujiwara, et al., 2005; 
Schiebener et al., 2011; Sinz et al., 2008; Zamarian et al., 2008). In the additional Experiment 
3 it was also observed that the core of decision-making behavior under conditions of 
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ambiguity, as normally measured using the IGT, was also present in the TDF-IGT: 
Participants learned to avoid the disadvantageous options and instead chose the advantageous 
options (e.g., Bechara et al., 1996, 1997; Turnbull et al., 2005). Given that these patterns 
emerged, the observed differences in behavior do not weaken the main conclusion. These 
differences are probably due to the fact that the TDF story is more complex or due to 
differences in the user interface (e.g. style of probability presentation, style of feedback 
presentation). 
However, of course, these minor behavioral differences need to be regarded when 
interpreting decision-making behavior in TDF tasks in future studies and when testing the 
framework for clinical application. In the tasks measuring decision making under risk, it 
seems that the behavior of healthy subjects includes slightly more risk taking than in the 
original tasks (reflected by more disadvantageous decisions in the TDF-GDT and more 
gambles in the TDF-PAG task). In the task measuring decision making under ambiguity, it is 
possible that the course of the learning curve in the TDF-IGT slightly differs from the course 
in the IGT.
In summary, the results indicate that the cover story of the TDF is appropriate for 
setting up tasks to measure human decision-making behavior. In the future the framework 
therefore can be applied in experimental research with healthy participants and patient groups. 
Additionally, the TDF may also be tested with regard to its potential as a practical diagnostic 
tool. In this context the framework could be useful when aiming at investigating patients with 
more than one decision-making task. For example, neuropsychologists may aim at 
characterizing the reasons for a patient’s problems with decision making and whether the 
problems originate from impairments in specific domains, such as in feedback processing, 
finding advantageous long term strategies, or handling simple probabilities. Then variants of 
the TDF can be applied, each of which tapping specifically one of the demands, while the 
general scenario, in which the different tasks take place can be kept stable.
In experimental research the uncounted possibilities for modifying the TDF can also 
be useful, enabling researchers to systematically and flexibly vary certain attributes of the 
decision situation while keeping all other aspects stable. Thus, the framework allows 
investigating the cognitive and emotional mechanisms of decision making in interaction with 
controlled situational variations. Furthermore, the TDF can be applied to examine decision-
making behavior in patients with pathological gambling without the influence of explicit 
gambling cues. The prominent strengths of the TDF are as outlined in the aims of this work, 
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the (1) adaptability for different questionings, (2) the flexible cover story, (3) that is reality 
oriented, (4) is poor in typical gambling-cues, and as has been shown in the three studies, (5) 
is able to project the main features of standard neuropsychological gambling tasks.
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8. Summary of the studies’ main results
The three studies in this thesis provided new empirical data on specific theoretical and
methodological topics of the neuropsychological literature on decision making. Study 1
investigated the involvement of different executive subcomponents in decision making under 
risk conditions. The results pointed out that particularly subcomponents that seem to be
responsible for strategic management of behavior predict decision making. Basic situation 
processing components affect decision-making performance indirectly, mediated by the 
strategy managing functions. The executive component that is responsible for flexibly 
reacting to changing task requirements was not related to decision-making performance. 
Moreover, the results indicated that the subcomponents of executive functions are organized 
hierarchically and act in concert in directing the decision-making process. 
Study 2 investigated the role of explicit performance goals for decision making in a 
situation allowing high strategic control. It was found that explicit goals caused more 
advantageous decision making when comparing subjects with explicit goals to subject without 
explicit goals. This effect seemed to be caused by the goal setting rather than the goal-
monitoring process. Regarding the literature on goal setting, it appears reasonable that the 
process of goal setting triggers a more strategic and calculative cognitive approach toward the 
evaluation of the attributes of the decision-making situation. Therefore goal setting seems to
lead to more advantageous decisions from the beginning of the decision task. However, higher 
goals were related to more risky decisions and particularly very high, unrealistic goals were 
associated with less advantageous decision making.
In Study 3, the TDF, a new framework for decision-making tasks has been tested. In 
three Experiments the participants’ behavior in original standard task were compared with the 
behavior in TDF tasks. In these the main features of the original tasks have been projected to 
the story line of the TDF. The results showed that the behavior in the TDF versions was very 
similar to the behavior in the original tasks. The main patterns of behavior (e.g., preference 
for the saver alternatives in the GDT or a learning effect in the IGT) could also be observed in 
the TDF versions. Thus, it can be concluded that the TDF versions measure the same 
underlying constructs as the original tasks. 
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9. General Conclusion
The results of the three conducted studies have novel implications for theory as well as 
for research practice and clinical application. These implications do not only focus on the 
topic of decision making under risk conditions but also the question for the organization of 
executive subcomponents. In the following, the broader conclusions for our understanding of 
decision making and executive functions are discussed. Furthermore, outlooks to future 
research are provided, and possible limitations of the conclusions are explained. (Please note 
that detailed discussions of the specific results can be found in the discussion sections of the 
three studies.)
9.1. Decision making under risk
The first two studies described in this thesis were conducted with the aim to gather
empirical data about the mechanisms involved in decision making under risk. The main 
question was which subcomponents of the central executive system direct the decision-
making process. Additionally, the effects of explicit goals in a decision situation, which 
allowed increased strategic control, were investigated. Based on the new results of this thesis 
and on empirical data that has been reported in the literature (see 3.1.3 and Table 3), a revised 
version of the model by Brand and colleagues (2006) can be suggested. The new version that 
will be described in the following contains four central changes: (1) the involvement of 
situational conditions, (2) an enhanced description of the mainly operating and interacting
executive subcomponents, (3) the definition of three possible routes to the decision, and (4) a 
readjustment of the focus, concentrating on the active cognitive and emotional processes. In 
the following the four changes will be explained in detail. Thereafter, the model as a whole 
will be explained, in order to describe the steps that can be supposed to direct decision making 
under risk (for a graphical representation of the model please refer to Figure 18 on page 150).
(1) The first specification of the model concerns the involvement of situational 
conditions. In the original model (Brand et al., 2006), influence of the attributes of the 
decision situation on cognitive processes in decision making were assumed. These were 
mainly concentrated on the characteristics of the decision task itself, but not on other 
situational conditions. Recent studies demonstrated that additional information about the 
decision situation can affects decision-making performance in interaction with the cognitive 
abilities of the individual. As has been outlined before (see e.g., 3.1.3) supporting as well as 
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misleading information can interact with executive- and working memory functions in 
predicting decision-making performance (Schiebener et al., 2012; Schiebener, Wegmann, et 
al., under review). The results of Study 2 in this thesis additionally pointed out that explicit 
goals can affect decision-making performance and risk taking. It is suggested that when goals 
are realistic they trigger increased effort and efficiency in the cognitive processes that guide 
decision making. This idea is in line with the theory on goal setting (Locke & Latham, 2002), 
which assumes explicit goals to trigger enhanced execution of mechanisms that are directed 
by the central executive system and involved in the decision-making process. Given that the 
role of situational influences has been reported in the literature and in Study 2, situational 
conditions and influences are added to the model. It is now suggested that situational 
influences can affect the executive processes in decision making. The inclusion of situational 
conditions to the new model is also in line with the PTF (Finucane & Lees, 2005), which
assumes that characteristics of the task (such as the amount of strategic control it allows), 
characteristics of the decision maker (such as the individual level of executive abilities), and 
external influences (such as the presence of explicit goals) interact in determining the 
decision-making competence.
(2) The main aim of this thesis was to provide an enhanced description of the role of 
executive subcomponents in decision making under risk. In the original model it has been 
stated relatively generally that executive functions should be involved in strategy 
development. While the original model only suggested that executive functions are involved 
in the development and application of a decision-making strategy, it has now been identified 
which functions are involved and how they probably interact. Study 1 could show for the first 
time that not all subcomponents influence decision making to the same amount. The results 
suggest that the cognitive processes that precede and accompany decision making are directed 
by hierarchically organized executive components. Thus, the role of executive functions is 
more specifically described in the new version of the model. Furthermore, the definitions of 
the possible interactions between executive processes, decision strategy, and decision-making 
behavior are specified in more detail.
It is now suggested that the role of executive functions is ascribable to three 
components: working memory, situation processing functions, and strategy management 
functions. Working memory stands for the active maintenance of information that can 
originate from external resources (e.g., the information about the decision situation, involving 
options, gains and losses or additional information) as well as internal resources (e.g., 
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knowledge about probabilities retrieved from long-term memory). This information is 
processed in working memory and manipulated under the direction of the two executive 
components: situation processing and strategy management. These are suggested to operate 
on a hierarchically superior level compared to working memory. Situation processing directs 
attention on relevant information, inhibits processing of irrelevant information and codes 
information into the working memory buffers. Strategy management is allocated on the 
highest level of the suggested hierarchy. This component is thought to direct the usage of 
information about the decision situation as well as about feedback events. It is also 
responsible for planning and monitoring a current decision-making strategy. Furthermore, 
strategy management functions probably direct the activities of the situation processing 
functions by managing towards which information the attention needs to be directed or which 
information can be inhibited. The result of this interaction of the subcomponents can be an 
action plan for decision-making behavior: A decision strategy, for which the behavioral steps 
are represented in working memory. The decision-making strategy can give direction to the
situation processing component because the character of the strategy can require specific 
processes guided by situation processing. These may involve focusing attention on specific 
parts of the decision task, inhibiting irrelevant information, and inhibiting inappropriate 
behaviors. For example, attention is focused on alternatives that have been chosen for the first 
decisions. Inhibition may be required to ignore the high possible rewards of very risky 
alternatives not involved in the planned strategy. Moreover, inhibition should also be 
important to inhibit impulsive deviations from the strategy (regarding the role of impulsivity
as a personality facet refer also to Bayard, Raffard, et al., 2011).
The results of Study 1 yielded the support for these differential roles of situation 
processing and strategy management. The data supported the idea that the two functions are 
distinguishable executive subcomponents. Nevertheless, the data also supported the 
assumption that the two functions interacted in directing decision making. They were closely 
related, and situation processing did not directly affect decision-making performance, but 
mediated by strategy management. These adaptions in the revised model are also in 
accordance with the results of previous studies pointing out the crucial role of executive 
functions in decision making under risk. This has especially been found when the decision 
situation allowed for development, monitoring, and revision of calculative long-term 
strategies (e.g., Brand, Heinze, et al., 2008; Brand, Fujiwara, et al., 2005). Thus, it is 
reasonable to assume that the strategy management function fulfills a directive role in 
decision making.
General Conclusion 148
(3) The third specification in the new model is the definition of three possible routes to 
the decision, instead of two possible routes as described in the original model. The original 
model suggested a cognitive route and an emotional route. Both are still represented in the 
new version of the model. In this, the cognitive route starts in working memory, with the 
representation of information from internal and external resources. It continues with situation 
processing and strategy management to the decision strategy. The decision strategy and the 
actual state of its execution in behavior are represented in working memory, which thereby 
provides the link between the cognitive representation of the strategy and its realization in 
behavior (as suggested in theoretical models of working memory, e.g., Baddeley & Hitch, 
1974; Baddeley, 2003). In the visualization (Figure 18) this route is represented by the arrows 
between the executive components, leading to the decision strategy, and then entering 
working memory and going on towards the decision. The emotional route integrates the 
emotional signals from the body periphery. The emotional signals can be used to base the next 
decision on intuitive hunches and guesses, without cognitive processes involved. 
Additionally, emotional feedback processing can also support the cognitive processes because 
the emotions can receive a representation in working memory. In other words, a person 
should be able to realize his/her emotions (e.g., negative emotion after a loss) and can 
therefore consciously revise the actual decision-making strategy. The cognitive and the 
emotional route have been adopted from the original model given that studies have found 
support for the role of both (see e.g., 3.1.2, 3.1.3, Study 1, and Brand, Grabenhorst, et al., 
2007; Labudda et al., 2007; Starcke et al., 2011).
In addition to these two routes, a third route is suggested. This leads directly from 
working memory to decision making, without the involvement of higher level executive 
processes and the development of a decision-making strategy. By adding this route it is taken 
into account that a person does not necessarily have to plan and apply a decision-making 
strategy. It is also possible to make decisions without an explicit strategy (as developed on the 
cognitive route) and without being guided by emotional signals of the body periphery that 
have been learned from the feedback of previous trials (as suggested on the emotional 
feedback route). On a theoretical level, it is reasonable to assume the third route because it 
should be possible to make decisions without consciously developing a strategy before. This 
assumption is also in line with the finding that some individuals make decisions under risk 
without performing calculative operations that would lead to an explicit strategy (Brand, 
Heinze, et al., 2008). Additionally, it is not necessary for making decisions that the executive 
control functions that are required to develop a strategy are intact. It is also possible to make 
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decisions with very reduced or impaired executive control functions as has been demonstrated 
in studies with patient groups (e.g., Brand, Fujiwara, et al., 2005; Brand, Labudda, et al., 
2004; Delazer et al., 2007; Euteneuer et al., 2009; Sinz et al., 2008). 
(4) Additionally, the focus of the model is readjusted. The new model more clearly 
concentrates on to internal processes that can be called active. These are active processes of 
working memory and executive control and of emotional reactions. In the original model the 
passive component “long-term memory” had been involved because it had been assumed that 
information from long-term memory can be retrieved to support strategy development. For 
example, such information might be knowledge about probabilities, numbers, or experiences 
with other decision situations. Although, studies have so far not investigated the role of long-
term memory for decision making under risk it is reasonable that such knowledge from long-
term is involved in decision making. However, long-term memory was removed from the 
model because it is regarded as a passive memory system (e.g., Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968; 
Baddeley, 2003) and therefore cannot be regarded as an active component in the decision-
making process. Therefore, the role of long-term memory is only implicitly addressed in the 
new version of the model by assuming that working memory not only holds representations of 
information from external resources (e.g., information about decision options) but also 
retrieves and maintains information from internal resources (e.g., from long-term memory).
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Figure 18. The proposed revised version of Brand’s model of decision making under risk (Brand et al., 2006).
The main difference in comparison to the original model is the description of interactions between different 
executive functions, which are supposed to direct the decision-making process. Additionally, situational 
conditions and influences such as additional information or explicit goals are suggested to affect the 
neurocognitive processes in decision making.
After these changes, the process of decision making is in the new version of the model 
compiled as visualized in Figure 18. In the first step, information about the decision situation 
is perceived and obtains a representation in working memory. This can include features of the 
decision task, as well as situational conditions and additional influences. This external 
information can be combined with information from internal resources, including general 
reasoning strategies, knowledge about probabilities, and numbers or mathematical operations. 
From this point on, there are two possible routes to the decision. The simplest route is the 
route that leads directly to a decision without developing a strategy (the decision maker 
simply decides without extensive cognitive operations or calculative strategies). On the other 
possible route cognitive operations, guided by subcomponents of executive functions, lead 
towards a decision strategy. In the situation processing component attention control is 
engaged to direct the attention on the relevant information of the decision situation, which is 
coded and maintained in working memory (e.g., available decision options, or probability 
information), while access of irrelevant information is inhibited (e.g., environmental 
information that do not contribute to the understanding of the decision task). Based on these 
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preparations by the basic situation processing functions, higher level strategy management 
can operate. This is responsible for planning a first decision-making strategy. For example, a 
decision maker may plan to start with medium risk in the first decision and also plan to see 
whether this will lead to success. The planed decision strategy can retroactively influence the 
situation processing operations (e.g., attention is directed to moderately risky alternatives). A 
representation of the strategy is maintained in working memory together with the relevant 
information for applying the strategy (e.g., a representation of the alternative that is supposed 
to be chosen first). Thereby, the working memory representation of the current state of the 
strategy leads to the first decision. At this point inhibition may be required for preventing
interference by irrelevant information as well as for inhibiting inaccurate behavior, such as an 
unplanned decision for a possibly short termly rewarding, but highly risky options (e.g., in 
order to reach an unrealistically high goal quickly). It has to be kept in mind that all these 
processes involved in strategy development and application can also be influenced by 
particular situational conditions. For example, the calculation of probabilities or the 
evaluation of risks may be affected by supporting or misleading information from external 
resources. Furthermore, higher cognitive effort, involving increased executive control in 
strategy development, may be triggered by explicit goals. In case of intact behavioral control 
the first decision is made according to the developed strategy. If there is feedback about the 
decision’s outcome, this can then be processed cognitively and/or emotionally. On the 
cognitive route the feedback information receives a representation in working memory. 
Again, it is possible to directly make a new decision without involving higher cognitive 
control for strategy management. Moreover, the two executive subcomponents can be 
incorporated to control cognitive processing of the feedback. In this case, strategy 
management operations, particularly monitoring functions, direct the operation of the 
situation processing component. This focusses attention on the strategy-relevant information 
(e.g., the height of the gain or loss and the resulting new money balance). Based on this 
information, strategy management functions realize monitoring of the success of the currently 
applied decision-making strategy. When evaluating the success of the strategy, situational
information may be taken into account (e.g., for verifying the accuracy of supporting 
information). Monitoring of the feedback may result in different processes: continuing with 
the current strategy, developing a plan for further validation of the current strategy, or in 
planning the application of a revised/new strategy.
Finally, the emotional processing of feedback can also affect decision-making 
behavior. On the emotional route, reward or punishment is experienced. This experience 
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initiates the creation of somatic markers that can enact anticipations of emotional 
consequences of future decisions (see also chapter 3.1.2 and further literature, e.g., Bechara, 
2011a; A. R. Damasio, 1994). Based on this emotional function the next decision may be 
made, also without involving cognitive operations. However, the cognitive and the emotional 
route are supposed to interact, whilst emotional experiences can support reasoning strategies 
as well as planning and monitoring of decision-making strategies (as also signified in the 
model of decision making under ambiguity; Bechara et al., 1997).
The results of this thesis do not only have theoretical implications for the model of 
decision making under risk conditions but can also be interpreted in relation to the PTF
(Finucane & Lees, 2005) as well as in relation to dual process theories (J. S. B. T. Evans, 
2003; Kahneman, 2003). Referring to the structure of the PTF, the role of specific person 
characteristics for decision-making competence was investigated in Study 1, the role of a 
potentially relevant context characteristic was investigated in Study 2, and variations in task 
characteristics were realized in Study 3. Particularly, the first two studies found support for 
the role of individual differences and context characteristics for decision making. However, 
these results and the findings reported in the literature (see chapter 3.1) indicate that there is 
still room for data based specifications in the PTF. Although the framework has intentionally 
been formulated relatively generally, it seems that it would be structured more systematically 
when also regarding specifications as they have been made in the model of decision making 
under risk. First, as already mentioned in the theoretical background (see chapter 3.1.1), the 
PTF does not explicitly incorporate a theoretical model of cognitive processing and 
behavioral control in the person characteristics section. The results of Study 1 and other 
findings (see chapter 3.1.3) suggest that individual differences in neurocognitive functions
could be involved as important examples of person characteristics. Particularly working 
memory and subcomponents of executive processing seem to be systematically involved in 
decision making. Given that this seems to apply especially in decisions under risk conditions
but to a lesser degree in decisions under ambiguity (see 3.1 and Starcke et al., 2011; Turnbull 
et al., 2005) the PTF may also profit from referring to the role of different types of decision 
situations in its task characteristics section. Second, the PTF may also refer to the role of 
explicit goals on decision making in the context characteristics section. The results of Study 1 
and other studies (Hassin et al., 2009; D. Knight et al., 2001; Schiebener et al., 2012)
supported the idea that goals can affect decision-making performance. It appears reasonable 
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that goals are substantially involved in decision making in the laboratory as well as in 
everyday life. Therefore goals should be regarded in a general framework for predicting 
decision-making competence.
Future studies may further investigate the assumptions in the PTF that individual 
differences in person characteristics and variations in situational conditions determine 
decision-making performance in interaction. Thanks to several neuropsychological studies 
(see chapter 3.1 and Study 1) fundamental abilities for making advantageous decisions under 
ambiguity and risk have been described. In contrast, general psychological studies have often 
observed effects of situational influences on decision making. However, little is known about 
the potentially moderating effect basic neuropsychological functions on the influences 
situational variations can have on decision making (e.g., effects of anchors, framing, task 
complexity, or decision support; see e.g., Appelt et al., 2011; Englich et al., 2006; Schiebener 
et al., 2012; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).
The results of this thesis and the specifications in the model of decisions under risk 
conditions may also help to answer the question on the role of intuitive System 1 and 
cognitive System 2 processes in decision making (J. S. B. T. Evans, 2003; Kahneman, 2003). 
In particular mainly the role of System 2 associated functions for decision making under risk 
was investigated in this thesis. The results of Study 1 clear assign a role of System 2 
processing to advantageous decision making under risk conditions. The study showed that 
higher level executive control functions are fundamentally involved in this type of decisions.
This can be interpreted as an indicator for controlled and arduous cognitive processing in 
decision making. Consequently, the results are in line with previous findings suggesting
decision making under risk to tap to a considerable extend into System 2 processing (Brand, 
Heinze, et al., 2008; Brand, Laier, et al., 2009; Starcke et al., 2011).
Principally, the results of Study 2 are also in line with this idea. It may be possible that 
goals positively affected decision-making performance in general, because they triggered 
increased inclusion of cognitively demanding System 2 processes into the development of a 
decision-making strategy. In future studies, it would be interesting to investigate the effect of 
goals on the choice of intuitive vs. cognitively controlled decision-making strategies. It may 
be thinkable that persons who normally tend to rely on intuitive decision-making strategies 
switch to calculative strategy development, if they have an explicit performance goal. In other 
words, it would be interesting to work out whether explicit goals affect the choice of one of 
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the routes as they are suggested in the revised model of decision making under risk 
conditions. 
Beside the theoretical implications, these new insights into the decision-making 
process have implications for clinical application and for research on decision making. The 
finding of Study 1, that lower level executive functions affect decision-making mediated by 
higher, strategy managing functions, indicates that advantageous decision making can rely on 
the integrity of more than one executive subcomponent. Therefore, impairments in decision 
making as they have been reported for patient populations can probably result from defects in 
basal attention/inhibition and coding functions as well as from defects in higher planning and 
monitoring functions. Likewise, one mechanism that might explain disadvantageous behavior 
may be dysfunctional goal-handling. This implies handling the conflict between the desire to 
attain ambitious goals and the necessity to decide conservatively in order to be sure not to lose 
too much stake. The involvement of conflict management in decision making under risk has 
also been suggested by Labudda and colleagues (2008). They reported activations in the 
anterior cingulate cortex during decisions involving conflicts between possible high gains
with low winning probabilities and possible low gains with high winning probabilities 
(Labudda et al., 2008). 
The new findings of this thesis should be attended in the development of therapy 
programs and cognitive training programs for patients with problems in decision making. 
General cognitive training programs such as NEUROvitalis (Baller, Kalbe, Kaesberg, & 
Kessler, 2010) already imply executive functioning trainings. If suchlike trainings would also 
aim toward specific practices on decision-making competence, these may clearly address 
lower and higher level executive functions and their interaction. Additionally, practices for 
handling situational conditions may be taken into account. For example, these practices may 
educate against misjudgments of probabilities (as for e.g. reported in Schiebener et al., 2012)
or disadvantageous handling of goals (Study 2).
The results of Study 3 have primarily practical implications for decision-making 
research. The newly developed framework for decision-making tasks, the TDF, may fill a 
methodological gap in the measurement of decision-making competence. The new framework 
establishes the opportunity to measure decision making in a more application oriented 
scenario, allowing to manipulate task characteristics pointedly (e.g. the amount of ambiguity 
General Conclusion 155
or the task’s complexity) while keeping other conditions stable. Thus, the TDF should help to 
approach further theoretical advances, for example additional specifications of the model of 
decision making under risk. Moreover, it appears recommendable to validate the TDF as a 
diagnostic tool, in order to detect problems with decision making in individuals with 
neurological or psychiatric diseases. A rather secondary implication of Study 3 is of 
theoretical nature. The model of decision making under risk implicitly assumes that decision-
making behavior remains stable in different scenarios, as long as the core information about 
the decision situation stay the same (involving the number of alternatives, probabilities and 
heights of gains and losses, as well as additional information, such as supporting or 
misleading information). The results of Study 3 support this assumption. The main patterns of 
decision-making behavior were very similar in the original tasks and their TDF versions, 
which shared the main situational information.
The current findings may inspire future research on decision making. Primarily, more 
empirical testing of the model of decision making is needed, in order to attain specifications 
in further domains. In particular studies, which investigate the role of individual differences in 
cognitive functions for the choice of decision-making strategies are rare. Several strategies are 
known to be applied in decisions under risk, such as probability matching, maximization, 
gamblers fallacy, or win-stay-loose shift (see e.g., Gal & Baron, 1996; Nowak & Sigmund, 
1993; P. Rogers, 1998; West & Stanovich, 2003). However, whether and how neurocognitive 
mechanisms predict strategy usage is relatively unclear. Future studies may investigate 
executive functions and situational conditions, as well as their interactions, as possible 
predictors of strategy choice and strategy adaption. 
Furthermore, studies on the exact role of working-memory are rare. Although 
relationships between working memory and performance in decisions under risk have already 
been reported (Schiebener, Wegmann, et al., in press; Starcke et al., 2011), the interaction 
between working memory capacity, buffering functions and the information-manipulating 
central executive functions need further attention in order to extent the description of the 
neurocognitive processes of decision making.
Further research is also required concerning the effects of goal mechanisms on 
decision-making performance. Although, the findings in Study 2 provided reasonable 
conclusions that lead to theoretical progress, data on this topic remains scarce. It may be 
investigated in the future, whether the effect of goal setting is moderated by executive 
functions and whether goals affect the choice of specific decision-making strategies. This 
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would theoretically be in line with the finding in Study 2, which has shown that it should be 
the cognitive process of goal setting, which triggers the internal mechanisms that are 
responsible for the improvement of decision-making performance.
Besides the research that is required to reach further specifications of the model, 
research is required to test whether there are other domains that are systematically involved in 
decision making under risk. Particularly, as described in the literature overview (3.1.3) some 
specific cognitive processes have been found to be associated with decision making 
performance (e.g., logical thinking, handling of simple probabilities, or the tendency toward 
calculative processing; Brand, Heinze, et al., 2008; Brand, Laier, et al., 2009; Schiebener et 
al., 2011). Furthermore, associations with scattered personality facets have been reported 
(e.g., subcomponents of impulsivity or perfectionisms; Bayard, Raffard, et al., 2011; Brand & 
Altstötter-Gleich, 2008). However, it may be possible that such domains rather moderate the 
relationship between executive functions and decision making instead of being main 
predictors of decision making (as reported by Brand, Laier, et al., 2009; Schiebener et al., 
2011).
Upcoming research should also profit from the development and evaluation of the 
TDF. This can be applied in several contexts, involving general judgment and decision-
making research with healthy individuals, as well as research with patient populations. 
Particularly, two topics may be investigated systematically with the TDF in future studies.
The first topic is the level of ambiguity. As outlined previously (3.4), there are several studies 
which have reported differential amounts of cognitive and emotional processing involved in 
decisions under risk versus decisions under ambiguity (Brand, Grabenhorst, et al., 2007; 
Brand, Recknor, et al., 2007; Drucaroff et al., 2011; Y.-T. Kim et al., 2011). Other studies 
found impairments in patient populations in one type of decision situation, but not in the other 
(Bayard, Abril, et al., 2011; Bayard et al., 2010; Rossi et al., 2010). The competencies in 
decisions under risk and under ambiguity were often investigated with tasks that differed in 
more attributes than only the amount of ambiguity, which undermines the theoretical 
conclusions (see 3.4 and Introduction of Study 3). With the TDF the level of ambiguity could 
be varied by systematically providing and withholding explicit information about possible 
gains, losses, and their probabilities, while holding the general scenario, the number of 
options, and the number of decision trials stable. The second topic is the level of situational 
complexity. The TDF might be used to manipulate the number of decision options in 
decisions under risk and under ambiguity. By this means the cognitive and emotional 
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processes, as well as strategy choice in situations of varying complexity could be investigated. 
While studies have already shown that participants more often applied heuristic, non-
compensatory strategies when the situation’s complexity was increased (Payne, 1976), the 
neurocognitive mechanisms involved in the ability to make advantageous decisions in very 
complex situations are still relatively unclear. In future research, it may be examined which 
neuropsychological processes realize the cognitive strategies that reduce the complexity, or 
whether the reliance on intuitive hunches and guesses may increases with more decision 
options.
Another important topic of future research may be real world decision making. So far, 
this has widely been neglected in judgment and decision-making research. While several 
studies, such as those reported in this thesis, have investigated the ability to make 
advantageous decisions in laboratory tasks and have been searching for predictors of task 
performance, the reports on associations with decision-making performance in real life have 
rather anecdotic character (e.g., in Bechara et al., 1994; Eslinger & Damasio, 1985). Despite 
the methodological problems that would probably undermine research on this topic, measures 
of real world decision-making performance should be developed and evaluated, in order to 
test the relationships between neurocognitive performance measures, decision making in the 
laboratory and decision making in real life.
9.2. Executive functions
Although, investigating the structure of executive functions was not the main aim of 
this thesis, the results of Study 1 have implications for the literature on the composition of the 
central executive system. As explained in detail in the theory section (3.2.2), the previous 
literature suggests that a hierarchical organization of the subcomponents may be reasonable
(Miyake & Friedman, 2012; Smith & Jonides, 1999). The results of Study 1 support this 
assumption. Three latent dimensions were found in the data: Lower level situation processing 
functions, higher level task management functions (or “flexibility”), and strategy management 
functions. This finding is not only in line with the already discussed arrangements of 
subcomponents (suggested by Smith and Jonides (1999) or Miyake and colleagues (2000)) 
but is also in line with other theoretically supposed arrangements of subcomponents. For 
example Borkowsky and Burke (1996) suggested task analysis, strategy control, and strategy 
monitoring as executive components. Elliott (2003) suggested solving novel problems, 
modifying behavior in accordance with new information, generating strategies, and 
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sequencing complex actions as executive subcomponents. These arrangements are 
comparable to those found in Study 1, given that they also suggest situational processing, 
handling of strategies, and flexibility as main contributors to cognitive and behavioral control. 
It should be noticed that the results of this thesis do not constitute another suggestion for a 
new definition of subcomponents. The subcomponent model suggested here should rather be 
regarded as an integrative approach, in which established theories of executive components 
are brought into line. The resulting model was tested with approved methods and in a 
situation, in which the functions were active and worked together: namely in directing 
decision-making behavior. In this situation, the components were found to act in concert, as 
had been expected on the theoretical level. Thus, there is theoretical and empirical support for 
this arrangement of subcomponents.
In future studies, the hierarchical interaction of the three components should be tested 
in samples of healthy participants and patients. Particularly, the interaction of the three 
components may be examined in patients, who are selectively impaired in one of the
subcomponents. This may help to understand how the three functions differentially determine 
goal-directed behavior and thereby also determine the symptoms of the dysexecutive 
syndrome and the strategy application disorder (e.g., Burgess, 2000). 
9.3. Limitations
Beyond the limitations that have been mentioned in the discussion sections of the three 
studies, there are two further aspects that may limit the conclusions that can be drawn from 
the results of the current thesis. First, all results are based on data from brain-healthy 
participants, who reported to have no psychiatric disorders. Therefore, the conclusions for 
patient populations are restricted. The role of different executive subcomponents and explicit 
goals would need to be tested in patient groups in order to test the validity of the conclusions 
for these groups. Given that only healthy participants attended the TDF study, the TDF should 
be carefully tested with patients in order to evaluate its value as a diagnostic tool. Second, the 
findings that have inspired the specification of the model are only based on one measure of 
decision making under risk, the GDT. Although, the task is a frequently used measure of 
strategic decision making under risk, it would be desirable to replicate the results in other 
decision-making paradigms.
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10. The end
Finally, this thesis provides the prerequisite to give an answer to the introductory
question that was raised at the beginning of this thesis. Which abilities does the consultant
need to make an advantageous decision between the two routes for driving to the meeting at a 
commercial enterprise? One route would result in saving a lot of time in combination with a 
high financial gain, but the risk for traffic jam is high on this route. The other route is a 
detour. This will result in saving less time and achieving a lower financial gain, while the risk 
for traffic jam is lower. The results of the studies indicate that the consultant would need to 
focus attention on the relevant information, including the driving times, the probabilities for 
traffic jams, and their magnitudes as well as personal goals for the outcomes of this additional 
occupation. This information needs to be coded into a working memory representation 
allowing an estimation of the probabilities for their occurrence. If the consultant has an 
explicit goal, he/she may even increase the cognitive effort and exactly calculate the 
probabilities and account them with the possible resulting salaries. May be the consultant is 
experienced with this or comparable decision problems (he/she might not be in this trouble for 
the first time). In this case, the memories about the experiences could be chosen for recall in 
order to be maintained in working memory. The previously used decision strategy can then be 
evaluated and monitored with regard to its reasonability and the actual consequences that have 
followed the last times (e.g., traffic jams, monetary losses). This memory and the probability 
estimation may be judged with regard to the explicit goal for the attained financial outcome. 
Integrating this information should result in planning a revised strategy for the upcoming 
decision. If all these processes are completed successfully and if the goal is realistic and not 
too high, the consultant may plan to make the safer and most probably more advantageous 
decision: to take the detour which promises a positive monetary outcome together with a high 
probability to lose not too much time. 
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